Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS



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Prepared by the
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PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

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The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate are, with the permission of their copyright owners, sometimes used verbatim or in modified form and are designated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified."

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(Uncataloged and Unclassified Materials)

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Nr East	Near East Section
P&GP RR	Periodical and Government Publication Reading Room
Sci RR	Science Reading Room
Slav Rm	Slavic Room

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I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A. BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

426
Ball, George W. THE DISCIPLINE OF POWER; ESSENTIALS OF A MODERN WORLD STRUCTURE. London, New York, Bodley Head, 1968. 363 p.
D843. B25 1968b

Contents. --The need for reassessment. --The larger implications of the changed world power structure. --The failure of the European system. --The drive for unity. --European unity and the Atlantic partnership. --The special problem of the United Kingdom. --The disadvantages of the special relationship. --The political consequences of General de Gaulle. --Germany--the heart of the problem. --The Far East in the equation of global power. --The unfinished business of nuclear management. --The shape of North-South relationships. --Dismantling the Iron Curtain. --From Versailles to Vietnam. --A summing up. --Bibliography.

Asserts the need for a modification of the world power structure to promote a more rational and just world order. In recent years the United States has shouldered a disproportionate share of the burden of spreading the ideals of the free world. Existing global relationships are closely examined to see how the system has failed and to gain insights into the creation of a more equitable power framework. The new framework would ideally include a united Western Europe working in concert with the United States to create "a safer and more decent world."

427
Bergner, Dieter, and Walter Jopke. [THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL CLASS STRUGGLE BETWEEN SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM TODAY] Theoretische Probleme des ideologischen Klassenkampfes zwischen Sozialismus und Kapitalismus in der Gegenwart. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, v. 16, no. 12, 1968: 1413-1440.
B3. D4, v. 16

The more hopeless imperialist prospects for liquidation of socialism through military means grow, the more politically significant becomes the ideological struggle between the two antagonistic systems. The social consequences of the scientific and technical revolution in each system have greatly complicated that struggle--a fact that can fully be taken into account in complex Socialist prognoses about society but not in bourgeois ones, for these inadvertedly are fragmented and fall into ever-growing conflict with objective social laws. This is so due to the inevitably anachronistic character of the imperialist social and ruling system, which is irreconcilable with mankind's progress to end exploitation of man by man and to make man a truly free master of his destiny. The containment policy after World War II assumed that the Soviet Union's and other Socialist countries' postwar economic weakness would greatly "widen the latitude" for unfolding the imperialist struggle against socialism. On similarly false precepts later rested the "roll-back" strategy and now the American global strategy and the West Germany's "new" Eastern policy. However, the growing realization by imperialist ideologists of the complex character of the struggle against socialism now expresses itself in a multitude of theories and prognoses--many contradictory to each other, but all designed to weaken Socialist ideology. Most of them reject laissez-faire and speak about "planned" or "regulated" capitalism instead--about the "growth society," "the changing society" and "the security of the future." Some, like Herman Kahn, F. J. Strauss, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, propose a "differentiated system" of fighting socialism. The theories of "decentralization," "liberalization," and "depolitization" also belong to this new arsenal. Some imperialist theoreticians "verbally accept Marxism" but attack genuine socialism for its alleged distortion of Marx' original intentions. "The Third Way" school, which includes the revisionists, criticizes "imperialism as well as socialism" from the quite obsolete bourgeois standpoint. Refined imperialist ideological methods to fight socialism call for a concerted effort on the part of Marxists to expose the intellectual frailty of each such doctrine.

428
Brock, Lothar. [RENAISSANCE OF THE POLICY OF NATION-STATE INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] Die Renaissance nationalstaatlicher Interessenpolitik in den internationalen Beziehungen. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Oct. 25, 1968: 727-734.
D839. E86, v. 23.

Sees in the contemporary revival of nationalism the failure of the international organization and an inability of simplistic doctrines for supranational cooperation to satisfactorily answer the problems that are arising from a new power structure in the world. The revival exposed, on one hand, the discrepancy between a superpower's military might and its limited leeway for political options and, on the other, the conflict between the principle of equal states cooperating together in supranational structure and a superpower's leadership in such a structure.

429
Converse, Elizabeth. THE WAR OF ALL AGAINST ALL: A REVIEW OF THE JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1957-1968. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 12, Dec. 1968: 471-532. JX1901. J6, v. 12

Reports on a critical survey of the major articles in the first twelve volumes of the Journal. A control paradigm is used as a conceptual organizing device for highly diverse approaches to social conflict originating in the social and behavioral sciences. Six phenomenological areas are examined: international war, international systems, international bargaining, national decision-making, conflict within and between, and third parties. Alternating sections deal with six central and difficult concepts in the study of conflict: violence,

power, utility, rationality, consensus, and guilt. A number of gaps are noted in the material: historical treatments of past wars, a sociology of war, and studies of international trade in relation to international conflict. "Psychological" and "rational" models of decision-making have not yet been adequately reconciled. Consensus within social groupings, both as a condition and as a process, deserves more careful attention because it involves the "withinness" and be "betweenness" of conflict. Tentative suggestions are made about a number of other aspects of this complex field of study. (Abstract supplied)

430
Das, Swadesh R. INCENTIVE BEHIND CZECH REVOLT. Radical humanist, v. 32, Sept. 8, 1968: 341-342.
DS401.R27, v. 32

The maverick liberalization of Communist thought that resulted in the Czechoslovak revolt can be regarded as a consequence of Tito's 20-year-old reforms in Yugoslavia, which were enacted not by rewriting Marxist text but by putting new measures into practice. The result was a society of more conscious workers, whose demands eventually necessitated a revision of the constitution of the Yugoslav Communist League. The rationale behind Yugoslavia's renunciation of the Soviet type of communism was communicated to Czechoslovakia through the mutual economic entente that is developing between the two countries. Their economic programs contain concepts in opposition to Comecon, "the network of bilateral trading arrangements built up by Moscow in the postwar years." The philosophy behind this system, as well as the liberalized social thought, contains elements of M. N. Roy's principle of "New Humanism." It is not known whether Tito formally embraces the philosophy, although he has proved its value as a social system.

431
Democritus. RED IMPERIALISM. Radical humanist, v. 32, Sept. 22, 1968: 355, 358.
DS401.R27, v. 32

All three experiments in communism--the Russian, Chinese and Yugoslav--disappointed and disillusioned the world's intellectuals. While each was different, all evolved contradictions in the Communist world and led to rivalry, quarrels, and attempts of one Communist country to dominate another. This was not what Marx expected; he believed that the elimination of economic exploitation would eliminate contradictions. Such contradictions result from individual interpretations of Marxism by each Communist Party leader, whereas the Marxist approach to the problems of mankind was mechanical and to a great extent fatalistic. Thus the communism of the invaders of Czechoslovakia, instead of being a liberating philosophy, became completely imperialistic, and the invaders buried Marxism under power politics. This approach forced India and Egypt not to protest against the invasion, since to alienate the Soviet Union was against their national interests. Power politics destroy men's personalities because power concentrated in the hands of one man or a few parliamentarians does not fulfill its original task, which is to serve mankind. Therefore power must be decentralized and reoriented to humanism, to satisfy the people's desire for freedom and free development. That is the only way in which the destruction of sovereign nation-states by imperialist interventions can be prevented.

432
Fink, Clinton F. SOME CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CONFLICT. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 12, Dec. 1968: 412-462.
JX1901.J6, v. 12
References: p. 456-460.

Part I argues for a generalist approach to the study of social conflict. A general theory need not overlook facts or principles which are crucial to special theories of conflict, and is not inconsistent with a middle-range approach. Furthermore, an adequate general classification is needed for developing an adequate set of special theories. Since competing general theories already influence specialized studies, they must be subjected to explicit critical analysis along with the special theories. Conceptual and terminological confusions in the conflict literature can best be dealt with in the context of a general theory of conflict. Part II examines the ambiguity of the term "social conflict." Broader and narrower conceptions are distinguished according to the various forms of psychological antagonism and overt struggle that they include or exclude. Shifting bases for distinguishing conflict from competition illustrate the multidimensional complexity of the problem. In view of the existing verbal tangle, the development of a general theory of conflict can best be pursued if we begin by defining it as a theory of antagonistic social relations in general. (Abstract supplied)

433
Grass, Günter. THE LESSONS OF PRAGUE. Survey, no. 69, Oct. 1968: 3-6.
DK1.S549, 1968

Text of a speech delivered at a meeting of writers in Basel, which was organized after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Instead of trying to understand the effort of the Czechoslovak reformers and adopt their program as their own cause, the Western revolutionary Left and student protesters criticized the endeavor as inadequate and unattractive. The Western students took Che Guevara as a model, developed no program, and debased their protests by uncomprehensible jargon so that they provoked the French and German radical Right into action. The success of the Western conservatives encouraged the Soviet Stalinists to strike in Czechoslovakia. The main reason for this situation was a difference in goals. The Czechs demanded liberation from the system and tolerance for opposing views, whereas the Western students rejected tolerance and declared liberalism to be an archenemy of revolution. The former acted soberly and without sentimentality, the latter chose revolutionary theatrics. For not learning this lesson, the Western students are guilty of what happened in Prague and will have to face up to the charge. They share the guilt with Western intellectuals who, instead of criticizing them, tried to participate in their pseudorevolutionary movement. The Czechs, with their "democratic socialism," came halfway to meet the Western social democratic parties, but these parties failed to meet them. After the catastrophic failure of the Marxist doctrine in the Socialist states, Czech socialism has become a necessity, and the Western Socialist democrats should cooperate to develop a "socialism of the seventies which seeks high-level participation and joint responsibility in controlling the exercise of power and the means of production." A reform program could put an end to the East-West power struggle and give some meaning to the present empty concept of coexistence.

434
Gross, Leonard. MISTER EUROPE AT EIGHTY. Look, v. 32, Nov. 26, 1968: 63. illus.
AP2. L79, v. 32

Briefly examines Jean Monnet's ideas concerning the United States, Europe, and peace. Monnet maintains that Europe must unite to deal as an equal with the United States and to join this country in confronting the Communist world. He concludes that since necessity forces unity, the need to develop a competitive production entity to stave off American economic domination will lead to eventual European political unification.

435
Hedri, A. [AGGRESSION AS A SOCIOPSYCHIATRIC PROBLEM] Aggression als sozialpsychiatrisches Problem. Praxis der Familienberatung, no. 4, 1968: 487-489. P&GP RR
Supplement to Wege zum Menschen; Monatsschrift für Arzt und Seelsorger, Erzieher, Psychologen und soziale Berufe, v. 20, Dec. 1968.
BV4000. W4, v. 20

Inquires into the "influence of human intraspecific aggression in today's society and culture." Hedri describes, among other things, "a process, which in authoritarian societies leads to genocide."

436
Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. COLD WAR OPERATIONS: THE POLITICS OF COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION. PTS. II AND 12. Naval War College review, v. 21, Nov. 1968: 57-68; Dec.: 16-26.
P&GP RR

Assessment of the present position of worldwide communism. Part II traces the history of Communist China in the sixties and summarizes the status of the Communist Party in 16 Asian countries, Australia, and New Zealand. Kirkpatrick includes a comparative chart of these parties. Part 12 examines the fragmentation of the international Communist movement, focusing upon Sino-Soviet rivalry in party affairs. The Communist dilemma is attributed to a lack of consensus in the interpretation of Marxism--no two theories are alike, and none is identical to that of Marx. Although Kirkpatrick asserts that the intraparty struggle within the Communist countries is greater than their fight against the United States, he warns that the Communist threat to the free world has not disappeared and maintains that America must help other countries retain independent control of their governments.

437
Liebig, Gerhard. ["POOR" NATIONS AGAINST THE "RICH" ONES--A WRONG SETTING OF ISSUES:] "Arme" gegen "reiche" Völker--eine falsche Frontenstellung! Einheit, v. 23, no. 8, 1968: 1028-1041.
HX6. E4, v. 23

A number of new theories advanced by people of diverse political orientations--e.g., Mao Tse-tung, Robert S. McNamara, Herbert Marcuse, and Gunnar Myrdal; bourgeois anarchist students; and extreme nationalists in the Third World--deny the Marxist truth that the most fundamental characteristic of today's world is "class contradiction between socialism and capitalism." Instead they emphasize the economic, national, geopolitical, and emotional differences between "poor" and "rich" countries, the world's north and south, or "the world's city" and its "village." There is an enormous economic cleft between industrial nations and the Third World, but for bridging that abyss only socialism is qualified, regardless of differences between "poor" and "rich" and the like. All historical and statistical evidence proves colonialism, capitalism, and imperialism responsible for the creation and present growth of that chasm. Today's preoccupation of bourgeois circles with the Third World is motivated solely by capitalist and imperialist interests, especially U. S. global strategy. In their relations with peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Socialist states consider such peoples equal partners. According to the Marxist prognosis, power relations in the world will in the next decades change much more quickly in favor of socialism than they have done so far. "The policy of peaceful coexistence is by no means a peace-refuge policy, but a hard class-struggle against imperialism, imperialist aggression, and national oppression." The prerequisite for further development of Marxist forces in the world is the prevention of global war.

438
London, Kurt. THE PERMANENT CRISIS; COMMUNISM IN WORLD POLITICS. [2d ed.] Waltham, Mass., Blaisdell Pub. Co. [1967, c1968] 246 p. (A Blaisdell book in political science)
D843. L6 1968

Contents. --Our political horizon. --Foreign affairs in a divided world. --The ingredients of power in the nuclear age. --Cold war economics. --To have and to hold: problems of security. --War and peace in the nuclear age. --The makers of foreign policy. --Fountainhead of policy planning: intelligence. --Bipolar conduct of foreign affairs. --Propaganda versus diplomacy. --Some concluding reflections. --Bibliography. --Index.

Focuses attention upon the changing nature of international politics. In outlining the various aspects of contemporary world politics, London emphasizes the need to break away from conventional political thinking and adapt doctrines to fit a rapidly changing environment. If the East-West stalemate is to be broken, archaic ideas must be discarded and new courses charted. The West certainly has the resources to "match the vigor of communist brains and brawn," but it will fail to counter "revolutionary totalitarianism" if it does not depart from established reasoning in world affairs.

439
Miller, J. D. B. POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS OF THE UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS. American scholar, v. 37, autumn 1968: 591-602.
AP2. A4572, v. 37

Although great heterogeneity exists among the underdeveloped nations--there is no romantic revolutionary ideology unifying the Third World as some would have it believed--a significant number of these countries do share several remarkably similar characteristics. Uppermost are two contradictory trends, a centralizing state nationalism on the one hand and tribal, linguistic, racial, and religious disintegration on the other, with the contrary pull giving rise to a third movement, a strong tide toward the establishment of regimes based on an alliance of the military and urban bourgeoisie. Internationally, these states are verbally committed to universalist causes like anticolonialism and nonalinement, but in practice are concerned with strictly local and regional issues. Although they possess little power of their own, they are relatively

immune to coercion by the great powers because of the nuclear stalemate and the inhibitions of the great powers themselves. The low level of commodity prices, local capital, and foreign aid is likely to protract indefinitely the economic conditions that underlie these political trends; to insure stability these states will develop an ideology that stresses the military virtues, parochialism, and superstitious reverence for the symbols and persons of leadership. These predictions could be upset only by war and invasion--the major powers will not involve themselves militarily with these regimes, but China, Indonesia, and Egypt might--or by the appearance of a client-master relationship between these states and economic giants like the Soviet Union, the United States, or Japan.

440
Miller, Neal E. THE BRAIN'S CRITICAL PERIODS. Impact of science on society, v. 18, July/Sept. 1968: 157-167. illus. Q1.I4, v. 18

There are certain short periods in the first few years of the development of the individual when the presence or absence of certain elements in his total environment has a virtually irreversible lifelong effect in determining his potentialities, behaviour, capabilities, physiological functioning and personality. These "critical periods," which are different for different environmental elements, may even occur when the human creature is still in the womb. Professor Miller here reports on the critical periods as regards the effects of biochemical agents, protein deficiency, visual experience and conditioning social stimuli. In animals, he notes, even aggressiveness must be taught during a certain critical period or else the young animal does not learn it. Does this have implications for controlling the dangerous aggressiveness which marks Man? (Abstract supplied)

441
Olson, William C. PUBLIC OPINION, THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 6, fall 1968: 352-360. D839.A85, v. 6

Examines the impact of public opinion in Europe and America on the issue of the Atlantic community versus European integration. Olson favors the broader Atlantic community idea, which he believes offers the best hope for a revitalized Western role in world politics. However, he concludes that, given the present state of European-U.S. relations, any expectation that Atlantic union can be achieved in the near future is illusory. Europeans have been shocked by the revelation in Vietnam that American power is limited; Americans are disturbed at being forced to adapt to a changing European assessment of the nature of the world balance of power. These new realities will have to be understood and absorbed if there is ever to be a unified Western policy in world affairs.

442
Pečuljić, Miroslav. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES. Review of international affairs, v. 19, Sept. 20, 1968: 1-4. D839.R4, v. 19

The invasion of Czechoslovakia disclosed that there are in the world both a struggle to develop a new form of Socialist society and a powerful tendency to resist this struggle. This problem applies today to the bourgeois society and capitalism as well as to the Socialist society, and the tendency to resist this development is a specter that hovers over the world and is reflected in its frightful militarization and the establishment of military-political camps. The main problem in the Socialist world today is how to transcend the bureaucratic and centralized early phase of socialism, which maintains itself artificially although its historical role has been played, and impels rulers to act against the interests of the people and principles affecting the future of socialism and finally to send troops to another Socialist country, under absurd pretexts, to defend the obsolete forms. Is there any danger that the reactionary forces could restore capitalist private ownership in a Socialist society in which the private capital has been abolished? No such danger exists, since only foreign intervention could accomplish such a change. The only real danger to a Socialist government would be a multiparty system, which would pave the way back to bureaucratic autocracy and could undermine the basic principles of socialism. By now the dividing line between the old bureaucratic system and the "revolutionary authentically Socialist tendencies" is clearly delineated. The workers' movement is concentrating on two basic questions that are important for the future of socialism: the participation of the working people in management, and "on socialist democracy, freedom, equitable international relations, on wrenching free of hegemony and on the willingness to resist it, on socialist internationalism with a new and richer content."

443
Rapoport, Anatol. PROSPECTS FOR EXPERIMENTAL GAMES. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 12, Dec. 1968: 461-470. JX1901.J6, v. 12

The use of laboratory experiments to study mixed-motive conflict has the advantages of tractability and control, and the disadvantage of artificiality. This paper reviews the achievements and problems of experimental gaming and its possible relevance to the construction of a general theory of conflict. Convergent designs, in which the probability of choosing a cooperative strategy is the central dependent variable, are distinguished from divergent designs, in which a set of conditions is held constant while a great many dependent variables are examined. The difficulties of basing a systematic investigation on a mathematical model, even of a simple 2 X 2 game, are formidable, and experimenters thus far have been forced to fall back on a "natural history" approach where the independent variables are limited to a few basic ones while the data corpuses are large and subjected to intensive study. Among these basic variables are the payoff matrix, time, subjects, and strategy of other. It may be wise to postpone the question of verisimilitude in 2 X 2 games while intensive investigation is carried further. This does not mean, however, that more complex and "realistic" laboratory simulations should be discouraged, for their results are often richly suggestive. (Abstract supplied)

444
Reynolds, V. CURES FOR HUMAN VIOLENCE. Nature (London) v. 221, Jan. 4, 1969: 99. Q1.N2, v. 221

A review of Violence, Monkeys and Man, by Claire and W. M. S. Russell. On the basis of evidence drawn from the study of nonhuman primate behavior, the Russells reject the thesis advanced by Konrad Lorenz in On Aggression that violence is innate in man and conclude instead that it is a response to stress induced

by frustration in the competition for scarce resources, chiefly living space and food. They suggest that the frequency of crime and war can be significantly reduced by lowering the birth rate in all nations and by effecting a more equalitarian distribution of wealth both between and within states. The Russells have made an important new contribution to the study of human violence, and their refutation of the Lorenz thesis, which is politically reactionary, is particularly welcome. However, a fully integrated treatment of this very complex puzzle has yet to appear. For example, the physiological roots of violence need to be related to the social ones, and the problem how to give political effect to the findings of scientists must be solved.

445
Stoljarow, Vitali, and Klaus Rum. [THE "CONVERGENCE THEORY"--A DISTORTED BOURGEOIS PICTURE OF SOCIAL REALITY] Die "Konvergenztheorie" --bourgeoises Zerrbild gesellschaftlicher Wirklichkeit. Einheit, v. 23, no. 10, 1968: 1247-1259.
HX6. E4, v. 23

Dismisses the convergence theory, whereby technological development induces the gradual mutual assimilation of the capitalist and Communist systems. Although cybernetics and operations research may help the system leaders to functionally optimalize their decisions, they cannot be a substitute for the "social content" of the decisions.

446
Wayper, C. L. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: CZECHOSLOVAKIA--THE ACID TEST. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 8, winter 1968: 251-253.
UG635. G7A1252, v. 8

Contrary to the widely expressed view that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia constitutes a grave international crisis and demonstrates the fundamental instability of Europe, it is rather an affirmation of the stability of that continent and "a timely reminder of the nature of the forces to which that stability is to be attributed." Rightly or wrongly the Russians were seeking to preserve their long-established power position in Eastern Europe; in other words they were seeking to conserve, not destroy, the existing order. As distasteful as the suppression of Czech freedom may be to the West, the Western Powers are not about to risk using force within the Soviet sphere of influence. Thus the crisis is Czech, not international, in character and confirms "the thesis that Europe today is one of the peaceful and stable areas of the world." As long as conditions of mutual restraint between East and West continue, this stability will not be jeopardized.

447
Wedge, Bryant. TRAINING FOR A PSYCHIATRY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. American journal of psychiatry, v. 125, Dec. 1968: 731-736.
RC321. A52, v. 125

While psychiatry cannot solve all the problems of international relations, it can contribute to better understanding of the nonrational and often unconscious factors that contribute to international friction. The author outlines suggested patterns of training designed to equip a few psychiatrists for a new kind of empirical study of international problems that he feels is necessary to define the distinctive contributions of the psychiatric discipline to a broad science of international relations. (Abstract supplied)

448
Wolfe, Bertram D. RUSSIA AND THE U.S.A.: A CHALLENGE TO THE CONVERGENCE THEORY. Humanist, v. 28, Sept./Oct. 1968: 3-8.
BL2700. H78, v. 28

Criticizes the convergence theory in general and John Kenneth Galbraith's thesis of convergence determined by economic forces in particular. According to Wolfe, neither history nor an actual examination of both countries supports the theory; it is more probable that each country will move toward its own future under the influence of its own traditions, institutions, and heritage.

449
Yazkova, Alla. IMPERIALISM AND EASTERN EUROPE--FLASHBACK TO THE LITTLE ENTENTE. New times, no. 48, Dec. 4, 1968: 12-14.
D839. N483, 1968

Traces the events that have led to the present status of East European countries. While the imperialists claim that these states "owe their establishment in 1918 and their role in world affairs to the policies of the Western Powers," history proves that it was the Soviet Union that enabled Eastern Europe to liberate itself from nazism and freely assume the Socialist structure that is "the basic guarantee of [its] security, independence and peace."

B. FOREIGN POLICIES

450
ANXIETY IN THE BALKANS. Intelligence digest, v. 30, Nov. 1968: 11-14. D410. R47, v. 30

While the immediate danger of a Soviet invasion of Rumania is receding, Yugoslavia's and Albania's anxieties are mounting in the face of the hostile Soviet and Bulgarian attitude toward them. The occupation of Rumania would not advance Russia's military and strategic goals as long as Hungary and Bulgaria remain firmly under Soviet control. Belgrade and Tirana, however, are fearful lest an accident in Macedonia fomented from Bulgaria be used as a pretext for Soviet military intervention and apprehensive of the expansion of Soviet power in the Near East. Expert estimates show that the Soviet Union has 60 warships in the Mediterranean, including 11 submarines, at least one of which has nuclear capability. Such vessels as the helicopter carrier Moskva are eminently suitable for an attack on the Yugoslav and Albanian coasts. Land and sea operations might be combined in one invasion, as Yugoslavia is accessible from Bulgaria, but Albania can be attacked only from the sea. The subjugation of these countries would bring Russia the facilities in Saseno which it lost to China, one of the best natural harbors for naval forces in Yugoslavia's Gulf of Kotor, and a rich Yugoslav supply of nonferrous metals, which the Soviet Union lacks. Finally, Russia might be tempted to kill two birds with one stone, as the occupation would put an end to two very important sources of unrest. Both Yugoslavia and Albania are aware that there are no treaty obligations binding the Western countries to protect them from a Russian invasion. It is not likely that China will defend Albania, which is therefore trying to reach a tacit agreement with Yugoslavia. Belgrade is making an exceptional effort to bring the West to repeat the declaration that stopped Stalin in 1945--1953, but, except for some assurances

through diplomatic channels, the West is not likely to offer any guarantee, and NATO emphatically denies any intention of a formal declaration of military support for Yugoslavia.

451
Appleton, Sheldon. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY; AN INTRODUCTION, WITH CASES. Boston, Little, Brown [1968] xiv, 624 p. illus.
JX1417. A76
Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents. --World politics: the search for peace. --The American national style. --The President and Congress. --The role of the military. --The CIA and the intelligence community. --Public opinion and foreign policy. --The developing nations. --The challenge of communism. --The instruments of policy: the new weaponry and the new diplomacy. --The instruments of policy: propaganda. --Index.

A collection of essays on U.S. foreign policy, which are supported by case studies to inform Americans of the how and why of U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking. Appleton contends that Americans are often ignorant of vital foreign policy issues and cites as an example a national poll taken in 1955, 2 years after the Korean War, in which less than one-third of the adult Americans sampled could identify the name of Karl Marx correctly. Indeed, many Americans say they are willing to die to defend their country against communism, but few actually know what communism is. Appleton concludes by exploring European attitudes toward the United States and its foreign policy objectives and the causes of the strain on Atlantic relationships.

452
Axen, Hermann. [PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM IN OUR TIME] Proletarischer Internationalismus in unserer Zeit. Einheit, v. 23, no. 10, 1968: 1203-1219.
HX6. E4, v. 23

Military action by five Socialist countries in aid of Czechoslovakia has met with the approval of most Communist and workers' parties, which attests to the maturity of the international Communist movement. Of the remaining parties belonging to the movement, some took a wavering position, and some disapproved the action completely. Differences in "appraisal of the dialectic of the class struggle between socialism and imperialism at the present stage" account for this discord, which also involves the question, "What is the highest principle in interrelationships between Communist and workers' parties and between Socialist states?" Reasons given by the Italian Communist Party alone for its disapproval testify to the gross misconception that this and other objecting brother parties have about the contemporary international class struggle. This party considers the action of the "Five" a "violation of a state's independence" as if Czechoslovakia were just another state and not a Socialist state, a member of the Warsaw Pact, and "a southwestern outpost of the community of Socialist states." For a Communist party the valid standpoint in this instance is the international class struggle and the security of the community, rather than the "autonomy and sovereignty of each Communist Party" because the community more than anything else protects the national independence and Socialist freedom of each of its members against the encroachments and attacks of counterrevolution and imperialism. The history of the international workers' movement, especially since the Second International, proves that the bourgeoisie's favorite weapon is splitting the working class. Evidence abounds of inroads made by the counter-revolution into Czechoslovak public life prior to the Five's action. American and West German designs to rip apart the community through the gradual instilling of bourgeois ideology aim at changing the European status quo, on which the European security system must be built.

453
Ballis, William B. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD DEVELOPING STATES: THE CASE OF EGYPT. Studies on the Soviet Union, v. 7, no. 3, 1968: 84-113.
DK1. S75, v. 7

An examination of Egyptian politics since 1952 with special emphasis on Soviet-Egyptian relations. Ballis believes an East-West détente would not change long-range Soviet goals in Southern Asia or the Middle East because Moscow is not likely to forget its historic objectives of influence and, if possible, control over the area. The author concludes that the argument that Russia wanted Egypt to suffer a humiliating defeat in the recent Arab-Israeli War so that Russia could come in and save it is unfounded; rather the Soviet Union wants "an Egypt which will enable the USSR to strengthen 'its entry into the Middle East and the Mediterranean area far beyond its positions between 1956 and 1967.' "

454
Barrett, Raymond J. THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Dec. 1968: 3-14. illus.
Z6723. U35, v. 48

America's current difficulties in Europe are the consequence of past success, not failure. The Soviet Union has been deterred, and as a result Europeans have become less concerned with problems of military security and political integration. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia has not changed this since the motive for it was fear rather than aggressiveness. This new situation has several implications for U.S. foreign policy. It is evident that U.S. relations with Europe are going to be more unpredictable than in the past. The new independent Europe will have to be dealt with on its own terms. NATO is becoming less a military alliance and more a political forum, and in light of this the size and composition of alliance military forces will have to be changed. Since it is fruitless to continue urging the Europeans to increase their conventional forces, the United States must be satisfied if NATO can maintain a mobile and flexible force capable of resisting Soviet pressure tactics in Europe and defending against flanking probes. The United States should proceed cautiously in the direction of improved relations with Eastern Europe and continue its effort to further the dialog with the Soviet Union. In facing this array of problems, Americans should be encouraged by the observation that the resurgence of demands for national identity in both East and West may be contrary to the ideology of the Soviet Union but not to their own. In fact, international pluralism is precisely what America wants.

455
Birnbaum, Immanuel. PEACE AS THE BASIC CONCEPT OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY. Pakistan horizon, v. 21, no. 3, 1968: 224-228.
DS376. P32, v. 21
Address delivered at a meeting of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, on Nov. 11, 1967.

The Bonn government's chief foreign policy objective is the maintenance of peace within its part of the world. It is eager to strengthen Western Europe and for that reason supports Great Britain's entry into the Common Market. Although at one time Bonn's leaders felt it necessary to avoid relations with every country but Russia that recognized two Germanys, they are now endeavoring to improve relations with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and have begun inviting them to send ambassadors to Bonn. Germany has already established commercial missions in Poland and Bulgaria and agreed to exchange diplomatic missions with Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. Although Germany's deep differences with the Soviet Union over the partition issue will not be resolved soon, the Federal Republic has actively sought mutual agreement in other areas, notably the conclusion of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. It has even endeavored to reduce tensions on the Continent by trying to "defreeze" its relations with the Communist sector of Germany, and the two sectors have concluded a trade agreement, a communications agreement, a postal agreement, and a number of technical agreements. Bonn hopes for a reunified Germany some day but wants to achieve it peacefully and will "not make the division of Germany a matter of daily friction, or a question of peace and war."

456
Bloomfield, Lincoln P. FUTURE SMALL WARS: MUST THE UNITED STATES INTERVENE? Orbis, v. 12, fall 1968: 669-684. D839.O68, v. 12

The 1970's should see a rethinking of U.S. foreign policy objectives in connection with America's role as policeman of the international community. Although the United States must not be a policeman to an unruly world in default of collective security and peacekeeping, it has a responsibility to intervene in local wars that threaten America's allies or world peace and to help those countries it has promised to protect by treaty. However, how will the United States be able to differentiate between aggression that threatens a balance of power (not necessarily the superpower balance of power) and peasant revolts or student riots, and who will be responsible for defining aggression, rectifying it, and maintaining the balance of power? Because the nature of local wars is changing--they are more a result of "wars of liberation" than decolonialization--some of America's foreign policy objectives, which some view as the containment of disorder and even the "essential bloodymindedness of the world," will have to change to cope with future political crises. Whether the United States should intervene in future small wars will depend on its future interests and its assessment of and reaction to Russia's role in small wars. Until today the Soviet Union has abstained from intervening in the developing areas because it has failed to prepare for local wars logistically. However, Russia has begun a program of competition with the United States to ensure its presence and power in local conflicts: The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean is indicative of this. In dealing with local wars the United States must not react in blind opposition "to revolutions wherever significant communist involvement or potential gain is perceived." U.S. interests are going to require a whole series of new political, economic, and social policies, and America will have to support foreign leaders not because they are in power but because they represent a national will. The test for backing a government will no longer be whether it is Communist or non-Communist but whether it fits into the political realities of the international community.

457
Blum, Robert. THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN WORLD AFFAIRS. Edited by A. Doak Barnett. [1st ed.] New York, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill [1966] xiv, 287 p. (The United States and China in world affairs)
E183.8.C5B5
Bibliography: p. 284-287.

Partial contents.--The confrontation between Communist China and the United States.--The Asian setting.--Communist China in world affairs.--Communist China's policy toward the United States.--An appraisal of United States policy toward China since 1949.--The framework for a China policy.--China and the United Nations.--Taiwan: island of contention.--A summing up.--Index.

Traces U.S.-Chinese relations from the end of World War II to the present. Blum attempts to stimulate responsible discourse on various alternative policies toward Communist China by pointing out that unless the United States makes some progress in its direct dealings with China it will continue to find itself frustrated in many other directions. The author believes current prospects for reaching a reasonable understanding with the Chinese are not good but that contentment with the present stalemate in U.S.-Chinese relations is not good statesmanship for the times.

458
Brahm, Heinz. [ECHO IN WORLD COMMUNISM TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S OCCUPATION] Das Echo im Weltkommunismus auf die Okkupation der Tschechoslowakei. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Oct. 25, 1968: 744-752. D839.E86, v. 23

Stresses the growing polarization between parties of the international Communist movement, which resulted from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Since Moscow does not want to renounce international communism, it faces an unresolvable dilemma between proletarian internationalism and Soviet power politics.

459
Brandt, Willy. ". . . A MERE MILITARY RESPONSE IS NOT ENOUGH . . . WE SHALL JOIN HANDS WITH EVERY SINCERE PARTNER." In Germany (Federal Republic, 1949-) Presse- und Informationsamt. Bulletin, a weekly survey of German affairs, v. 16, Dec. 3, 1968: suppl. 1-4.
DD259.A35, v. 16
Foreign policy declaration of Nov. 29, 1968, to the Bundestag.

Emphasizes the importance of NATO in safeguarding peace in a situation brought about by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Brandt states that "neither the Federal Government nor its allies have any intention to start a new arms race" and forecasts "a new dialogue" between the world powers. The German Federal Republic's NATO allies understand that the nation's foreign policy aims at ensuring "that the still outstanding Central European and German problems are not left out of any future East-West dialogue." Western Europe needs a "concerted European policy," conducted by its member states individually and through international organizations such as the Western European Union and NATO. The prime objective of West German foreign policy is peace and the relaxation of East-West tensions in Europe.

460
Brandt, Willy. [PEACE POLICY IN EUROPE] Friedenspolitik in Europa. [Frankfurt a. M.] S. Fischer [1968] 223 p. DD259.7.B7A5

Contents.--From the spirit of history.--In Europe's heart.--Peace above all.--Priority Europe.--France-Germany: primacy of the neighborhood.--The Six and other relatives.--For a greater Europe.--Courage of favoring it, weakness of opposing it.--Partner America.--Alliance in change.--Beginning of a dialog between Germany and the Soviet Union.--Détente policy--repairing the bridge between Eastern and Western Europe.--Status quo or the difficulty of "realities."--Perspectives of our policy.--"Safety first."--Détente--no slogan.--The crucial question: control of the atom.--The task: European security.--Road to solidarity.--. . . and the Third World.--Lessons of yesterday--signals of the future.--Personal experiences.

Expounds European unification and German reunification as the most important goals of German foreign policy. Brandt considers East-West détente in Europe, particularly the improvement of relations between the German Federal Republic and East European nations, the best way to realize these goals despite East German efforts to block a movement in that direction. He hopes the economic, military, and political integration of Western Europe and changes in the Communist bloc policy and ideology--such as those in Czechoslovakia and Rumania--will bring Western and Eastern Europe together. European security calls for close cooperation with the United States. Brandt thinks Germany's vital interests require the Federal Republic to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, provided that Bonn's most important reservations to the draft of the treaty are taken into account. The treaty should obligate nuclear-Weapon countries "against nuclear pressure."

461
Carleton, William G. A NEW DEPARTURE IN FOREIGN POLICY. Virginia quarterly review, v. 44, autumn 1968: 559-579. AP2.V76, v. 44

If the United States is to extricate itself from its troubles at home and abroad, its leaders must seriously consider a "New Departure" in foreign policy. Only through seeking positive political cooperation with the Soviet Union can America hope to ease world tensions and pave the way for significant arms control measures. Now that "the old Communist monolith (the solidarity of which was always exaggerated) has been torn asunder," U.S. foreign policymakers should abandon what remains of the old containment policy. The assumptions underlying the pax Americana doctrine, America's intervention in Vietnam, and the negative approach to Communist China are no longer valid and obstruct the path toward cooperation with the Soviet Union to stabilize world conditions. Intended "to give America the image of disinterested keeper of the world's peace," the pax Americana doctrine has now been largely discredited by the enormity of the task and the questionable justness of a unilaterally imposed peace. The Chinese do not yet have the resources to carry out their aggressive threats; if at a later date the Chinese revolutionary fervor does not moderate, and China engages in territorial expansion, the United States would then be justified in attempting to contain it. In order to obtain the needed support of India, Japan, and the Soviet Union for this policy, it would have to forgo its "holy war" against communism and strive instead to preserve the security of all Asian states, regardless of their ideologies. Because of the high stakes involved, the United States should make every effort to bury its suspicion that ideological affinity will eventually bring Russia and China back together and should attempt to lay the groundwork for a "New Departure" in foreign policy by endeavoring to join the Soviet Union in making "the world safe for diversity." Perhaps the first step would be for the superpowers to negotiate neutralization agreements encompassing the world's most critical areas. While full-scale neutralization would be needed in Southeast Asia and Korea, the problems of the two Germanys and the Arab-Israeli dispute could perhaps be solved by mutual concessions "less formal than full-scale neutralization agreements." Neutralization would relieve both the United States of its present costly unilateral commitments and Russia of the strain of balancing its desire to check China against its desire not to appear to oppose Communist movements. Following neutralization of the crisis areas, the superpowers may make headway in concluding international arms control measures.

462
Cousins, Norman. CZECHOSLOVAKIA, VIETNAM, AND WORLD LAW. World federalist, Aug./Sept. 1968: 3, 7. JX1901.W825, 1968

The invasion of Czechoslovakia cannot be explained by the Soviet leaders' inability to tolerate criticism, a desire for more territory, impulsiveness, or an unwillingness to countenance disunity in the Communist camp. These leaders seem to be nationalists rather than ideologists, and national security might have been the real reason for their intervention in Czechoslovakia. They might consider the Czech liberalization movement in terms of their estimate of its effect on central Europe, which they regard as a security buffer, and on the European balance of power. The historical vulnerability of Czechoslovakia to Germany might have been another vital factor. The invasion shows how easily a threatened shift in the balance of power can touch off unpredictable action and how the existing approaches to world peace are unworkable, as the events in Berlin, the Congo, the Middle East, and Vietnam proved. Since governments want to keep their freedom of decision, they reject the authority of the United Nations and make it powerless by use of the veto. It seems that the human race has failed to establish effective rules for the behavior of nations. Men are still tribalists and do not realize the need for a world society under law. Unless this need is met, any approach to world problems will be tentative and unsound.

463
THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS. In Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR. Bulletin, v. 15, Sept. 1968: 5-9. DK266.A21575, v. 15

The reason for the sudden Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was not, as Tass maintained, an appeal for help from unidentified persons in Czechoslovakia or a "subversive threat" from outside the country since the West observed a policy of complete neutrality throughout the crisis. The real reason was the diversity of views among the Soviet leaders on the method to be adopted for resolving the crisis. The main attack was directed against the Czechoslovak experiment--an attempt to combine communism with democracy (not "people's" democracy) and real freedom in the sense in which it is understood by every human being. This kind

of freedom is a mortal danger for communism as it may start a chain reaction ending in disintegration. Because of this danger, Alexander Dubcek's policies were unacceptable to the whole Politburo, which disagreed only about tactics. To stop the experiment was more important than the potential consequences--the negative reaction of international communism and the Western World. The main points of the crisis show that, although a transformation from international to national communism can be traced in many countries, it is very difficult for Communist regimes to evolve to liberalization and democracy. This situation is a setback for those who had begun to believe that a convergence of communism and the free world is possible, and also indicates that the ideological unity of the Warsaw Pact members has almost eliminated the chance to establish a real, lasting coexistence of Eastern Europe and the West. The crisis accelerated the evolution of militarism in the Soviet Union, but, as militarism has never been a sign of strength, its development may indicate the decline rather than the ascendance of communism. In such a situation a regime is usually inclined to use force; therefore the use of force may not be confined to Czechoslovakia. From this viewpoint the policy of maintaining the present sphere of influence between East and West becomes particularly debatable.

464
Das, Banka Behary. INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS: A SHIFT IN POLICY. National defence, v. 6, Aug. 1968: 4-5, 28. U1.N15, v. 6

Criticizes the Soviet decision to supply arms to Pakistan, argues that it represents a shift in the Soviet policy toward India, and criticizes any government that would create tension on the subcontinent by acting in such a manner. He concludes that India's best interest lies in developing itself economically and militarily to ensure its independence and nonalinement policy.

465
Debré, Michel. THE FRENCH POLICY; INDEPENDENCE AND SOLIDARITY. Vital speeches of the day, v. 35, Dec. 1, 1968: 118-120.
PN6121.V52, v. 35
"Delivered before the Diplomatic Press, Sept. 16, 1968."

Maintains that two ideas, independence (freedom) and solidarity (cooperation), govern the operation of French foreign policy. Debré contends that France refuses to "participate in the so-called disarmament undertaking as it is being pursued today . . . because this undertaking is misleading." Sincere disarmament is impossible when the objective is to limit the growth of existing nuclear stockpiles and forbid nonnuclear nations from obtaining such weapons. France will aid in this undertaking only when the superpowers view disarmament as a means of guaranteeing the safety of all, not merely their own.

466
Djilas, Milovan. RUSSIA'S DANGEROUS NEW DOCTRINE OF CONQUEST. Reader's digest, v. 94, Jan. 1968: 43-47. AP2.R255, v. 94

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia is but the beginning of a new policy of overt aggression launched by Russia's ruling elite to preserve and expand its sphere of influence. Alarmed by the seeds of freedom spreading through its domain and perceiving the weakening of the ideological appeal of communism, the unimaginative Soviet bureaucracy has resorted to brute force. Left unchecked, this forceful approach could lead to a dangerous armed clash with the West. Thus the West must reinvigorate its own self-defense through NATO, maintain a sufficiently wide margin of military superiority to discourage Soviet adventurism, endeavor to isolate "the Soviet Union as a moral leper in the opinion of mankind," and initiate "tough, realistic, just proposals for the solution of outstanding differences with the Soviet Union."

467
DOCUMENTS ON THE CZECHOSLOVAK SITUATION. Marxism today, v. 12, Sept. 1968: 283-288.
AP4.M335, v. 12

Complete texts of the joint statement of the Communist Parties of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union issued on August 1, 1968, in Cierna and Tisou; the statement issued on August 3, 1968, after the Bratislava Warsaw Treaty Organization's conference; and two statements of the political committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain on the Czechoslovak-Soviet negotiations, issued on July 26, 1968, and August 8, 1968.

468
Fitzgerald, Paul A. JAPAN'S DILEMMA. America, v. 119, Nov. 9, 1968: 437-440.
BX801.A5, v. 119

Japan is currently confronted with the dilemma of choosing between unarmed neutralism and a policy of moderate militarism. Its relationship with the United States along with security, economic, and public opinion factors will be a fundamental consideration in its selection. The nature of future Japanese-American relations hinges upon the continuation of the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which will come up for renewal in 1970. Originally ratified amid violent public protests, the treaty is still the subject of public controversy because of its constraints on Japanese sovereignty. Although Prime Minister Sato clearly recognizes the necessity of the treaty and will push for its approval, he still must convince a vocal segment of the population that "the U.S.-Japanese security system is the most effective and appropriate way to maintain the peace and safety of" Japan. Some Japanese shy away from military commitments because of the suffering created by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In addition, many Japanese are reluctant to divert a sizable proportion of their rapidly expanding economy to military purposes. In view of its enormous resources and the threats posed by its Communist neighbors, however, it would be far more realistic for Japan to cooperate with the United States to promote stability in Asia. Japan certainly "cannot now afford to dispense with the protective umbrella provided by America's armed forces," but it can endeavor to modify the subordinate nature of its relations with the United States.

469
THE FOREIGN POLICY ROLE OF THE CONGRESS. Congressional digest, v. 47, Oct. 1968: 225-256.
JK1.C65, v. 47

Contents.--The foreword.--Relevant provisions of the Constitution.--Formal instruments of U.S. foreign policy.--Major U.S. mutual security arrangements.--Foreign policy action in the 90th Congress.--Should

Senate Resolution 187 concerning power of the executive in foreign policy be adopted? Pro: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Con: U.S. Under Secretary of State Katzenbach.--Should Congress effect major changes in Vietnam policy by curtailing defense appropriations? Pro: U.S. Senator Wayne L. Morse. U.S. Senator Joseph S. Clark. Con: Hon. Robert S. McNamara. U.S. Senator John C. Stennis.

Excerpts from the continuing dispute over the role of Congress in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. Opposition in Congress to administration policy in Vietnam has occasioned an intense debate over the proper distribution of powers between the President and Congress in relation to U.S. foreign policy. The Constitution, in foreign as in domestic affairs, establishes a balance of power between the two branches that requires mutual accommodation in the making of foreign policy. However, because Congress has the paramount power of controlling the purse strings, the relative influence of the two branches at any given time derives less from the Constitution than from "the personality and popularity of the Chief Executive, the degree to which his influence extends over Congress, the urgency of a particular situation in which he acts, and the mood of the country itself."

470
Furnas, Howard. THE PRESIDENT: A CHANGING ROLE? In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Resources and needs of American diplomacy. Philadelphia, 1968. (Its Annals, v. 380, Nov. 1968) p. 9-15.
H1. A4, v. 380

The manner in which the President discharges his foreign affairs responsibilities is likely to change markedly in the next few years, for the atmosphere of our national life is changing. The American mood will not be isolationist. However, the public may, for a number of valid reasons, call for a de-emphasis on foreign affairs. The foreign affairs agencies might then have to co-ordinate themselves, for the President may have neither the time nor the inclination to contribute as he has heretofore. It will also be essential to relate foreign policy more closely to the broader national scene, for in the 1970's foreign affairs will have to compete with domestic needs for resources as well as presidential attention. The President might, therefore, be better served in the future by a Secretary of State with broad national experience rather than by another of the foreign affairs specialists who have held the job in recent administrations. In the period since World War II, there has not evolved any generally satisfactory way of organizing the various foreign affairs agencies to meet the President's needs. President Johnson, however, took a major step forward in providing the Department of State with the legal authority to assert effective leadership over all aspects of American foreign affairs activities. Although the innovation has worked imperfectly so far, it is a good tool, and may be the key to an adequate foreign policy and diplomacy in the 1970's. (Abstract supplied)

471
Gati, Charles. ANOTHER GRAND DEBATE? THE LIMITATIONIST CRITIQUE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. World politics, v. 21, Oct. 1968: 133-151.
D839. W57, v. 21

A review of The Arrogance of Power by J. William Fulbright, The Limits of Power by Eugene J. McCarthy, The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy 1941-1966 by Arthur M. Schlesinger, and Pax Americana by Ronald Steel. Gati warns that the present debate over American foreign policy, to which these four volumes are a contribution, must not be confused with the pre-World War II isolationist-internationalist dispute or the postwar realist-idealist controversy. Both sides in the present debate are internationalist and realist, and the true division is between "limitationists," who argue that, since the power of a nation is finite, its aspirations and commitments must be brought into balance with its power, and "globalists," who reason that in the nuclear age the defense of the national interest entails worldwide responsibility and engagement. Gati traces the development of the limitationist argument in the writings of Lippmann, Morgenthau, and Kennan and then, after an explication of the main points of the globalist position, attempts a systematic critique of the four limitationist volumes under review. He finds in these works the suggestion of a grand design for U.S. foreign policy, of which the chief elements are a qualified and implicit acceptance of spheres of influence; multilateralism in economic and, if needed, military policy; and the expectation that the international system is moving toward pluralism. He terms the limitationist critique of globalism "devastating" but argues further that the limitationist alternative suffers from inconsistency and weaknesses common to all grand designs in foreign policy. The limitationist stance is valuable as a stimulus to thought but has not yet been put into an operational form useful to the statesman.

472
Gill, R. Rockingham. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: WILL THE SOVIET ARMY INTERVENE? East Europe, v. 17, July 1968: 2-6. illus.
DR1. N363, v. 17

Summarizes the pros and cons of a potential Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia. Gill concludes that the chances of the Soviet Union's using armed forces to occupy a neighboring Socialist state are considerably less than they were in 1956 when the Soviet Union occupied Hungary but that they cannot be discounted altogether.

473
Gittings, John. CHINA IN OUT OF THE COLD? Nation, v. 207, Dec. 23, 1968: 686-688.
AP2. N2, v. 207

Signs of a more flexible Chinese foreign policy have been detected. The most remarkable example of this change is "China's invitation to the United States 'to conclude an agreement on the five principles of peaceful coexistence' conveyed in an official foreign ministry statement of November 26 on the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks in Warsaw." This proposal, although linked to a demand that the United States withdraw from Formosa, indicates that the Chinese "have once again adopted a coherent negotiating position for the ambassadorial talks [and] . . . it at least provides a basis for further discussion." While it would appear that an insoluble conflict of principle toward Formosa is involved, both sides now can probably indulge in "a greater freedom of maneuver behind their entrenched principles, as they were before the cultural revolution." There are certain reasons for this conclusion: In 1960, before the cultural revolution, Premier Chou En-lai stated that China requires a "commitment in principle from the United States to withdraw from Taiwan before other issues can be considered, but not a physical

withdrawal of support"; a different pattern of power relations in Asia will emerge from a Vietnam settlement; and Chinese concern about the Soviet military buildup in the Soviet Far East and Outer Mongolia may make it necessary to demonstrate greater flexibility toward the United States for tactical reasons.

474
Gittings, John. THE ROOTS OF THE AGONY. Far Eastern economic review, v. 62, Nov. 14, 1968: 368-372. illus. HC411. F18, v. 62

America's Vietnam involvement began in response to the prospect of a Communist victory in China. In 1949 Secretary of State Dean Acheson, feeling that Southeast Asia's security was of vital interest to the free world, adopted the policy of containment of China. In 1950 he promised aid to the French in their struggle against the Vietminh, "justifying his decision on the ground that 'neither national independence nor democratic evolution exist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism.' " The basic fallacies of his approach to Indochina have continued to govern America's approach to Vietnam: the beliefs that a "genuine nationalism" could be developed without the Communists and that Indochina's peaceful and democratic development could materialize only after stability was restored. America's early involvement in Indochinese affairs, although indirect, is related to the present situation in two ways: It led directly to America's assuming "the French mantle of patronage over South Vietnam after the Geneva Conference, and to the eccentric interpretation of the Agreements reached at that Conference" and it is a reminder that the United States intervened against a Communist-led anticolonial struggle, not against an international Communist movement.

475
Goto, Motoo. CRISIS IN JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONS. Japan quarterly, v. 15, Oct./Dec. 1968: 421-429. DS801. J274, v. 15

Since the beginning of 1968, various incidents have caused Japanese-U.S. relations to become strained. In certain instances the Japanese Government was at fault for not explaining fully its relations with the United States to the Japanese people; moreover, the Government failed to reexamine changing Japanese-U.S. relations. Therefore, much of the popular dissatisfaction is directed not toward the United States but toward the administrative leaders of Japan. The people "feel that something is being hidden from them about the results of the negotiations between Japan and the United States which were conducted through official channels; and that points of difference between the two countries have not been clearly and frankly stated." Thus the recent victory of the pro-American Liberal-Democratic Party in the Japanese House of Councillors' elections cannot be interpreted as proof that Prime Minister Sato's administration has been strengthened, that Japanese-U.S. relations are secure, and that the Japanese-U.S. Security Pact enjoys popular support; instead, the election results indicate a public desire for change in Liberal-Democratic U.S. policies. Even if Liberal-Democratic Prime Minister Sato is elected to a third term at the end of this year, Japanese politics during the next 2 years will revolve around a reexamination of Japanese-U.S. relations. The opposition parties will continue their demands for "changes in the Security Pact, ranging from gradual dissolution to outright abrogation"; further, the issues of Okinawa's return to Japan and the future status of U.S. bases on the island will figure prominently in discussions among all Japanese parties. In reexamining Japanese-U.S. relations, certain frictions must be considered an inevitable result of Japan's economic improvement and Japanese disappointment in the changing image of the United States. Frank discussion between the two countries is required if future problems between them are to be solved easily. Fortunately a new era is beginning in which the problems facing the two countries can be tackled. Negotiations should begin immediately.

476
Grattan, Michelle. "ARMED NEUTRALITY"--A FOREIGN POLICY FOR AUSTRALIA? Australian quarterly, v. 40, Dec. 1968: 44-56. DU80. A95, v. 40

With the Vietnam War drawing to a close and the American and British positions in Asia in a state of flux, new foreign policy options are beginning to open up for Australia. One of the most radical alternatives is the policy of "armed neutrality" advocated by numerous intellectuals and leftwing members of the Australian Labor Party. The armed neutralists propose a gradual withdrawal from military alliances, the return of all troops stationed overseas, and the development of a strong national defense establishment. They maintain that the greatest threat to Australia's security emanates from its alliance with the United States, which exposes it to nuclear attack from Russia and China and could aggravate its relations with neighboring states. Since nonalinement would not preclude "a generally pro-Western ideological stance," Australia could "always re-negotiate [its] dependence" if it were endangered at a later date. Armed neutrality incorporates many of the same attractions that were attributed to isolationism during the period between the two World Wars. Both policies appeal to the traditional Australian Labor Party's desire for independence and morality in the conduct of foreign relations. A nonalined Australia could avoid international conflicts yet strive to develop "harmonious relationships internationally." Despite its many attractions, armed neutrality is not a particularly viable foreign policy alternative for Australia. Public support for nonalinement would probably never be forthcoming from a population staunchly loyal to its British and American "protectors." Moreover, in renouncing firm, existing alliances, Australia could seriously damage its relations with the United States and tarnish its international image. Most supporters of armed neutrality are probably "over-reacting to what appear to have been the errors of Australia's Vietnam policy." Now that America seems to want to avoid any future involvement in Asian conflicts, it would be a particularly bad time for Australia to pull out of the alliance, which provides the country with useful guarantees without straining its economic resources. However, the Australian Government should make it clear to its allies that it reserves the right to follow an independent policy when such a course is deemed to be in Australia's best interests.

477
Hao, Chih-cheng. THE SHIFTING EMPHASIS OF MAO'S STRATEGY. Chinese Communist affairs, v. 5, Oct. 1968: 34-43. DS777.55.C4495, v. 5

The issuing of Mao Tse-tung's "newest instruction" just at the start of the Vietnam peace talks in Paris is no coincidence, since it reflects the adaptation of

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Chinese internal and foreign policies to the changed situation. On the internal front Mao is trying to turn Liu Shao-chi's ideological deviation into a political crime, since to be a Kuomintang agent is a more serious crime than to be a "capitalist roader." On the external scene Mao finds it necessary to adapt his strategic plan to a possible emergency in the Formosa Strait. Mao believes that the United States will not pull out of Asia after the end of the Vietnam War but that instead of armed forces it will send more logistic support to its Asian allies. This expectation increases his fear of an attack by Nationalist China. While, by starting troubles in sensitive areas, he is trying to exploit U.S. willingness to make concessions, he is preparing his country to cope with an escalated conflict in Southeast Asia if the Vietnam peace talks fail. His general intention is to combine military redeployment with political and economic measures and ideological mobilization, and this intention should not be taken lightly by the West. Since Mao is not prepared for a war with the United States, he hopes that the "doves" will influence U.S. policy, and since he does not dare break relations with the Soviet Union because of the common interest of the two countries in opposing the United States, he prefers to freeze Sino-Soviet relations for the time being. The cultural revolution has convinced Mao that the real threat to the Chinese Communist Party comes from the Kuomintang and is supported by the growing anti-Communist feeling among the masses, who are eagerly awaiting the return of the Republic of China.

478
Heidmann, Eberhard. [U.S. GLOBAL STRATEGY] Zur USA-Globalstrategie. Dokumentation der Zeit; Informations-Archiv, v. 20, no. 411, 1968: 15-19.
DD261.D4, v. 20

Changed power relations in today's world have caused American monopolies to adopt global strategy, a new doctrine for achieving their world domination. It is based on U.S. interventionism "on a global scale" through economic, political, military, and ideological means aimed at reversing the achievements of socialism that were made according to Socialist theoretical principles. The doctrine assumes that the current development of "state monopolistic capitalism" offers adequate material and technological means to achieve its goal by breaking the cohesion of "the world Socialist system" and exploting some situations on the peripheries of the Socialist camp, as in Vietnam, and through military interventions in the Third World. This strategy, developed under President Kennedy, was first applied in his "policy of cooperation and conflict." It underwent some changes under President Johnson, who put greater emphasis on conflict, although he did not go so far as to revive the Dulles policy. Since U.S. imperialism cannot realize its global strategy with its own means alone, it uses the services of its allies, whose own ambitions are not always in accord with those of America, for the United States wants to secure for itself a monopoly on being the principal nuclear power in the imperialist system. Hence there is growing discord between Bonn and Washington despite the "special alliance" between the two capitals that allows the West German imperialists to pursue their own policy goals in Europe. Similar discord explains the French refusal to go along with military integration of NATO. Such discords will grow because of "contradictions" inherent in the imperialist system itself. Herein lies the main weakness of the global strategy.

479
Hester, Hugh. THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. New man, v. 20, Oct./Dec. 1968: 4-7.
P&GP RR

The Czech crisis emphasized that until West Germany renounces its territorial claims against its neighbors, peace in Europe is impossible. Czechoslovak plans to normalize relations with "Nazi revanchist West Germany" threatened the Soviet Union and its allies, especially the German Democratic Republic, "which West Germany openly avows to take over," and Poland because the Federal Republic refuses to accept its Oder-Neisse borderline; therefore, invasion was necessary to ensure their security. If the United States had agreed to the provisions of the Potsdam agreement, which called for the demilitarization, decartelization, democratization, and eventual reunification and neutralization of Germany, then peace in Europe would probably be a reality today. However, its refusal has meant that European stability is precarious: The Soviet Union and its allies must maintain a security belt against West Germany that cannot be surrendered unless and until NATO and Warsaw Pact members sign a treaty to guarantee the present borders of the East European countries. Such a treaty should be a first objective of the new U.S. administration. If, however, the United States continues to support West German efforts to subvert Eastern Europe, a major European war will result.

480
Howe, Fisher. POLICY-PLANNING IN THE NEW DIPLOMACY. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Resources and needs of American diplomacy. Philadelphia, 1968. (Its Annals, v. 380, Nov. 1968) p. 39-49.
H1.A4, v. 380

Most issues in foreign affairs can only be resolved by intuitive judgments based on knowledge and experience. Some problems, however, are susceptible of more rational, objective treatment, and application of such methods can only be helpful. New methods, including systems analysis and new mathematical techniques, can be usefully employed, in the areas of prediction, factor analysis, and what might be described as prescriptive analysis, in search of the optimum course. Such methods help to sort out the interacting variables with which foreign affairs is replete. Application of these methods will not be easy, partly because of the subject's complexity, partly because of practitioners' resistance to such innovations. In the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), a useful beginning has been made. Its application, however, to the traditional diplomatic functions--representation, negotiation--will take time and experimentation. State Department foreign affairs planners now direct their work toward analysis of special problems and country studies. In addition, planners fulfill a limited adversary role, offering "alternatives" to recommendations before the decisionmakers. These functions can all be strengthened. PPBS should also be pursued, despite very real limitations on its full application. Additionally, changes are needed in organization, method, personnel, and, particularly, commitment if planning is to meet the needs of the new diplomacy. (Abstract supplied)

481
Hudson, G. F. IN FEAR OF CHINA. Quadrant, v. 12, July/Aug. 1968: 83-89.
AP7.Q8, v. 12

Challenges Gregory Clark's thesis that Communist China's primary desire is to be left alone to cope with its internal problems. In his book In Fear of China, Clark writes that since 1949 China has never done more than react to threats, but that Australia and other Western powers have followed a policy of opposition to Peking. Hudson refutes this argument by tracing the events of the Korean War, the Chinese seizure of Tibet, and Sino-Indian relations, and notes that China violated international law when it annexed Tibet, carried out a policy of calculated deceit and unilateral action along India's border, and attacked U. N. forces in Korea engaged in beating back Chinese-approved aggression. Hudson concludes that, until China forgets the humiliations it has suffered at the hands of foreign nations over the past four generations, it "is going to be difficult to deal with."

482
[IMPERIALIST INTERFERENCE IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS] Die imperialistische Einmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten der CSSR. Dokumentation der Zeit; Informations-Archiv, v. 20, no. 408, 1968: suppl. 15 p.
DD261. D4, v. 20

Quoting extensively, mostly from West German publications, the editors try to show how intensive Western political interference was in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs. The material is arranged under the following headings: "The aims of the imperialist intervention policy," "Crucial points of imperialist interference policy in regard to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic," and "Methods of imperialist interference and their camouflage." The article lists the names of "agents of the American secret service" who were active in Czechoslovakia prior to the Warsaw Pact intervention in that country. Reprinted from Neues Deutschland, July 18, 1968, is the text of the common letter by the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Polish United Workers' Party, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with justification for the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia.

483
Jangam, R. T. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY: A BALANCE SHEET OF RECENT YEARS. Modern review, v. 123, Dec. 1968: 924-927.
AP8. M6, v. 123

China's development of nuclear weapons, its cultural revolution, and its comparative isolation from other nations have all heavily influenced its foreign policy. Although China does not have the nuclear capability to defeat either the United States or the Soviet Union, it does have the capacity "to harass or menace these or other nations." Moreover, as the possessor of nuclear arms China has begun to carve out spheres of influence in the Afro-Asian region, thereby disturbing the balance of power in this area, and has become increasingly antagonistic toward the Soviet brand of communism. Mao's hard-line approach to world revolution has been greatly bolstered by the triumph of his cultural revolution, in which the more Moscow-oriented Peking leaders were soundly defeated. Because of its tough revolutionary ideology, China remains aloof from the community of nations. While it suffers somewhat from this isolation, it also benefits in that it "does not have to follow the injunctions of the [United Nations] or international law inasmuch as it is formulated by it." Thus it can pursue its nuclear weapons program "unfettered by the resolutions or treaties of the United Nations."

484
Javits, Jacob K. THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE AFTER VIETNAM. Look, v. 32, Nov. 12, 1968: 82, 84, 89, 92.
AP2. L79, v. 32

By altering economic relations and transforming the security environment, the technological explosion has rendered obsolete the present structure of U.S.-European relations. The prolonged U.S. involvement in Vietnam, resulting in the neglect of Europe, has prevented a restructuring of this traditional relationship. Now with the possibility of a Vietnam peace, however, an examination of how these relations might be revitalized seems appropriate. U.S.-European economic relations need attention, especially the trade and investment sector. Further, a solution is needed both to Britain's economic crisis and to the problem of lessening the damage to Western interests that results from Britain's continued exclusion from the Common Market. Moreover, greater cooperation in liberalizing world trade and in organizing the enormous productive capacity of Western Europe and North America is needed. NATO's entire structure and purpose must be reassessed. Its future purpose must be to maintain deterrence and to achieve a détente with the Soviet Union and its allies. A greater coordination of Western policy, a continued U.S. military presence in Europe for some years as part of an integrated NATO command, and an extension of NATO policies and actions outside the defined "treaty area" to meet the Soviet threat in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and to play a global peacekeeping role are needed. Finally, the West must seek a more productive relationship with the underdeveloped world.

485
Johnson, Frank J. MOSCOW'S NEXT MOVE. In American Security Council. Washington report, Oct. 21, 1968: 1-4.
P&GP RR

Speculates that the Soviets might move militarily into Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania, West Germany, or West Berlin, considering Moscow's invasion of Czechoslovakia and Pravda's recent assertion that national sovereignty must not prevent Communist intervention from halting "antisocialist degeneration." The new Soviet hard line makes ultimate war between the United States and the Soviet Union more probable and increases the likelihood that the next American President will confront a new international crisis. NATO is in a poor position to challenge the Soviet Union, whose capability vis-a-vis its opponents is greater than ever.

486
Johnston, Whittle. LITTLE AMERICA--BIG AMERICA. Yale review, v. 58, autumn 1968: 1-16.
AP2. Y2, v. 58

World War I should have made it plain that the exponential increase in the destructiveness of war, the greater size of the national actors, and the growth of hostile and intensely ideological world views were creating a state of affairs in which balance-of-power politics would be irrelevant. These developments in fact gave rise to two mutually antagonistic reactions

against the older state system. One was the hard Utopia of communism. The other was American liberalism. The prevailing American instinct was to reject the balance-of-power system and work for its replacement by the rule of law. This optimistic view--a product of the American enlightenment--gained credence from the Nation's early insularity and later preponderance of power, and even more perhaps from its domestic experience. In a real sense, the American nation was created by its Constitution--a legal document in which a commitment to freedom under law transcends race, religion, and class divisions. From this experience arose the belief that the domestic accomplishment--the creation of a framework within which a pluralistic order can exist in safety--could be repeated in the international sphere. From these thoughts on the international system and the American political experience, what can be concluded about the role of the United States in world affairs? Evidently, the one extreme--to be everywhere at once, making the world safe for diversity--is beyond the Nation's physical or psychological resources. On the other hand, a "Little America" policy is equally untenable. The fact of U.S. power and its impact on the other nations of the globe cannot be escaped. In the past the United States has sought to extend the principle of diversity under law from the domestic to the international community. In this it has been constantly frustrated, but the goal is not ill conceived. The collapse of the Westphalia system has made it more essential than ever that the order of the smaller realm triumph over the disorder of the larger, and this will require a greater role for America.

487
Jones, P. H. M. RE-THINK IN PEKING. Far Eastern economic review, v. 62, Oct. 3, 1968: 18-20. illus.
HC411. F18, v. 62

Briefly summarizes Peking's foreign policy toward specific countries. Discussing China's reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Jones criticizes Peking's failure to gain influence for itself within the world Communist movement by concentrating on Russia's violation of national sovereignty rather than the right of national Communist parties to choose their own path to socialism.

488
Joshi, Subhadra. INDIA MUST ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH GDR. Socialist congressman, v. 8, Oct. 15, 1968: 44.
JQ298.S6A35, v. 8

"Speech on the occasion of celebration of the 19th anniversary of the foundation of G.D.R. on 9th October, 1968."

Lauds the industrial and agricultural progress of the G.D.R., particularly its conversion to a socialist economy. Similarities between Indian and East German foreign policies lead to the conclusion that diplomatic relations between the two countries should be established, particularly in view of India's policy of nonalinement and its recognition of West Germany.

489
Kovaliov, Sergei. "PEACEFUL" AND NON-PEACEFUL COUNTER REVOLUTION. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 7, Oct. 4, 1968: 20-26.
DK266.A2R37, v. 7

Translated from Pravda, Sept. 11, 1968.
Slav Rm

Those who do not see the meaning behind the events in Czechoslovakia do not understand the sum and substance of a new historical phenomenon, the so-called "quiet" or "peaceful" revolution--a new tactic recently adopted by the anti-Socialist counterrevolutionists. Instead of using force, they camouflage their designs by pretending to oppose only "bad socialism" and to favor "good socialism." Of course, by "bad" socialism they mean pure, genuine socialism, whereas the so-called "democratic socialism," which implies a return to a bourgeois regime, is the "good socialism." Thus, the anti-Socialist forces in Czechslovakia originally said that they opposed only the bureaucratic party apparatus and stood for economic reform, but behind this smokescreen they were hiding their intention to destroy the party leadership, switch over to a market-type capitalist economy, and break away from the Socialist community. Later they would have called the masses to an armed struggle and used the slogan of "neutrality" to tear Czechoslovakia from the Communist camp. The Czechoslovak people and some Communists in other Socialist countries failed to recognize the ruses. However, the real revolutionaries saw the danger and could not wait until guns were used; that would have been a criminal and disastrous policy. The period after the suppression of the Hungarian revolution demonstrated that the Socialist countries do not oppose the rectification of past mistakes or the development and consolidation of democracy; they facilitated the process in Hungary and will do the same in Czechoslovakia. But the experience showed that the liquidation of the exploiting classes does not automatically end the class struggle and that the survivors and servants of the old regime must be watched since they might try to undermine communism in the Socialist countries with the help of foreign counterrevolutionaries.

490
Kovaliov, Sergei. SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL DUTIES. Survival, v. 10, Nov. 1968: 375-377.
U162.S9, v. 10
Translated from Pravda, Sept. 26, 1968.
Slav Rm

The Soviet Union and its Socialist allies were forced to move their troops into Prague to protect the vital interests of the Socialist community and the Socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people. Under the guise of self-determination, reactionary forces in Czechoslovakia had begun to undermine the principles of communism, thereby jeopardizing the advances made by the Czech working classes and the security of all other Socialist states. Since "world socialism is the common gain of the working people of all countries," the movement is "indivisible and its defence is the common cause of all Communists." Thus, when all other measures failed, the Socialist countries brought in armed forces to protect the working people of Czechoslovakia. "Those who speak about the 'illegal actions' of the allied socialist countries in Czechoslovakia" are ignoring the fact that "laws and legal standards are subject to the laws of the class struggle." In accordance with Marxist-Leninist teachings, the notion of sovereignty cannot justifiably be used to prohibit "support for the struggle of progressive forces."

491
Kraminov, D. IN DEFENCE OF PEACE. Soviet Union, no. 11 (224) 1968: 1. DK266.A2S574, 1968

The Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia were taken to thwart a move by various anti-Communist organizations to reclaim Czechoslovakia from the Socialist camp, force a geographical division of the Socialist countries of Europe, and thereby open a corridor to Russia. Hitler recognized the strategic position of Czechoslovakia and seized the country as a preliminary step to occupation of Russia. The Soviet blood investment in freeing the Czechs was acknowledged when they freely voted the Communist Party into office after World War II. The present capitalist moves to recapture Czech allegiance are motivated by West German revanchist policies; at the time of the Soviet aid to Czechoslovakia, Bundeswehr divisions created an obvious threat to peace in Europe and the world by massing at the Czech borders. "The steps taken by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in bringing their forces into Czechoslovakia prevented blood from flowing there and the dangerous, far-reaching consequences that such a tragedy would have had."

492
Laeuen, Harald. [EASTERN EUROPE CLUTCHED BY HEGEMONICAL POWER] Osteuropa unter dem Zugriff der Hegemonialmacht. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Oct. 25, 1968: 735-743.
D839.E86, v. 23

Discusses the Soviet "new intervention ideology," which was formulated shortly after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet forces and those of four other Warsaw Pact members. Laeuen points out the double standard in the Soviet interpretation of "proletarian internationalism," which allows the use of a threat of force to strengthen the unity of, and the Soviet domination over, the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The reaction to this policy in the international Communist movement is national communism, hostility toward Russians, and intensification of centrifugal tendencies within the bloc.

493
Laqueur, Walter. WHAT DO THEY WANT? Survival, v. 10, Nov. 1968: 361-362.
U162.S9, v. 10
Reprinted from the Sunday Times, Sept. 8, 1968.
Newsp

Despite protestations that the Czech invasion was a regrettable error for which the Russians are eager to make amends, there is every reason to believe that Moscow does not consider the occupation to be a failure. Not only is the new Czech Government more responsive to Soviet demands, but "Rumania and Yugoslavia are far more cautious now than a few weeks ago." Since there is no danger of further escalation, the move appears to fit in with Russia's desire to avoid a confrontation with the United States and yet assert its authority in areas considered to be in the Soviet sphere of influence. Because of the great risks involved, further Russian probes into central Europe are unlikely; however, the trend in Soviet policy toward "nationalism and the assertion of military power" portends danger for the Middle East and large parts of Asia. "The ideological appeal of Soviet Communism no longer exists, but the Soviet Union is still a super-power with ambitions in many parts of the world."

494
Leng, Shao-chuan. CHINA'S INTERNAL STRUGGLE IN PERSPECTIVE. Yale review, v. 58, Oct. 1968: 61-73.
AP2.Y2, v. 58

Assesses the results of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the latest and most spectacular stage of the continuing struggle between the doctrinaire adherents of Mao Tse-tung and the more pragmatic followers of Liu Shao-chi. The conflict between these two has shattered the old party organization and state administration, leaving the army as virtually the only center of power in the country. For the moment, Mao seems to have overcome his opponents, but in the long run the victory of the pragmatists seems assured by the imperatives inherent in the nature of government. Contrary to his claims, Mao's opponents are not "traitors" or "appeasers"; they are dedicated Communists, but they are also realists willing to learn from their mistakes.

495
London, Kurt L. THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT TODAY. Current history, v. 55, Sept. 1968: 159-164, 181.
D410.C82, v. 55

The Sino-Soviet conflict involves not only differing Chinese and Russian doctrinal interpretations and a struggle for leadership in the Communist world, but also divergent views on the Vietnam War. Russia considers itself an Asian as well as European power, and, although it dislikes the American presence in Vietnam, it fears that China will come to dominate Asia. Russia's dilemma is that "although a united Vietnam under Communist leadership would seem to be theoretically desirable . . . an ominous background presence of Red China would almost suggest in practice that a divided Vietnam may not [thwart] the long-range policy planners of the USSR." The Chinese, on the other hand, would object to a Soviet presence in North Vietnam. Whatever the outcome of the Paris negotiations, Vietnam will continue to play a large role in Sino-Soviet relations. The Sino-Soviet split, however, is not unbridgeable, nor will it lead to a war between the two countries. Relations between Communist states cannot be measured by Western political thinking because the nature of these relations "depends on the leaders who decree the party line according to their own lights." Indeed, as long as China's present leaders remain in power, Sino-Soviet relations are likely to get worse before they become better.

496
LOSING AN EMPIRE, FINDING A ROLE. International journal, v. 23, autumn 1968: 507-610.
D839.I5, v. 23

Contents.--British foreign policy in retrospect, by Sir Llewellyn Woodward.--Multicoloured Britain, by Alastair Buchan.--Imperial defense without the empire, by Leonard Beaton.--British maritime policy in transition, by L. W. Martin.--Great Britain's long recessional: an Australian viewpoint, by T. B. Millar.--Britain and Germany: the last three years, by D. C. Watt.--The Scottish nation faces the post-imperial world, by H. J. Hanham.--The Westminster model overseas: the Canadian case, by Alexander Brady.--Britain's future in world affairs, by F. S. Northedge.

Essays on major issues in postimperial British foreign policy. Woodward rebuts charges of British decadence and expresses optimism about Britain's

future, particularly in the context of European union. Buchan explores Britain's growing racial problems and with reluctance calls for a stricter immigration policy to prevent the nation from becoming a new racial battleground. Beaton suggests that U. S. attempts to repudiate its special relationship with Britain are primarily responsible for the British military withdrawal but that this pullback from global responsibilities is temporary. Martin speculates on the future of the British Navy but concludes that little can be said on this subject until more is known about Britain's future political role. Millar mourns the passing of Britain's restraining presence in the Far East since this has left a security gap that Australia is unable to fill. Watt traces the causes of the recent cool-off in British relations with Germany to differences over NATO financing and strategy, European union, and the nonproliferation treaty. Hanham interprets resurgent Scottish nationalism as a response to Britain's loss of worldwide empire, while Brady describes the functioning of the British system of parliamentary government in Canada. Northedge argues that even though Britain has drastically reduced its military commitments abroad, its dependence on favorable international conditions for its livelihood and physical security will require that it continue to play an active role in foreign affairs.

497
Luchsinger, F. THE PRICE OF AGGRESSION. Survival, v. 10, Nov. 1968: 365-367.
U162.S9, v. 10
Translated from Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Aug. 25, 1968. Newsp

By ordering their troops into Prague, the Russians have "shown the satellite countries quite clearly the precise limits to freedom of movement." Regardless of the derogatory consequences for the world Communist movement, the Soviet Union felt compelled to intervene forcibly in a situation considered to be a threat to its national interests. While Moscow has lost considerable ideological appeal by resorting to force, it probably has not seriously damaged the thaw in East-West relations. It is doubtful whether the United States will abandon its efforts to reach a mutual understanding with the Soviet Union since, above all, Washington desires to avoid a nuclear confrontation with Moscow. Without U. S. support, "nothing will be done that the Soviet Union could consider as an affront, either bilaterally, or in NATO, or even in matters of trade with the East."

498
McGowan, Patrick J. AFRICA AND NON-ALIGNMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY. International studies quarterly, v. 12, Sept. 1968: 262-295. D839.B2, v. 12

A comparative study of the cold war foreign policies of 32 African states, which attempts to examine the role of new states in international politics and to contribute to international relations research. Factor analysis is used "to measure on a comparative basis the African response to the choice of alignment and nonalignment presented by the loose bipolar international system of the period 1963-1965" and to determine the main policy instruments used by the Communist world to establish contact with African states; correlational analysis is used to measure the association between foreign policy responses and four categories of state characteristics--size, level of socioeconomic development, type of polity, and degree of foreign penetration. Generalizations drawn from the study are: African interaction with the Communist world was unevenly distributed--while a few states had intense relations with the Soviet bloc (high interaction), most states had little or no contact (low interaction); the most clear-cut forms of interaction were Communist economic and military aid and commercial and cultural relations between the two groups of states; African states that interacted highly with Communist states tended to interact with the entire international system; the source of military aid to African states distinguished between high interactors--supplied by the Soviet Union--and low interactors--supplied by NATO; African countries large in territory and population tended to have high interaction scores; high interactors were more developed than low interactors, had closed societies, and received more foreign aid from all sources than did the low or medium interactors; low interactors tended both to belong to West European-controlled economic groupings and to have dependent economies; and at least nine of the 10 types of African-Communist world interaction studied, such as air agreements with the Communist world and Soviet economic technicians in residence, were highly intercorrelated and were "individual indicators of a general foreign policy orientation of African willingness to accept or avoid contacts with the communist world." In conclusion, five research hypotheses are suggested, which, if confirmed by subsequent research, could aid in explaining the behavior patterns described in this study.

499
Malaviya, H. D. G.D.R. --THE GERMANY OF TOMORROW. Socialist congressman, v. 8, Oct. 15, 1968: 44-45. JQ298.S6A35, v. 8

The maintenance of a 23-year European peace, albeit somewhat shaky, reflects the success of the East German Socialist state in controlling the "traditional German militarists and war-mongers" who "are at it still in West Germany." East Germany has commanded the respect and allegiance of the emerging nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, who see in the success of the G. D. R. a pattern for their own development. This success influences those West Germans, particularly the youth, who accurately perceive no future for West German policy, to revolt in protest. "It is obvious that the German Democratic Republic of today is the Germany of tomorrow." Consequently the Indian Government is ignoring the shape of the future if it continues to refuse recognition of the G. D. R.

500
Meier, Viktor. [LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATION IN THE BALKANS] Grenzen und Möglichkeiten der Zusammenarbeit auf dem Balkan. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Oct. 25, 1968: 753-762.
D839.E86, v. 23

Considers the Rumanian concept of cooperation between the Balkan States most realistic and promising, despite Yugoslavia's previous apathy to it. Rumania wants close-knit cooperation within the European framework regardless of the different sociopolitical systems of the states involved. Yugoslavia still harbors high hopes in the international solidarity of the Socialist states. Because it is deeply engaged in the Third World, its foreign policy is less Europe oriented than Rumania's. Meier outlines the political history of the Balkans in the 19th and 20th centuries and emphasizes the negative effect of both nationalism and the big powers' politics on the peninsula's peace and security.

501
Morgenthau, Hans J. THE FATE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. New republic, v. 159, Dec. 7, 1968: 19-21.
AP2. N624, v. 159

Excerpt from his forthcoming book, A New Foreign Policy.

Both nuclear superpowers are confronted with the dilemma of avoiding nuclear war while attempting to pursue national goals successfully. Such a policy often involves compromise, which is particularly difficult for the Soviet Union since "the legitimacy of the Soviet government is predicated at the very least upon the appearance of success." Thus, when Czechoslovakia began initiating reforms that could result in a challenge to its "political, economic, and military orientation" toward the Soviet Union, Russia decided to try to forestall this threat to its role "as the fountainhead of international Communism" by military intervention. Kremlin leaders were anxious to ward off the erosion of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe since, with the exception of East Germany and Poland, East European countries are not completely dependent upon the Soviet Union and may have followed the Czech example. In moving away from the Soviet orbit these countries would naturally increase their ties with their other powerful European neighbor, West Germany. The Soviet Union was determined to avert this possibility since it "regards this alternative as a threat to its security and the stability of Europe." Viewed in this light the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia demonstrates that the Communist governments tied to the Soviet Union "are not expressions of the popular will" but are pawns to satisfy the needs of the Russian state. It remains to be seen how long the ruling elites in these countries will remain unaffected by the spirit of freedom of the rebellious populations.

502
Muhlen, Norbert. BONN LOOKS AT PRAGUE. National review, v. 20, Dec. 17, 1968: 1270-1271.
AP2. N3545, v. 20

Most Germans are hoping the new administration will revise the disastrous policies of the Kennedy-Johnson era that involve America's European allies. The U. S. attitude toward the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia reinforced German fears that America is more concerned with avoiding nuclear war than protecting the interests of its NATO partners. In trusting Russia to confine itself to its own "sphere of influence," U. S. policymakers fail to recognize that an aggressive power such as the Soviet Union would not hesitate to violate the integrity of the American sphere, which includes West Germany. Besides increasing disillusionment with recent U. S. foreign policy, the Czech incident impaired Foreign Minister Willy Brandt's efforts to seek rapprochement with East Europe. The hope that the Communist monolith was dissolving at last "into areas of independent and liberal Communism" proved only illusory. Now there is a good deal of pressure within Germany to forget its "bridge-building" endeavors and return to the NATO policy of military superiority in Europe. "Responsible West German voices" are stressing the need for the United States to give European security requirements precedence over Soviet demands and to diminish its emphasis on the "American-Russian alliance against a nuclear war," which is epitomized by its advocation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

503
Newton, William R. SOVIET AIMS AND WEAKNESSES. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 6, fall 1968: 321-330.
D839. A85, v. 6

An effective Western policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe presupposes a balance of forces between the two camps. Consequently, it is disconcerting to observe that, while unilateral force reductions are being carried out in the West, the Soviet Union continues to increase its own military capabilities for flexible response, maritime operations, and the projection of its power into every corner of the globe. Its politicomilitary interventions in the Third World and the Mediterranean are especially disturbing and provide evidence that, whatever may be the case in Europe, elsewhere the cold war is still very much alive. The Soviet position, of course, is not without weaknesses. Unrest among its satellites is a major source of anxiety for the Soviet Union and reduces the shortrun prospects for détente or a Soviet agreement on mutual force reductions in central Europe. In the long run, however, a dissolution of the Communist bloc will encourage a lessening of East-West tensions. The West, while sympathetic to these pluralistic trends, has scrupulously avoided interfering in the internal affairs of the Warsaw Pact regimes, but the Soviet Union has not shown a like degree of restraint in its relations with the West. Apropos of this, Suslov said recently that "peaceful coexistence is an important form of the struggle against imperialism." The truth is that the Soviet approach to politics is still governed by the Leninist concept of democratic centralism, which is just another name for totalitarianism, and by the myth of Marxist-Leninist infallibility. Only very recently have some Communists begun to raise questions about these doctrines. Meanwhile, the West must continue, as in the past, to pursue its own course with an open mind and a tolerance for error, which, in the long run, may be the only way to peace.

504
Okabe, Tatsumi. THE NATURE OF THE "THREAT OF CHINA": A JAPANESE VIEW. Developing economies, v. 6, June 1968: 221-240.
HC59. 7. D4, v. 6

Japanese policymakers have tended to emphasize Chinese capabilities over intentions, thus concluding that Japan must cooperate closely with the United States to create a strong nuclear deterrent against potential Chinese aggression. However, a consideration of China's objectives based on its past behavior indicates that the greatest danger to Japan arises not from the Chinese nuclear arsenal "but from international tension stemming from the 'Sino-American confrontation.'" World revolution, forceful acquisition of territory, national security, and the establishment of a position in international society are frequently listed as China's most significant medium-range objectives. However, China's support of conservative regimes in Cambodia and Pakistan does not conform to its announced revolutionary strategy; moreover, China would not be inclined to seize undisputed foreign territory since Mao Tse-tung's ideology attaches great importance to winning the friendship of neighboring peoples, and peaceful trade agreements would meet China's economic needs more satisfactorily than coercion. If national security considerations were given high priority, China would actively pursue the easing of

tensions with America and would refrain from alienating the Soviet Union. China's refusal to accept a two-China policy in order to secure a seat in the United Nations and its unpopular activities in Africa and Asia indicate that improvement of its international status is also not a top priority goal. At this point the only goal that does not appear to be subordinated to others is the liberation of Taiwan, which is considered indispensable for the completion of the Chinese revolution. In pursuit of this goal, Chinese leaders are promoting worldwide national liberation struggles to occupy American resources and turn the United States into a "paper tiger" as far as Formosa is concerned. There is every reason to believe that China's nuclear aspirations are directed solely against the United States and need not be feared by other countries. Only if Japan were to become involved in a war between China and the United States would China be likely to unleash its military forces against Japan. Thus Japan's security interests would best be served not by strengthening its relations with America against the "Chinese threat" but by encouraging better communications with China, attempting to ease the confrontation between the United States and China, and by promoting unity among the Japanese people.

505
Orestov, O. MUDDY STREAM. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 20, Jan. 8, 1969: 16-17.
D839.C87, v. 20
Translated and condensed from Pravda, Dec. 19, 1968.
Slav Rm

In the guise of "'fighters' for Czechoslovak democracy," the British news media, particularly the press, have bombarded the Soviet Union with invectives at every opportunity since August 1968. The improved Anglo-Soviet relations of the past few years and the mutual trade, cultural, economic, and scientific agreements are being forsaken so that Britain may "gain the 'confidence' of the Bonn revanchists and with their help . . . try to make its way into the Common Market under the threadbare banner of anticommunism." Despite assurances from the British Foreign Office that news media operations are completely independent of their control and do not reflect official views, it is well known that the "independent" press is a puppet of London's Fleet Street millionaires. Britain's professions of continuing good will toward the Soviet Union are to be seriously doubted in the face of these onslaughts.

506
Pachter, Henry M. [WORLD POWER RUSSIA. FOREIGN-POLICY STRATEGY THROUGHOUT THREE CENTURIES] Weltmacht Russland; aussenpolitische Strategie in drei Jahrhunderten [von] Heinz Pächter [Oldenburg] Stalling [1968] 399 p.
DK66.P3

Partial contents.--For an introduction.--pt. 1. Historical perspectives.--pt. 2. Soviet theory on foreign policy. Lenin's foreign policy.--pt. 4. Liquidation of communism.--pt. 5. The Great Patriotic War.--pt. 6. The Red empire.--pt. 7. Nuclear stalemate and Stalin's legacy.--pt. 8. Khrushchev's era.--pt. 9. Conflicts in the Third World.--pt. 10. Soviet policy yesterday, today and tomorrow.

Contends that the present East-West struggle is primarily power politics, motivated by reason of state rather than ideology, and aimed at establishment of a new system of states in place of the old "concert of powers" that was shattered by World War II.

507
Parry, Albert. WHY MOSCOW COULDN'T STAND PRAGUE'S DEVIATION. New York times magazine, Sept. 1, 1968: 5, 39-45, 47. illus.
AP2.N6575, 1968

The Soviet leadership is haunted by the specter of a second political party emerging in a Communist country. Half a century ago it was still possible to be a militant Socialist and a supporter of multiparty politics, but Lenin, to whom any opposition was anathema, forcibly put an end to that state of affairs. Stalin merely pushed Lenin's party doctrine to its well-known extreme. A few second-echelon Soviet leaders have always thought otherwise on this question, and in Yugoslavia the idea of a multiparty system has had a very lively career among disenchanted and rebellious intellectuals. More recently, a nihilist trend bordering on anarchism and opposing itself to all party formations has been gaining influence in the Communist bloc. Nevertheless, in Czechoslovakia the multiparty idea was taking on a new life. The supposedly moribund National Front was proving to be more than a mere facade. Dubcek had supposed that a revived Front would be independent but loyal, and that it would concern itself with social questions, not political ones. However, social questions have political dimensions, and ferment began to spill over into areas touching the politicoeconomic foundations of the regime. The Soviet leadership has a domino theory of its own. According to the theory, turmoil in Czechoslovakia posed a threat to stability throughout the Soviet bloc. The Kremlin did not doubt Dubcek's loyalty but did fear he was too naive to prevent the first domino from falling. At whatever cost in prestige abroad, Brezhnev had to intervene.

508
Pfaff, William. THE 'LESSON' OF MUNICH. Commonweal, v. 88, Aug. 9, 1968: 519-520.
AP2.C6897, v. 88

In 1938 Great Britain and France betrayed Czechoslovakia at the Munich Four Power Conference for the sake of peace and to avoid World War II. Because of this example the United States, "impressed with the futility of appeasing international brutality," intervened in Vietnam. Now a new Czechoslovak crisis has arisen, and a decision by the United States is urgently needed. No one wants a war between the superpowers; thus direct intervention is impractical. Besides, since 1956 U.S. intervention to counter a Soviet invasion has not been a credible threat to the Soviet Union. But the United States could threaten to break the détente, refuse further arms control negotiations, refuse political cooperation with the Soviet Union if it acts against Czechoslovakia, and extend some support to the country in the form of open negotiation on the Czechoslovak gold sequestered by the United States since World War II--in short "offer to resume the Cold War with Russia on painful and expensive terms, accepting the risks that this implies." Unfortunately American policymakers are more interested in good relations with Russia, arms control negotiations, and the Soviet Union's assistance in extricating the United States from the Vietnam War than in the lesson which may be taught by successful Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. These policymakers do not seek peace; nobody thinks that a protective gesture on behalf of Czechoslovakia will provoke general war. They want to secure the collaborative convenience of the big powers even at the cost of Czechoslovakia. This is the U.S. response to

the lesson of Munich, which is primarily a lesson concerning "the political morality and constancy of the democracies."

509
QUEST FOR PEACE IN EUROPE [editorial] ACEN news, no. 137, Nov./Dec. 1968: 1-3.
D1050.A15, 1968

Questions the accuracy of the Soviet belief that maintenance of unchallenged hegemony in Eastern Europe is militarily and ideologically in its national interest. Each repressive Soviet act increases the enmity of the East European countries; thus the policy of "balancing . . . on top of a powder keg" seems a strange military strategy. Moreover, the Soviet policy generates countermeasures by the West and keeps Europe in constant crisis. On the other hand, the time is past for an identical ideology for all Communist-ruled countries that was possible under Stalin in the postwar chaos and before the break with China. Only a reestablishment of the legal order based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights--the return of the rights of self-determination, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity--would speedily neutralize the explosive elements in Eastern Europe. While the loss of domination might seem unpalatable to the Soviet Union, it would provide that country with peaceful neighbors on its western border, who would mind their own domestic developments, and thus increase Soviet security in respect to China.

510
Rakhmaninov, I. SOVIET-FRENCH COOPERATION AND EUROPE. International affairs (Moscow) no. 9 Sept. 1968: 37-43. D839.I465, 1968

Frustrated by the failure of the Franco-German alliance and not wanting to be reduced by the United States to the status of an unequal partner in NATO, France decided to reorient its policy toward cooperation with the Soviet Union and for this purpose to pursue a plan to ease tensions and develop Franco-Soviet relations. While the two countries have different social systems and therefore do not always see eye to eye in political matters, both realize that their cooperation is a key element in the normalization of the European situation. General de Gaulle's concept of European cooperation "from the Atlantic to the Urals" is a happy alternative to the policy of Atlanticism and makes NATO superfluous. Both countries feel that the security of Europe depends on the prevention of a German militarist and Nazi revival. This can be achieved only if the European security system is based on sound guarantees that rule out for all time the possibility of any fresh German aggression, such as recognition of existing European frontiers including the Oder-Neisse Line, prevention of German access to nuclear weapons, and recognition of the two German states. On the first two guarantees France and the Soviet Union agree. The development of Franco-Soviet relations depends largely on the identity of the national interests they may share as the two biggest powers on the European Continent and because of their geographic location. Their cooperation will necessarily have a beneficial effect on the situation in Europe.

511
REPRESENTATION OF CHINA. UN monthly chronicle, v. 5, Dec. 1968: 22-31.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 5

Announces both the General Assembly rejection by a vote of 44 to 58, with 23 abstentions, of a resolution to expel the representatives of the Republic of China from the United Nations and replace them with representatives of the People's Republic of China and its defeat of a proposal by a vote of 30 to 67, with 27 abstentions, to establish an ad hoc committee to examine the China representation problem thoroughly. During the debate a total of 60 speakers expressed their views, some requesting the restoration of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and condemning as unrealistic the arguments of the opposition and others maintaining that it would be unfair to expel the Republic of China, which, unlike the Peking government, had consistently cooperated with U.N. endeavors to secure peace and disarmament.

512
Richard, Ivor. WHAT KIND OF FOREIGN POLICY? Socialist commentary, Oct. 1968: 22-24.
HX3.S74, 1968

The dilemma of Great Britain's foreign and defense policies is how the nation can, at a time when its military position is declining, maintain and possibly increase its potential to influence those world events that might affect its future. The resolution of this dilemma should be the object of Britain's foreign policy because, by maximizing its influence over events which affect it, uncertainty is reduced and a more stable framework of operations is established. Since European affairs have the greatest effect on Britain's security, and the East-West confrontation is potentially the most dangerous in that area, Britain's influence should be directed toward minimizing uncertainty on the European Continent. This can be accomplished most effectively through a collective defense alliance, within which Britain should exert the maximum possible influence. The recent events in Eastern Europe presage an unpredictable phase of international relations, which requires that NATO be maintained and the level of its conventional forces at least stabilized. Britain should remain in a position to affect the level of troop strength and thereby remove potential danger. However, the events of Czechoslovakia demonstrated that NATO is merely a military backstop and greater European political unity is needed to ensure effective crisis management.

513
Richter, Hans. [THE SYSTEM OF TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP AND AID BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST STATES--ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND IMPORTANCE] Das System der Freundschafts- und Beistandsverträge zwischen den sozialistischen Staaten--seine historische Entwicklung und Bedeutung. Dokumentation der Zeit; Informations-Archiv, v. 20, no. 409, 1968: 12-20.
DD261.D4, v. 20

Explains that the system of treaties of friendship and mutual assistance between the Socialist states that was originally based on the principle of "proletarian internationalism" has been guided in the course of its development by the principle of "Socialist internationalism," which represents a higher form of international cooperation. "Socialist internationalism" expresses the interests of the commonwealth of Socialist states as a whole, whereby it adapts the system of treaties to important changes for the commonwealth. This principle, moreover, adapts itself to changes within each Socialist state; viz, a member of

the community. Richter points out the paramount importance in those treaties of provisions for "European security" and the territorial integrity of Socialist states. Further, he discusses the Warsaw Treaty Organization and its role in securing Cuba's freedom, in torpedoing the establishment of NATO's multilateral nuclear force or Atlantic nuclear force, and in aiding the Arab States against the Israeli aggression. A list of over 30 bilateral treaties between the Socialist states is appended.

514
Simpson, Smith. THE NATURE AND DIMENSIONS OF DIPLOMACY. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Resources and needs of American diplomacy. Philadelphia, 1968. (Its Annals, v. 380, Nov. 1968) p. 135-144.
H1.A4, v. 380

Diplomacy is the art and science of international politics. It has also acquired a domestic political thrust. Possessing in modern times the dimension of organization, it faces the serious problem of how personal and creative political skills in foreign affairs can be married to bureaucratic procedures. If diplomacy is to be dynamic, capable of providing an effective alternative to war, organization must become its servant rather than its master. While generally viewed as the means of carrying out foreign policies, diplomacy generates resources needed for the formulation of sound policy, and its practitioners should therefore be fully utilized in the policy-forming process. At the same time, the resources of diplomacy must be considerably amplified in all its dimensions: intellectual and cultural, political, research and analysis, planning, education and training, and others which space limitations deny treatment here. We should develop and use the total human resources of our diplomatic establishment, including those of consular and junior personnel, in the pursuit of our international objectives, providing officers with an education and training commensurate to the demands placed upon them by modern diplomacy. For this purpose, the possibilities of a Foreign Service (Foreign Affairs) Academy deserve further consideration. (Abstract supplied)

515
Simpson, Smith [ed.] RESOURCES AND NEEDS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Resources and needs of American diplomacy. Philadelphia, 1968. (Its Annals, v. 380, Nov. 1968) p. 1-144.
H1.A4, v. 380

Contents. --Foreword, by Smith Simpson. --The problems we face: an introductory comment, by Foy D. Kohler. --The President: a changing role?, by Howard Furnas. --Organizational imperatives, by Graham Martin. --The managerial crisis, by John Ensor Harr. --Policy-planning in the new diplomacy, by Fisher Howe. --Research and analysis, by E. Raymond Platig. --People: the squandered resource, by Charles W. Bray III. --Morale, by Norris S. Haselton. --Down in generation gap: the junior foreign service officer looks at the system, by Elizabeth A. Bean. --Education and training for our new diplomacy, by Richard H. Ullman. --Resources of other departments: a case study, by George L-P Weaver. --Politico-military problems and resources, by John C. Ausland. --Foreign policy and diplomatic initiative in Washington, by Daniel C. Lazorchick. --Dealing with Congress, by David K. Willis. --The State Department at home, by Peter F. Krogh. --Lessons of Vietnam, by Richard Critchfield. --The nature and dimensions of diplomacy, by Smith Simpson.

Essays that explore major problem areas in U.S. diplomacy. The focus of these essays is on the organization and management of diplomacy and the recruitment and training of the diplomat, rather than the substance of U.S. foreign policy. The chief problem is how to combine the diplomatic art with large-scale organization in such a way that the former is the master of the latter. Too often the reverse relationship asserts itself, with the consequence that the political skills and personal creativeness so essential to diplomacy are stifled. These issues have been neglected in the past, but in the modern age they can no longer be ignored since diplomacy offers the only alternative to war.

516
Sommer, Theo. CONTINUATION OF DETENTE. Survival, v. 10, Nov. 1968: 370-372.
U162.S9, v. 10
Translated from Die Zeit, Sept. 20, 1968.
AP30.Z39

In the wake of the Prague debacle it is time for Bonn to reassess and redefine Germany's European policies. Bonn's relations with Western Europe should not be totally governed by its relations with the East. German policymakers must acknowledge that the goal of an integrated Europe is unreachable at the present time and the old concept of European unity is impractical. Moreover, "the German policy of peace and détente should be marked by a sober sense of its limitations." It must be realized that rapprochement with the East is impossible as long as the other side refuses to tolerate internal social or political changes. However, this does not completely rule out progress toward easing East-West relations; Germany can still contribute to détente by making clear its readiness to support efforts in that direction. It should demonstrate to the Russians that it is prepared to respect Russian security interests, although it "would wish to see no Soviet interference in the process towards ideological diversity within their sphere of power, and consequently, in the contacts between East and West." Furthermore Bonn should create "modalities for reunification which would render reunification itself either superfluous, or its absence negligible" and should express its willingness to accept the existing Czech and Polish frontiers.

517
Sorenson, Jay B. PAYING FOR PRAGUE. Far Eastern economic review, v. 62, Nov. 7, 1968: 333-335. illus.
HC411.F18, v. 62

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia halted Prague's independent course but added impetus to that of other Communist Parties. An example is the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), which "has made independence the dominant theme in its relations with Moscow" since the invasion, and has been firmly committed to noninterference and equality for all Communist Parties; the JCP's strong condemnation of Moscow's action as a "disgrace to socialism" and "not permissible" gives testimony to its position. The JCP, as one of the more important nonruling Asian Communist Parties, is important to Russia: The Russians cannot reassert their leadership in the world Communist movement without Asian representation, and JCP

domestic activities are important to Soviet foreign policies--especially its opposition to the U.S.-Japanese Friendship Treaty. Unless Moscow changes its course and abandons its interventionist and repressionist ways, however, it can not gain the JCP's support and cooperation. To protect its independence, the JCP could ally with other Communist Parties, particularly in Asia, and form a neutral bloc, but now the prospects for such a bloc are only fair.

518
Spyla, W. POLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY. Socialist congressman, v. 8, Sept. 1, 1968: 11-12.
JQ298.S6A35, v. 8

Poland's foreign policy is based on the premise that "all countries and nations have an equal right to live in conditions of freedom, sovereignty and peace"; consequently, it deplores the American aggression in Vietnam and Israel's attacks on those Arab States that represent the most potent force for progressive reform in the Middle East. The most effective policy to combat imperialism and neocolonialism is a strong union of nations dedicated to noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries and a firm commitment to aid the victims of imperialist aggression. In these interests Poland has advanced several proposals to enhance the future of peace; e.g., a European treaty renouncing the use of force in the affairs of other nations, dissolution of the NATO and Warsaw Pact blocs, and establishment of a "zone of thinned-out armaments" encompassing Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East and West Germany.

519
Starner, Frances L. NO 'CAMOUFLAGE SURRENDER.' Far Eastern economic review, v. 62, Oct. 17, 1968: 155-156, 159. HC411.F18, v. 62

Interview with Thailand's Foreign Minister, Thanat Koman. The Thai leader, commenting on his country's attitude toward various regional problems, maintains that British withdrawal from Southeast Asia will not directly affect Thailand, that U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam would affect more profoundly the United States as a world power than the Southeast Asian countries, that a settlement should not be imposed upon Vietnam, and that once China decides to deal sensibly with other nations, Southeast Asia should be prepared to deal with it.

520
Stillman, Edmund. THE END OF AMERICAN INNOCENCE. Yale review, v. 58, Oct. 1968: 17-27.
AP2.Y2, v. 58

America is the product of a geography and historical experience radically different from any other on earth. For this reason its society and politics cannot serve as a pattern for the rest of mankind. Furthermore, this unique historical experience prevents Americans from understanding the repetitive tragedy and violence infesting other nations or sympathizing with the kind of mentality these conditions spawn. As a result, American interventions outside of Western Europe normally have done far more harm than good, as the present Vietnam affair well illustrates. Some critics now see that the American experience has little relevance abroad and that optimism and idealism in foreign policy too often reflect an "arrogance of power." The old verities in both foreign and domestic policy are under attack by Negro militants and the "angry and dispirited children of the triumphant . . . American middle classes." The Nation seems fated to experience a series of tragic lessons on the limits of American mythology and power, and in these heartbreaking events it will lose its innocence abroad. But failure at home could have more serious consequences. Although the alienated in American society have no ideology at present, this moral and emotional vacuum cannot last forever. If it is filled with a new antirationalist faith in rebellion against enlightenment ideals, an activist nihilism will be the result, to which would be added the growing separatism of Negro militants, encouraged by the general breakdown of loyalty to existing institutions. The prospects for the future are murky indeed.

521
Thomas, John R. SOVIET RUSSIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. Current history, v. 55, Nov. 1968: 275-280, 302-303. D410.C82, v. 55

Russian involvement in Southeast Asia has resulted in part from voluntary support of the national liberation war in Vietnam and in part from events beyond Soviet control. The original Soviet objective of advancing communism has expanded since the escalation of the Vietnam conflict to include forcing the United States off of the Asian mainland and thwarting Red China's imperialist ambitions. The Russians have been able to exploit the Vietnam conflict against both the United States and Communist China and gain greater influence for themselves in North Vietnam. The Soviet Union would prefer a stalemate in Vietnam that would eventually end in a Communist victory. This would reduce the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation, and would prevent a quick Communist victory, thereby proving the failure of the Chinese-advocated, aggressive strategy for winning "People's Wars." Moreover, a stalemate would keep the United States and Red China involved with each other and prevent them from blocking Soviet interests in other areas. Finally, an extended conflict would cause the North Vietnamese to rely more heavily on the Russians for assistance and would ensure that the United States contain Communist China until either India or Japan is strong enough to do so. Once this is accomplished, the Soviets could resume their goal of driving the United States out of Asia. Moreover, the Soviet Union is concerned about a possible two-front threat that may be posed by Red China and West Germany in the future, conceivably with political collusion. In the event of this contingency, Vietnam would play a minor role in Soviet policy considerations, but a Communist-dominated Vietnam would be important symbolically for its pro-Peking or pro-Moscow orientation. Also, the Soviets would benefit from Vietnam's local ambitions, which would place it in conflict with Communist China. The Russians display their goals of expelling the United States and thwarting Red Chinese ambitions in Southeast Asia in other areas of their Southeast Asian policy. They oppose U.S. encouragement of regional security organizations; they prefer facing a divided Southeast Asia in which the individual countries are exposed to greater Soviet influence. Further, they hope to use these nations to contain Red China and have been willing to deal with them on a nonideological basis to do so.

522
Tormey, James H. SPAIN: HER FUTURE AND DEFENSE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Jan. 1969: 90-96. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 49

Evaluates recent trends in Spanish domestic politics from the point of view of their likely impact on Spanish foreign policy. Tormey predicts political stability, moderate liberalization, continuing economic progress, and continuity in foreign policy for Spain in the immediate future.

523
TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC ON THE TERMS OF TEMPORARY STATIONING OF THE SOVIET TROOPS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 7, Nov. 1, 1968: 3-10. DK266.A2R37, v. 7
Translated from Pravda, Oct. 19, 1968.
Slav Rm

Full text of the treaty concluded in Prague on October 16, 1968, which legalized the stationing of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

524
Ulam, Adam B. EXPANSION AND COEXISTENCE; THE HISTORY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1917-67. New York, Praeger [1968] 775 p. DK266.U49
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents. --The sources. --The prelude: 1914-18. --The first steps: 1918-21. --Transition: 1921-33. --The search for peace and the coming of the war: 1934-39. --Coexistence with Germany: 1939-41. --The diplomacy of the Grand Alliance: 1941-45. --Victory and discord. --The end of an era. --Changing directions: 1950-56. --The perils of Khrushchev. --Choice deferred. --Index.

An analytical history of the first 50 years of Soviet foreign policy. Ulam's major concern is to discover to what extent the Soviet Union has been induced by its experience with external relations to modify the original ideological premises of its diplomacy. Today, faced with a growing awareness that the national interests of the Soviet Union and the interests of world communism do not coincide and challenged by the urgent need to adapt the Soviet political system to a world situation radically different from that at its founding, the Soviet leadership is uncertain and apprehensive about the future. The great appeal of communism in its early period was its promise of international peace, but after 50 years of Soviet diplomacy it is clear that the movement, by its emphasis on political power, has the contrary effect of continually aggravating international tensions. The present leadership can either continue to pursue ideological expansion and the phantom of Communist bloc unity--the former goal in conflict with the U.S.S.R.'s national interests, the latter, unattainable--or choose to break with the past by forsaking expansion in all its forms and seeking international stability.

525
Ullerich, Curt. [WORLD POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS] Der weltpolitische Hintergrund der tschechoslowakischen Krise. Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, v. 16, Sept./Dec. 1968: 203-212. D410.Z4, v. 16

Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, which cost the Soviet Union a considerable loss of prestige in the international Communist movement and the world at large, was undoubtedly decided upon after cool-headed probing of advantages and disadvantages of such action. Moscow feared that the Czechoslovak reform trend would go out of control in the fashion of Hungary in 1956, and a most important bulwark for the Soviet defense system would fall out of the Warsaw Pact. The behavior of the West and especially West Germany, made the Soviet Union expect a near anti-Communist offensive aimed at disintegration of the Soviet bloc from within. The Soviet Union has been seriously concerned by the aggressive aspirations of West Germany. It appeared to Moscow that, owing to the naivete of the Czechoslovak leaders, Bonn's new Eastern policy would finally be a success in the bloc at no costs to the German Federal Republic. "As long as the United States stays in Bavaria and in Hessen, elementary security reasons simply forbid Kremlin to allow any risks in its external forward zones." Bonn must realize this. It should renounce its illusionary revisionist hopes and devote itself to greater West European tasks. It should recognize the Oder-Neisse Line, the German Democratic Republic, and the Socialist status quo in Eastern Europe for the sake of European peace and security.

526
Wagner, Wolfgang. [EUROPEAN POLICY AFTER THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS] Europäische Politik nach der tschechoslowakischen Krise. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Sept. 25, 1968: 651-658. D839.E86, v. 23

Moscow's decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia militarily "has dramatically revealed the Soviet leadership's lack of confidence in its own ability to assert the Soviet position in the Socialist camp and in central Europe with means other than pure and simple violence." The Russians feared the peacetime disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization's southern flank. Since their manifestation of force in this instance marks their weakness rather than their strength, it would be wrong for the West to react to it as if NATO's military position in Europe were seriously threatened thereby. The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia certainly does not denote Russia's increased preparedness to attack NATO territory; Moscow is quite aware of the suicidal character of any such invasion and has effectively been deterred from such action by NATO's military posture until now. The Soviet bloc's Achilles' heel is the attractiveness to its peoples of Western ideas and ways of life. The Czechoslovak Communist reformers, who realized this perfectly, wanted to make communism more attractive. Western Europe should not react to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia by overemphasizing NATO's armaments needs because this would adversely affect the West's remarkable influence on East European peoples. The most fertile conditions for such influence are those of the relaxation of East-West tensions.

527
Whiting, Allen S. TIME FOR A CHANGE IN OUR CHINA POLICY. New York times magazine, Dec. 15, 1968: 28-29, 108-112, 114-116. illus. AP2.N6575, 1968

America's current China policy simply perpetuates the negative practices of the Korean War-McCarthy era, and the argument that the United States must wait

for the "right moment" for a change means, in practice, that there will be no change. A study of the circumstances surrounding the 1962 Formosa Straits confrontation and the Sino-Indian border conflict shows that the crucial difficulty in the way of improved Sino-American relations is mutual misperception. The same study also serves to put China's aggressive behavior in perspective by revealing that it is essentially a response to imagined threats in times of domestic instability and vulnerability. Just as the motives of China's aggressiveness have been misunderstood, so its ability and willingness to engage in more indirect forms of intervention have been exaggerated, for in fact China is incapable of giving more than token support to foreign pro-Peking movements. As to the future, the military elite that now governs China will have little time for wars of national liberation and is too much aware of costs and vulnerabilities to engage in conventional wars or nuclear adventures. Certainly it is true that the interests of China and the United States often conflict, but this need not prevent improvements in their relations. The United States can encourage this development by ending the trade embargo on China, withdrawing its aircraft and warships from an area of reasonable size off China's coast, and possibly by inviting the Chinese to participate in an expanded Vietnam peace conference. After this, the questions of recognition and U. N. membership could be discussed in secret. It is encouraging that the Chinese have recently called for a Sino-American agreement to be based on the "five principles of coexistence." The Nixon administration will have "some relatively happy options" to exploit in moving toward a policy that will give both the United States and China new flexibility in their foreign relations.

528
Wilson, Desmond P. STRATEGIC PROJECTIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS IN THE SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONSHIP. Orbis, v. 12, summer 1968: 504-517.
D839.O68, v. 12

Surveys the policy options the Soviet Union has in its relations with Cuba--it can withdraw from Cuba and maintain either a hard-line or soft-line policy toward the West or retain the island and maintain a hard-line or less militant policy--and the ways they affect future Soviet-American relations. Wilson creates several scenarios illustrating these policy options, and he speculates that a Russian withdrawal could be hampered by the U. S. -O. A. S. (Organization of American States) embargo, which makes Cuba solely dependent on the Soviet Union. He concludes that, had Russia known in 1960 the nature of entanglement that could arise from a distant and indefensible Caribbean island, it might never have committed itself to Castro's regime.

II. THE STRATGIC ENVIRONMENT

A. MODERN WAR

529
Brighton, P. THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 8, winter 1968: 289-293.
UG635. G7A1252, v. 8

Extracts from a paper written by Wing Commander Brighton in 1967 after his return from a tour of duty in Saigon as Assistant Defense Attaché.

The U.S. experience in Vietnam has provided many useful lessons in the deployment of airpower in counter-insurgency operations. Massive airpower has been used successfully in the south to prevent the Vietcong from assembling sizable attack forces and inhibiting their daytime movements. It was discovered that concentrating the aircraft in a few strongly defended areas and on aircraft carriers provided the best defense against guerrilla attacks. Since most strikes have to be made on short notice anywhere within an area of 65,000 square miles, they are controlled by an airborne Forward Air Controller who patrols his assigned region, locates and marks the targets, directs the strikes, and assesses their results. In addition to the fixed-wing ground attack aircraft, helicopters have proved extremely useful in countering guerrilla operations in Vietnam. Although deficiencies in night and all weather close-support capabilities must be overcome before airpower can be fully exploited in future counterinsurgency operations, the Vietnam experience has contributed substantially to the solution of many of the problems likely to be encountered.

530
Fink, Donald J. STRATEGIC WARFARE. Science and technology, Oct. 1968: 54-65, 67-68. illus.
Q1.1587, 1968

How many ICBM's must we have to deter a potential aggressor? It is relatively easy to engineer an offense once this question has been answered. But the defense side is a more complicated problem. Many new roles have opened for the defense and there is no single measure of its effectiveness. However, the author concludes that the recently announced Sentinel area defense system should at least be able to defend the U.S. against "primitive" attacks by a country such as Red China. With an offensive force now believed strong enough to deter the Soviets from making a surprise attack, some balance has been struck in the action-reaction cycle that has marked the history of the arms race. Many potential threats could change this balance--the Soviet deployment of ICBM's with more than one warhead, for instance. How to meet these threats in a way that will be stabilizing rather than escalating is the challenge that confronts us. (Abstract supplied)

531
Gatland, Kenneth. A NUCLEAR ANALYSIS. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization. EMO national digest, v. 8, Aug./Sept. 1968: 14-19. illus.
UA926. C295, v. 8

Published in "the Canadian Magazine, May 4, 1968, . . . under the title 'You Have Seven Minutes to Live.'"

Discusses the present power balance in the nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia in relation to the emerging small nuclear forces. The equal sophistication of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons and advance warning and communications systems, as well as the threat of the powers' mutual annihilation, provides a basis for the avoidance of thermonuclear war. The nuclear arms buildups in other nations, particularly China, France, and Great Britain, threaten this strategic balance. The United States and Russia, increasingly concerned over the threat to world security, agree on the necessity of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

532
Goldsmith, R. F. K. SOME DILEMMAS OF DEFENCE IN THE 1970'S. Contemporary review, v. 213, Oct. 1968: 195-199. AP4. C7, v. 213

Discusses the nature of revolutionary guerrilla warfare and the kind of threat it poses to Western security. Goldsmith believes that the proved inadequacy of orthodox military methods for supressing revolution-minded guerrillas is one reason--in addition to the regularly cited financial ones--for the recent sharp cutbacks in British defense forces. He points out that the British have more experience with counterguerrilla operations than any other Western state and suggests that this knowledge be put to use defending friendly nations--particularly those of the Commonwealth--against internal subversion.

533
Krebs, Robert G. BEAUFRE AND TOTAL STRATEGY. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Dec. 1968: 34-40. Z6723. U35, v. 48

Gen. André Beaufre, director of the Institut Français d'Etudes Stratégiques, defines strategy as the art of directing the use of force to achieve politically defined national objectives. He has outlined two schemes for the classification of strategies. In one, strategies are classified as being in the direct or the indirect mode, while from a somewhat different perspective, total, overall, and operational strategies are distinguished. Total strategy coordinates all the components of national strength--political, economic, and military --and its most important aspect is nuclear strategy. Beaufre believes that only a deterrence strategy is feasible in present circumstances and hence argues that deterrent forces are currently the decisive strategic factor. He notes that mutual deterrence between the superpowers has led to a measure of international stability and argues that this would be reinforced if a third power allied with one of the superpowers achieved a credible deterrent of its own. He opposes unlimited nuclear proliferation, or, as he calls it, the "democratization" of nuclear weapons, but does favor limited proliferation among responsible powers. He believes that some degree of international control over the

nuclear weapons of the major powers is attainable, but that nuclear disarmament is not since nuclear weapons sustain the balance of forces between the superpowers that insures international stability. Contrary to some others, Beaufre argues that nuclear weapons have significantly reduced the utility of conventional forces but have not put an end to the cold war. He is led by these observations to consider "indirect strategy," which governs the use of all means other than the traditional military ones. Beaufre believes that with an effective indirect strategy the West can protect the developing nations from Communist subversion.

534
Long, William F. COUNTERINSURGENCY REVISITED. Naval War College review, v. 21, Nov. 1968: 4-10.
P&GP RR

Seven years of counterinsurgency action--strategy, tactics, and techniques developed to meet Communist subversive aggressions--have tested U.S. doctrines and personnel training. The United States succeeded where concepts of conventional war and industrial organization applied but not in areas of psychology, cross-cultural communications, or politics. Because Communist dogma reduces the military contribution to but one segment of a larger political struggle, counter-insurgency becomes political. Illusions that menace prospects of U.S. success are: that the military establishment can "go it alone," which ignores social and economic aspects of war that are beyond the capability of existing U.S. forces; that "advisers can win people's wars, "which disregards the unrealistic cultural and management situation and advisers' inability to cope with essential political and social problems; to "beat the Communists at their own game," which overlooks the fact that U.S. units cannot organize politically and the techniques of developing such organizations may be contrary to American interests; that "the 'people' are not for the Viet Cong," which ignores that they do not support their government; that "technology and foreign aid can substitute for the support of the people," which ignores the fact that the object of the war is the people's support; and that "U.S. idealism and organization can substitute for indigenous leadership and reform," which fails to realize that the Americans menace governing elites and do not understand the history and culture. Greater intellectual commitment is needed to participate in and lead the revolutionary spirit of the age.

535
Menard, Orville D. DIRTY WAR REVISITED. Midwest quarterly, v. 10, autumn 1968: 13-23.
AS30.M5, v. 10

If the parallels between the Indochinese and Algerian Wars and the Vietnam War have been generally ignored, so have their implications for Americans. An examination of France's experience with revolutionary war provides certain lessons: foreign policies are not irrevocable and should not appear so; "limited wars should not become ironclad in ideologic and moralistic justifications, for such positions . . . are not negotiable"; and neither armed force nor economic and political programs are solutions to revolutionary war--a key factor instead is the reflection of the basic aspirations of the people concerned. Other lessons provided are the importance of watching and controlling limited war "to ensure that the military means remain consonant with the political ends, and that the former adapt to fluctuations in the latter when circumstances suggest change is necessary"; the importance of courageous and far-sighted leadership in freeing a nation from an inextricable situation; and the knowledge that national interests are nebulous and subject to change. The French wars, moreover, reveal two dangers to democratic systems in prolonged limited war situations: civilian control of the military is threatened, and the body politic is poisoned. These dangers are presented only as warnings; common experiences do not indicate that history will hold the same fate for both countries, but "to ignore the past is to remain largely ignorant to the present."

536
Miller, Raphael. THE METAPHYSICAL WORLD OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, Dec. 1968: 18-22.
TK9145.A84, v. 24

There are two circumstances in which a state might initiate a nuclear war. First, if it found itself with a first-strike capability--whether inadvertently or by design makes little difference--it might choose to use it. Second, irrespective of whether it has a first-strike capability, a state may begin a nuclear war in the course of escalating a smaller conflict. To avoid these situations the designer of a strategic force ought to stress maintenance of a second-strike capability and measures to prevent an accidental or uncontrolled response to provocation. In general, this has been U.S. policy, but more emphasis ought to be put on preventing uncontrolled responses due to flaws in strategic system design and enhancing the survivability of strategic weapons during a nuclear attack. If both superpowers choose to emphasize survivability over offensive measures, the strategic balance will be stabilized and the opportunity for arms control agreements will be significantly improved. Unfortunately it now seems that damage-limiting offensive technology is improving more rapidly than survivability technology. This danger cannot be averted, as some believe, through a negotiated numerical limitation on offensive missiles coupled with the freedom to deploy ABM's in unlimited numbers, since this would allow one nation to destroy most of its enemy's offensive force with a first strike and then dispose of the residual counterblow with ABM's. The ABM issue aside, however, the Soviet Union will never agree to a freeze on offensive weapons at the present U.S.-Soviet 3-to-1 ratio. The key to the whole problem is to improve the cost-effectiveness of survivability technology relative to damage-limiting technology. Only through improvements in this area can a deadly new phase in the nuclear confrontation of the superpowers be avoided.

537
Nierenberg, William A. TOWARD A FUTURE NAVY. Science and technology, Oct. 1968: 72-76, 78, 80-82. illus.
Q1.I587, 1968

The emergence of the Soviet Union as a major sea power poses a threat to the U.S. Navy. From conventional ships that can harass U.S. fleet movements, to small missile-carrying craft that can sink big naval vessels, the Soviets are developing a range of ocean-borne weaponry that is challenging our dominance of the seas. To maintain the balance of power, the author describes a mix of major technological innovations, some of them already on the horizon, that might be adopted: The Navy, he shows, may have to be rebuilt around an Air-Force-like system of smaller, yet highly mobile surface-effect ships. These high-speed vehicles would be integrated into complex patterns of defense and attack through a sophisticated

command-and-control system based on satellite communications. They would be refueled from man-made floating platforms that would double as stationary aircraft carriers located over the globe. Such measures, combined with deeper-diving missile and attack submarines, may provide a new kind of Navy capable of maintaining our lead for some years to come. (Abstract supplied)

538
Simpson, Howard R. THE GUERRILLA AND HIS WORLD: PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE. Naval War College review, v. 21, Nov. 1968: 11-40. P&GP RR
Bibliography: p. 39-40.

Recognition of the psychological aspects is essential to understanding guerrilla warfare and often decides the outcome of guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations. Both depend on the actions of individuals whose existence is determined by psychological conditioning--the environment, commitment to the cause, and motivation--and individual character and physique. The guerrilla's psychological strength depends on certain physical advantages shared by members. His lack of heavy weapons, which is often considered a weakness by the enemy, actually gives him more mobility. The manipulation of psychological forces is controlled by the political officer, who is responsible for morale, indoctrination, propaganda, evaluation of soldiers' psychological reactions, and matters such as leave and marriage applications. Guerrillas use propaganda to exploit the outside world and indoctrinate captured enemy troops. Terrorist actions can be effective publicity and an aid in breaking the population's spring of resistance, but they may force the government to apply its complete resources to crush the guerrillas. Traditional warfare procedure has become obsolete; the guerrillas' constant politicomilitary action annuls military victories by political triumph. Guerrillas or counterguerrillas, to succeed, need the support of the local population even if their support is only passive. Future directions of guerrilla action are uncertain, but the most vulnerable targets are cities, which exert a more subtle and complicated set of psychological pressures on guerrillas and impose more complex restrictions on counterguerrillas. Guerrilla movements are often tied to sea and inland waterways, which act as covers, food sources, and transportation routes for supplies and communications.

B. MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

539
[AIRCRAFT OR MISSILES?] Avions ou missiles? [by] P. C. Aviation magazine, no. 501, Nov. 1, 1968: 22-23. illus. TL502.A854, 1968

Reports on the military advantages of the Mirage F-1 and the swing-wing Mirage G aircrafts and their role in France's future defense program. The author concedes that, although the Mirage F-1 is the most effective and flexible French military aircraft, it will not cover the Air Force's military needs in 1980 and is already considered the last link in a chain of specialized aircraft production. On the other hand the Mirage G will be extremely costly to mass-produce, and the main concern is whether the rate of obsolescence, typical of this type of plane, can be reduced.

540
Andrews, Walter. LIGHT INTRA-THEATER TRANSPORT: STOL OR V/STOL? Armed Forces journal, v. 106, Oct. 26, 1968: 10-12.
U1.A66, v. 106

Summarizes the considerations that will influence the selection of the aircraft to perform the light intratheater transport (LIT) mission during the next two decades. The three candidate vehicles include a tilt-wing turboprop with vertical and short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) capabilities, a fixed-wing turboprop with a short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability of under 1,000 feet, and a fixed-wing turbofan with a STOL capability of 1,500 to 2,000 feet. STOL proponents maintain their aircraft can be developed more cheaply than the turboprop V/STOL and, in conjunction with helicopters, can effectively fulfill LIT requirements. Advocates of a V/STOL aircraft stress its versatility and claim that the cost differences between V/STOL and STOL are only marginal.

541
Babenkov, M. PORTABLE RADIO EQUIPMENT DESCRIBED FOR CIVIL DEFENSE USE. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations. no. 455; July 31, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 46,036) p. 20-23. illus.
AS36.U57, no. 46,036
Translated from Voennye znaniia, no. 5, 1968, p. 22-23. Slav Rm

Describes the advantages, capabilities, and components of the R-105, R-108, and R-109 ultrashortwave radios for civil defense use. Although the radios have their own frequency bands, they can operate together, and each has an operating range of up to 20 kilometers. These radios "can establish dependable communications at maximum distances exceeding the operating range envisioned by the tactical-technical data" if they are skillfully located; i.e., in public parks, gardens, and vacant lots.

542
Bailly-Cowell, G. M. A FLYING WATCH-DOG FOR FRONT LINE FIELD COMMANDERS. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 13, Aug./Sept. 1968: 66-69, 71. illus.
UA646.F5, v. 13

Description of the U.S. Army's battlefield reconnaissance aircraft, the MOHAWK, preceded by a brief summary of the basic concepts of airborne reconnaissance and surveillance. Through the use of cameras, radar, and infrared devices the MOHAWK greatly facilitates the swift and accurate transmittal of target information to field commanders. While its adversaries claim air reconnaissance should be performed by the Air Force, "it is quite difficult to negate the role of the MOHAWK" since it is the only system capable of supplying the constant air surveillance required by ground forces.

543
Booda, Larry L. "BARRIER" CONCEPT COMPLEMENTS MOBILE SYSTEMS IN ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE. Undersea technology, v. 9, Nov. 1968: 42-43, 46-47, 50. illus. V210.A1U5, v. 9

Describes recent developments in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) technology. Booda comments briefly on the characteristics and capabilities of new fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, satellites, information systems, detection devices, attack submarines, and torpedoes. He suggests that recent cutbacks of funds for some of

these programs can be explained only by assuming that the Soviet submarine fleet's growing strategic nuclear warfare capability has brought about a still-classified Navy decision to shift the emphasis in ASW from mobile forces to defensive barriers similar in concept to those deployed for continental air defense.

544
Booda, Larry L. P-3C ORION FLIES NAVY'S A-NEW ASW DEFENSE SYSTEM. Undersea technology, v. 9, Nov. 1968: 64-65, 67-69. illus.
V210.A1U5, v. 9

Describes the Navy's A-NEW antisubmarine warfare system. A-NEW is mounted in a Lockheed P-3C Orion aircraft and combines all communications, data processing, and sensor and weapons control functions in a single integrated and computerized system. The P-3C can remain aloft for as long as 17 hours and is armed with rockets, mines, torpedoes, and conventional or nuclear depth charges.

545
Brenner, Hans. [MODERN RECONNAISSANCE WEAPONS SYSTEMS: MCDONNELL DOUGLAS RF-4C/4E PHANTOM II] Moderne Aufklärungs-Waffensysteme: McDonnell Douglas RF-4C/4E Phantom II. Flug Revue, Oct. 1968: 40-43. illus.
TL503.C524, 1968

Begins with a description of the multiple-sensor version of the F-4C, the RF-4C, and its three basic reconnaissance systems: side-looking radar to record high-definition radar pictures of terrain on each side of the flight path on film; infrared detector to locate enemy forces under cover or at night by detecting exhaust gases and other heat sources; forward and side-looking cameras including panoramic models for horizon-to-horizon pictures. Then the report deals with the F-4E, which generally is similar to the F-4D except [for] the new internally-mounted Vulcan-M-61A1 multi-barrel gun, the improved AN/APQ-120 fire control system and J79-GE-17 turbojets of increased rating. The Phantom II version which the Luftwaffe eventually plans to buy is the RF-4E, a F-4E without the M-61A1 Vulcan gun but with the high-performance camera systems of the RF-4C. (Abstract supplied, modified)

546
Cohen, Jay M. THE DEEP QUESTIONS. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 95, Jan. 1969: 26-37. illus.
V1.U8, v. 95

Surveys the Nation's military-scientific-industrial activities in the field of deep submergence vehicles (DSV). As a Trident Scholar, the author toured numerous DSV facilities and studied their operations. The vessels examined included General Dynamics versatile Star series; the Navy's bathyscaph Trieste II; the Westinghouse submersible, the Deep Star 4000; Grumman-Piccard's Ben Franklin, a sizable vessel capable of carrying a six-man crew and remaining submerged up to 6 weeks; and Lockheed's Deep Quest, which may become the prototype for the Navy's new deep submergence research vehicle. Poor underwater visibility, space limitations, electrical deficiencies, and inadequate launch and recovery capabilities were among the common problems discovered during the survey. The author concludes that an intensive research and development program coordinated by the U.S. Navy would be the best solution to these problems.

547
COMMAND AND CONTROL. Science and technology, no. 82, Oct. 1968: 40-42, 44-46, 50-52. illus.
Q1.I587, 1968

Computer-based information systems help keep commanders informed and aid their control of forces and weapons, but there is no clear hierarchy of information flow among the military [that] can be automated simply by specifying a piece of equipment for each function of command and control. The quality and relevance of data becomes more vital than the capacity and sophistication of the equipment that processes it. Decision-making is still done by humans, aided by computers. (Abstract supplied, modified)

548
THE CONTROVERSY OVER A U.S. ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM. Congressional digest, v. 47, Nov. 1968: 257-267, 288.
JK1.C65, v. 47

Contents.--The foreword.--The U.S. strategic ballistic missiles.--Comparison of U.S. and Soviet weaponry.--A glossary of strategic weaponry.--Congress and evolution of the ABM.--"Sentinel" anti-ballistic missile system.

Background information pertinent to an understanding of the controversy over U.S. deployment of an ABM system. A brief summary of the debate is followed by a description of America's strategic missile force; a chart comparing the strategic strengths of the superpowers based on data compiled by the American Security Council in 1967; a glossary of terms employed to describe strategic weaponry; a brief chronological history of the development of the U.S. ABM; and a description of the components of the Sentinel ABM system, the light ABM shield approved by the Defense Department in September 1967.

549
Dupuy, T. N. TACTICAL NUCLEAR COMBAT. Ordnance, v. 53, Nov./Dec. 1968: 292-296.
UF1.O67, v. 53

Since World War II, attitudes toward tactical nuclear warfare have gone through three distinct phases. Immediately after the war, the military wrote about the new atomic weapon but did not actively consider its potential for land warfare. By 1953, however, intensive efforts were undertaken to make plans for employing tactical nuclear weapons as realistic as possible. In about 1961, the military realized that, although employing these weapons was possible, fighting a tactical nuclear war was impossible both practically and physically, and they became concerned that this type of war might escalate into a nuclear holocaust. Since then, they have paid more attention to improving conventional combat capabilities. Now, however, a reassessment of nuclear combat is in order because Communist China will soon have a tactical nuclear capability, U.S. and Soviet ABM capabilities will raise the threshold of general nuclear war, and physical and conceptual developments, such as improvements in communication and mobility capabilities, indicate that military forces could survive and operate in, or in relation to, a nuclear environment. Although this will not eliminate the catastrophic casualties that will result from employing tactical nuclear weapons, historical trends in the relationship of combat factors --firepower (lethality), dispersal, and mobility--suggest the possibility of devising "new concepts of weapons employment and force deployment which will permit land forces to adapt themselves to these condi-

336-937 O - 69 - 3

tions without losing all operational capability." From a historical study of the interrelationship between combat factors conducted by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO), two major conclusions emerged: "A combat force should be so dispersed that it occupies an area, measured in square miles, at least as large as the value of its own composite lethality index" and it should be so concentrated that its reserves could be committed effectively to any part of its area within approximately 4 hours. If this relationship is valid, it can be deduced that: as weapons lethality has increased, dispersion of combat forces has increased; therefore, in tactical nuclear war a corps of approximately 100, 000 men will require a front of approximately 150 to 200 miles and an equivalent depth to survive on the battlefield. A tactical nuclear battle would involve armies logistically self-contained for combat of limited duration; they would fight a particular battle for a particular area with the strength and material present when the battle began; only local reserves would be employed in such operations. General reserves would fight a battle in contiguous zones 150 to 200 miles deep, either ahead of or behind the preceding battle zone, depending on which side had won the tactical advantage previously. Thus, tactical combat would comprise a succession of clear-cut battles with the intervening periods offering a chance for negotiations if losses mounted "beyond the points of common sense and reason in comparison with experience in nonnuclear wars." If this tentative concept is valid, the lethality indices of the HERO study should be validated exhaustively for extrapolation and model-building purposes; more important, however, is that the Army realize the possibility of this type of war and possess the capability to deal with it.

550
Fink, Donald E. FRENCH FACE NEW AEROSPACE BUDGET CUTS. Aviation week & space technology, v. 89, Dec. 2, 1968: 22-23.
TL501. A8, v. 89

French President de Gaulle's recent $1 billion budget cut will notably affect the progress of the country's aerospace programs. Most of the $80 million trimmed from the defense budget will be applied to the force de frappe program; all nuclear warhead tests are canceled for 1969, and the development of land- and sea-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles will be further delayed. Because of their export potential the Dassault Mirage F-1 aircraft and the Dassault Mirage G variable-geometry fighter programs will not be cut substantially. Although the austerity programs should not seriously hurt the Anglo-French Concorde supersonic transport or Martel missile programs, the status of the joint helicopter programs conducted by the two countries may be in jeopardy. France's participation in the European Launcher Development Organization and the European Space Research Organization will be curtailed by the cuts, and its D-2 and FR-2 satellite projects will probably be delayed. The monetary crisis is also expected to delay several commercial air transport programs, including the A-300 airbus, the Mercure 2 twin engine aircraft for short hauls, and the Hirondelle light transport.

551
Foster, John S. THE LEADING EDGE OF NATIONAL SECURITY. Science and technology, Oct. 1968: 12-21. illus. Q1. I587, 1968

The job of running the most massive research and development effort in the world requires a combination of technical, management, and political skills. For the Director of Defense Research and Engineering is responsible for evolving an $8 billion R&D program that touches on literally every field of science and technology. In addition, he must use the most sophisticated management tools to keep it running smoothly and make sure that decision-makers constantly get all the data they need in a form that is usable to them. Finally, he must be ready at a moment's notice to explain and defend the entire program to congressional committees. Sometimes the key to the job is brevity--each of the most important programs is monitored with an up-to-date report that is restricted to 20 pages. Often, the only answer is to learn to live with complexity and redundancy--multiple channels of communications must be kept open so that controversy about technical options is not smothered deep down in the organization. Through it all is the overwhelming responsibility of knowing that the sum of thousands of day-to-day decisions is a defense establishment that keeps the world balancing on a fulcrum between a relatively peaceful existence and a nuclear holocaust. (Abstract supplied)

552
Frosch, Robert A. NAVY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. Naval War College review, v. 21, Dec. 1968: 4-15. P&GP RR
"An address delivered at the Naval War College on June 13, 1968."

Extrapolates--from the technological developments of the last 30 years--predictions of "intellectual technological inventions" as well as actual hardware developments for the next 30 years, developments that will "change the world in some intrinsic way, so that warfare or human activity is somehow different in a major way." Frosch examines recent developments--such as solid state electronics and the concepts of feedback and "system"--in terms of the change evoked in the world. Out of these developments come the directions for future research, including studies of the quantitative aspects of the psychology of deterrence, development of the ability to think about nonlinear situations, mobile basing on a vastly larger scale, and most importantly, a shorter development time for new devices to provide a more rapid response to changes in the world.

553
Garwin, Richard L. STRENGTHENING MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. Science and technology, Oct. 1968: 22-27. illus. Q1. I587, 1968

The author takes a utilitarian view of military R&D, namely that such activities are only desirable insofar as they contribute to our capability in meeting seen and unforeseen threats. Each development should be undertaken with a clear statement of its probable application, with an estimate of savings or a prediction as to improved capability, and with a description of its potential impacts in fields other than the primary one. He believes the introduction of a classified journal of defense research will help defense R&D "to build on what it has done" and to indicate new directions for possible improvements in military capability. In addition, he suggests that DOD should do more exploratory development, as contrasted with full-scale development, in order to determine "the limits of the feasible." He believes that the increased effectiveness of the DOD's exploratory development efforts may depend upon greater autonomy and better education of those who have the capacity to do the exploratory development. (Abstract supplied)

554
Hadwin, James F., and Phil Miller. RUBY LASER RANGEFINDER. Signal, v. 23, Dec. 1968: 28-30. illus. UGl. M65, v. 23

Describes the design and operation of the ruby laser rangefinder, a passive ranging device for the Army's ordnance test program. The rangefinder determines the distance to a target by measuring the time required for a pulse of light to travel to the target and return. Developed originally to survey dispersion patterns of several types of ordnance, the rangefinder is being used further for direct ranging of air bursts of explosive munitions and for computing the height of burst.

555
INTERCEPTOR MIX, TACTICAL MINI-AWACS FOR EARLY '70'S. Space/aeronautics, v. 50, Oct. 1968: 28, 30, 33-34, 36, 38. TL501. A786, v. 50

Examines the prospects for the development of an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and a complementary interceptor force for the 1970's. Because of technological restraints, the timetable for AWACS will extend far beyond earlier predictions; it is now believed that the Air Force will be unable to "get an AWACS plane off the ground before 1975." The long delay does not suit the pressing need for a tactical overland radar system in the Vietnam campaign. Thus there will be much pressure to develop a separate tactical AWACS instead of the dual-mission AWACS preferred by the Defense Department systems analysts. Although the Air Force is unhappy over the delays in the strategic AWACS program, the stretchout should reinforce its argument in favor of the F-12 interceptor over the modified F-106 preferred by the Department of Defense. The Air Force contends that, while the F-106X appears to be a less expensive way of meeting the immediate bomber threat than the F-12, it does not have as great a potential "to grow with the threat." Congress is also involved in the controversy, which may very likely culminate in the creation of a mixed force.

556
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR REVIEW. Nuclear news, v. 11, Sept. 1968: 27-53; Oct.: 27-56. illus. QC770. N75, v. 11

[Pt. 1] Contents. --Preface: a world of promise, by Glenn T. Seaborg. --Austria: keeping up--a big job for a small industrial nation, by Raphael Spahn. --Belgium: research and industrial capacity are chief assets, by F. Seynaeve. --Brazil: nuclear plans based on native uranium supply, by CNEN, Brazil. --France: long view taken in full-fledged nuclear program, by C. Benoit. --Germany: making up for lost time. --South Africa: uranium rich and ready for nuclear power, by A. R. Newby-Fraser. --Spain: uranium deposits spur full program, by M. Lopez Rodriguez. --Sweden: looks first to own needs, by Sten Sandstrom. --Switzerland: accents private initiative and development, by Heinz Ramstein and P. Feuz.

[Pt. 2] Contents. --Preface: a bridge between nations, by Sigvard Eklund. --Australia: uranium search, nuclear research. --India: modern technology in an ancient land. --Italy: government lures private industry into an expanding nuclear program, by Guido Botta. --Japan: nuclear program includes reactor development, uranium re-processing, by Seinosuke Hashimoto. --The Netherlands: main efforts are in research and reactor technology. --United Kingdom: pioneering in reactor development, by R. G. Sowden. --Euratom: rounds through joint undertakings, by Bruce M. Adkins. --FORATOM: nuclear forum among nuclear forums. --IAEA: serving needs, not fears, of mankind, by Nils Lund.

A two-part survey of international nuclear activities, which describes recent progress in the scientific, technological, and commercial applications of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes.

557
JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1968-69. Edited by Raymond V. B. Blackman. London, S. Low, Marston, 1968. illus. VA40. F5, 1968-69

Partial contents. --Foreword. --The navies of the world. --World figure table of naval strengths. --Naval aircraft. --Guided missiles.

Comprehensive data on the ships, aircraft, and missiles of all the world's navies. Chapters devoted to each national fleet include a numerical summary of that fleet by combat category, and list by name or hull number, under combat category and class, all naval vessels in commission. Displacement, dimensions, complement, armament, propulsion, and speed are given for each class of vessel along with construction, commissioning, conversion, and transfer information. Photographs or scale drawings are included in most cases. The table of naval strengths is a numerical summary by combat category of the 55 largest navies.

558
Johnston, Robert L. AIR ARMAMENT. Ordnance, v. 53, Nov./Dec. 1968: 232, 236, 238. UFl. O67, v. 53

A 1967 study that examined policies, procedures, and organization of the Air Force's conventional air armament research recommended a new armament testing organization, the Armament Development and Test Center (ADTC). This organization will include three principal operating directories: engineering, test and evaluation, and acquisition. ADTC's objectives are: to accomplish engineering development, participate in Government agencies' test and evaluation programs, conduct Air Force weapons effectiveness testing, and "act as the focal point for munitions integration into aeronautical systems." Another Air Force Systems and Command's development and test center at Tullahoma, Tenn., the Arnold Engineering Development Center, has opened a new armament test wind tunnel. However, armament research, development, and test evaluation have been on a catch-up basis since the end of World War II, and the gap in conventional armament innovation and production that has since developed is adversely affecting America's war effort in Vietnam. With the advent of the Vietnam War "a wide variety of crash efforts and jury-rigged armaments and the fitting out of fighter aircraft (other than interceptors) built without internal guns ensued."

559
Kotish, N. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE EXERCISE CONDUCTED IN THE PACIFIC. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations. no. 458; Aug. 1, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 46,058) p. 19-24. AS36. U57, no. 46,058

Translated from Krasnaia zvezda, June 23, 1968, p. 2. Slav Rm

Discusses an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) exercise conducted by the Soviet Navy and Air Force in the Pacific. Making contact with enemy submarines was the major problem for the Air Force, since submarines are separated from an airplane by air and water, but this was remedied by radio hydroacoustical buoys, which can locate submarines at great depths. The exercise was successful, as "an entire formation of submarines could be considered as having been sunk."

560
LOW-ALTITUDE AIR DEFENCE. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 13, Aug./Sept. 1968: 59-64. illus.
UA646. F5, v. 13

Surveys the problems and trends in the development of low-altitude air defense systems. Low-flying targets are particularly difficult to intercept because of the cover they receive from the landscape. Ground-to-air defense systems must be able to react swiftly and must be mobile in order to minimize their vulnerability to attack. While antiaircraft guns are useful for short-range low-altitude defense purposes, guided missiles are far more versatile interceptors. The first-generation missile systems are somewhat cumbersome and operate best under optimum weather conditions; however, research is currently underway on highly automated, mobile all-weather systems capable of rapid and effective reaction.

561
MILITARY INCREASING AVIONICS DEVELOPMENT. Aviation week & space technology, v. 89, mid-Dec. 1968: 32-34. illus.
TL501. A8, v. 89

Predicts an acceleration of activity in the field of military avionics within the next few years. As a consequence of the Vietnam War the military services will be exploring ways to enhance the accuracy of weapons delivery, improve aircraft reconnaissance capabilities, develop effective electronic countermeasures to jam the enemy's radar and communications systems, and equip aircraft with effective night vision capabilities. Moreover, a new generation of military aircraft is on the horizon that will generate a demand for new sensors and data procession, control, and systems integration techniques. In addition, naval avionics are seriously in need of updating to improve shipboard communications and countermeasures and navigation systems.

562
Miller, Barry. USAF SEEKING IMPROVED ANTI-RADAR GEAR. Aviation week & space technology, v. 89, Dec. 16, 1968: 73, 75, 77.
TL501. A8, v. 89

Announces the Air Force's quest for an advanced radar system to improve the capability of its tactical aircraft to cope with enemy antiaircraft guided missiles. Informally called the advanced "Wild Weasel," this new capability will effectively tie together the "detection and analysis of enemy radar and warning of SAM [surface-to-air] missiles with the aircraft's attack radar, the pilot's visual sight, a weapon's release computer, onboard active ECM [electronic countermeasures] and perhaps the chief element--the radar-hunting, air-launched Standard ARM missile." The prime contractor for the new system, McDonnell Douglas, is expected to select an avionics company to define and design the new system by the end of January 1969.

563
Miloserdov, D. ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY COMPARED TO MISSILES. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations. no. 471; Aug. 30, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 46,332) p. 45-49. AS36. U57, no. 46,332
Translated from Krasnaia zvezda, Aug. 1, 1968, p. 3. Slav Rm

Cites the problems facing American and West European scientists in the development of an antiaircraft missile system and a radar system capable of detecting low-flying aircraft. Miloserdov describes the Red-eye light antiaircraft missile, which is capable of interception under conditions of visual perception of the target, and notes that most of the antiaircraft missiles developed in the capitalist countries are far from perfect. He concludes that certain free-world specialists have confirmed that the only effective armament for combating low-flying aircraft is cannon artillery and that foreign observers believe the only effective antiaircraft system is a combination of missiles and artillery guns.

564
Ogorodnikov, V. THE TRENCH IN NUCLEAR WARFARE. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations. no. 452; July 5, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 45,858) p. 40-44.
AS36. U57 no. 45,858
Translated from Krasnaia zvezda, May 30, 1968, p. 3. Slav Rm

Although the character and methods of war have changed considerably, the trench remains an absolute requirement of modern warfare. Trenches that are properly camouflaged and built on the reverse slopes of hills can protect combat vehicles that otherwise would be overturned during a nuclear shock wave. However, modern warfare has caused trench digging to become mechanized, and various earthmoving machines such as bulldozers and excavating and drilling machines can now be used. A chain-bucket excavator "is capable of digging 6-8.5 linear meters of trench up to 1.8 meters deep, or a one-man foxhole in one minute, and a heavy machinegun emplacement in 3.5 minutes." The U.S. Army has been experimenting with mechanical and explosive devices that enable one soldier to dig a foxhole in 30 minutes.

565
PAKISTAN AIR FORCE BUILT AROUND MIG-19. Aviation week & space technology, v. 89, Dec. 2, 1968: 42-43, 45-46, 49, 52. illus.
TL501. A8, v. 89

Surveys the variety of aircraft deployed by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). Its strike force is now principally centered around the Chinese-built Soviet MiG-19 and is supplemented by vehicles received from Western sources prior to the 1965 conflict with India. Despite initial problems of adapting to an alien vehicle, PAF pilots now prefer the MiG-19 over the remaining U.S. F-104's and F-86's, the French Mirage 3E's, and other American and French aircraft in the combat wing; they regard it as a highly superior ground-attack vehicle as well as an efficient low- and medium-altitude interceptor. Although the PAF can never match its competitors in size, Air Marshal Nur Khan's emphasis on pilot training and efficient maintenance make it superior to forces of comparable strength.

566
Poluboyarov, Pavel. THE SOVIET ARMOURED CORPS. National defence, v. 6, Sept. 1968: 18-19. illus.
Ul. N15, v. 6

Cites the importance of tanks in Soviet military operations and notes the continued improvement in their design. Poluboyarov contends that today's tanks can tackle any assignment; they "are provided with mighty armaments and means of protection, great speed and excellent cross country capacity." Further, they have a large range of operations, are fitted with equipment for underwater driving, have special trawls to overcome mine fields, and have night vision instruments; the bridgebuilding tank can set up a track bridge over ravines within minutes.

567
PORTON OPENED TO THE PUBLIC. Nature (London) v. 220, Nov. 2, 1968: 426. illus.
Ql. N2, v. 220

Reports on a recent 1-day open house at the Microbiological Research Establishment, Porton, England. The facilities open to the public emphasized defense work. Demonstrations were given of a proposed early warning system and protective clothing. Tests to determine the effect of wind velocity on the dispersal of microbes were described, as were experiments aimed at discovering the ability of microbes to survive in air and infect individuals through inhalation. Porton's excellent facilities for the production of vaccines were another noteworthy part of the public display.

568
Rees, Joseph, and Arnold Whitaker. THE NEXT GENERATION OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. Science and technology, Oct. 1968: 84-91. illus.
Ql. I587, 1968

The tactical posture of our air forces--including ground support, fleet air defense, and air superiority--must be considerably updated to meet the challenges of the seventies. Perhaps the most pressing need is the potential for mastering the enemy's air space. To carry the fight to the enemy, the next generation of fighters to do that job will have to have lots of thrust. And since speed doesn't win close-in maneuvering contests, agility will have to be the fighter's forte. (Abstract supplied)

569
Singh, Sukhinder. AIR DEFENCE: METHODS AND PROBLEMS. National defence, v. 6, Aug. 1968: 42-43.
Ul. N15, v. 6

Describes various defense tools against aircraft attack. Singh notes that, while all defensive operations depend upon radar efficiency and allied radio communications, these systems are vulnerable to enemy countermeasures. He concludes that, in the final analysis, the man in charge of the machine holds the key to a weapon system's effectiveness and efficiency--"no mechanism can match the effectiveness of skilled men."

570
SOVIET NAVY HAS DEVELOPED MODERN SHIPS, WEAPONS. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on Eastern Europe: Political, Sociological, and Military Affairs. no. 27; Sept. 6, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 46,363) p. 1-2.
AS36. U57, no. 46,363

"Excerpt from article by Lieutenant Commander Guenter Larisch Erfurt, Das Volk, German, 10 August 1968, p. 6."

Discusses types of ships and weapons used by the Soviet Navy. Russian missile cruisers and destroyers and the new missile-carrying motor torpedo boats are unmatched in imperialist navies. U.S. ships have antiaircraft missiles, but no vessel-to-vessel missiles as found on these Russian ships.

571
Sullivan, Leonard. R&D FOR VIETNAM. Science and technology, Oct. 1968: 28-35, 38. illus.
Ql. I587, 1968

The author heads the office in the Pentagon whose specific purpose is to expedite those R&D activities which hold some promise of increasing the effectiveness of our forces in Southeast Asia. From that special position, he tells of the important role of R&D in the war. Currently, the Department of Defense is investing some $800 million per year in this effort. Given the long time required to bring ideas through the R&D process and convert them to hardware, is it reasonable to expect that today's ideas can be developed in time to have an effect on the battlefield? The Pentagon clearly believes so, citing the more than one hundred new types of equipment that are added to our operational inventory each year. Currently, more than one thousand specific R&D projects are going on in support of the war. (Abstract supplied)

572
Taylor, John W. R. AIRCRAFT FOR THE ONLY KIND OF WAR. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 8, winter 1968: 255-262. illus.
UG635. G7A1252, v. 8

In planning the future shape of the British Armed Forces, strategists should keep in mind that Britain can realistically expect to participate in only one type of war in the future--counterinsurgency. As demonstrated by the U.S. campaign against the Vietcong in South Vietnam, small low-speed, low-flying aircraft are more effective than sleek supersonic fighter-bombers in the hide-and-seek operations that characterize this type of war. In addition to the tactical fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters have proved to be particularly useful in counterinsurgency operations because of their maneuverability and close-support capabilities. Unfortunately, most of the aircraft now planned for the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the seventies are not suited to this type of war. Strategists have placed far too little emphasis upon the Hawker Siddeley Harrier VTOL strike fighter, which is "potentially the most advanced and formidable counterinsurgency aircraft [ever] conceived." Given 200 or 300 Harriers and adequate air-and-sea Harrier transports, the RAF of the 1970's could provide a very formidable counter-insurgency force.

573
Townes, Charles H. [interview] THE LASER--WHAT IT CAN DO. U.S. news & world report, v. 65, Dec. 23, 1968: 78-81. illus. JX1. U65, v. 65

Dr. Townes discusses practical applications of the laser in medicine, engineering, industry, and national defense. He discounts speculation about a "death ray" but notes that the laser has great potential as a range-finding device and in communications.

574
VIETNAM-DELAYED HARDWARE EFFORTS TO GAIN FISCAL 1970 BUDGET IMPETUS. Aviation week & space technology, v. 89, mid-Dec. 1968: 16-21. illus. TL501.A8, v. 89

Lists the Defense Department projects affected by the $3 billion cut in its FY 1969 budget and those which will be reinstated in its 1970 budget. About 80 percent of the 1969 cuts were dictated directly by Congress and caused a slowdown of aircraft development and procurement programs, the Air Force's manned orbiting laboratory project, and the Navy's Poseidon missile program. In order to comply with revised budget ceilings the Air Force cut $928 million from its budget, the Navy, $992 million, and the Army, $900 million. However, in the interest of national security many programs pushed aside by financial demands of the Vietnam War can be delayed no longer, and President Johnson has approved the development of the advanced manned strategic aircraft, the Air Force's FX advanced air-superiority fighter, the Navy's VFX air-superiority fighter, the Minuteman 4 intercontinental ballistic missile, an advanced surface-to-air shipboard missile, the airborne warning and control system, and the Navy's VSX carrier-based antisubmarine patrol aircraft.

575
Wallis, Arthur J. [ON THE FARNBOROUGH FLYING DISPLAY AND EXHIBITION, 1968: SITUATION REPORT OF THE BRITISH AEROSPACE INDUSTRY] Zur Luftfahrtschau Farnborough 1968: Situationsbericht von der britischen Aerospace-Industrie. Flug Revue, Oct. 1968: 27-33, 98. illus. TL503.C524, 1968

The 26th Flying Display and Exhibition, the nineteenth at its site in Farnborough, is supported by all leading British airframe, aero-engine and missile firms, together with 300 of the equipment, electronics and material companies, and will leave no doubt of the determination of the British Aerospace Industry to meet the current challenges of aerospace technology and, in a growing partnership with Europe, to win an increasing share of the expanding air transport and military aviation markets of the next decade. The Anglo-French supersonic transport aircraft Concorde will be in everyone's mind in Farnborough for it is the very embodiment of European co-operation which, at long last, is having something outstanding to show. On the military side, Jaguar demonstrated that Anglo-French partnership is now truly airborne. Arthur J. Wallis views the present situation of the British aerospace industry, its abilities and its order books on the airframe, aero-engine (civil, military, V/STOL), helicopter and space sector. (Abstract supplied)

576
Winston, Donald C. SENATE UNIT URGES NEW STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. Aviation week & space technology, v. 89, Oct. 7, 1968: 31. TL501.A8, v. 89

Notes the release by the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of a report, based on testimony by Department of Defense officials, in which it recommended the prompt development of an advanced manned strategic aircraft, the acceleration of the Poseidon missile program, and the continued development of the powerful WS-120A intercontinental ballistic missile. According to the report these moves are necessary for the maintenance of U.S. strategic superiority in view of the increasing Soviet threat presented by recent improvements and enlargement of their ICBM force, their powerful intercontinental bombers, their deployment of an ABM system, and their advances in submarine capabilities.

577
Witze, Claude. TAC: FACING A NEW MOMENT OF TRUTH. Air Force and space digest, v. 52, Jan. 1969: 27-31. illus. UG633.A65, v. 52

Burdened with a multitude of chores and a paucity of equipment, the Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC) is in need of revitalization. TAC is not an operational command, but it must be prepared to provide combat-ready airpower to many parts of the globe. Currently most of TAC's strength is committed to Vietnam, and in the opinion of military officials it must expand its resources to meet potential requirements in Europe, "the tinder box of the Middle East," and other theaters. Testifying before the Senate Armed Service Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee in 1968, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, USAF Chief of Staff Gen. J. P. McConnell, and Gen. Gabriel P. Disosway, then TAC Commander, pointed out the serious nature of the Soviet tactical threat. They indicated that while the United States surpasses Russia in air-to-ground tactical capabilities, Russia is ahead of the United States in interceptor and air superiority capabilities. Alarmed by this evidence, the subcommittee recommended the development of the new air superiority fighter, the ZF-15A; a critical review of the "correctness" of TAC's mix of air-to-ground and air-to-air vehicles; and a reexamination of Air Force requirements for a new close support aircraft. TAC officials agree with these recommendations and point out that there is further need for an airborne warning and control system, a light intratheater transport, a reconnaissance version of the ZF-15A, the modernization of the C-130 transport fleet, and the acquisition of the F-111A aircraft.

578
Wyszecki, Fritz von. ARMORED WARFARE: TRENDS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Nov. 1968: 76-79. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 48

Compares the trends in tactics and techniques of armored warfare in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Wyszecki describes the various tanks and armored vehicles used by these alliances, including the British Centurion and Chieftain and the Soviet T54, T55, and T62. The author believes that antitank weapons have lessened most of the advantage that the armored vehicle experienced during the Second World War and that the tactical doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, which is based on Soviet concepts, is similar to that of the German Army of 1941. Although NATO does not employ a joint strategic doctrine, certain tactical concepts are evident, and these are outlined. Wyszecki concludes that the combat power and mobility of NATO's armored units are superior to those of the Warsaw Pact.

579
Ziegler, Roland. [THE AVIONICS OF THE SAAB 37 VIGGEN] Die Avionik der Saab 37 Viggen. Flug Revue, Oct. 1968: 49-52, 61-63. illus. TL503.C524, 1968

Gives a detailed report on the avionics system of the Saab 37 Viggen. The core of the Viggen's extensive onboard equipment is the airborne general purpose digital computer which can be made to meet quite different requirements. The main functions are: navigation computations, computation of fuel needed to complete the mission, computation of optimum flight path prior to weapons release, computation of target movements, fire control computations, calculation of complete landing procedures, control and supervision of the other onboard systems. The author continues with the attitude reference system, the air data computer, the automatic flight control system, radar, automatic checking equipment, radio altimeter, ECM, head-up and head-down display. (Abstract supplied)

C. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

580
Andrews, Walter. THE OUTLOOK FOR NEW WEAPON STARTS. Armed Forces journal, v. 106, Nov. 16, 1968: 12, 14, 16, 18. illus.
Ul. A66, v. 106

During his campaign President-elect Nixon repeatedly reiterated the need for the United States to maintain strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. He severely criticized the current policy of parity with the Russians and noted that "U.S. superiority is necessary to the successful negotiation of arms control and disarmament agreements." In view of Nixon's attitudes new weapons technology should receive a boost during the next 4 years. Nixon could very well launch the development of new land- and sea-based missile systems and seriously consider Air Force proposals for a mobile missile system. The forthcoming administration is expected to support the continued deployment of the Sentinel ABM system and the Navy's sea-based antiballistic missile intercept system. The concern expressed by the President-elect over Soviet advances in submarine warfare should stimulate antisubmarine warfare projects and accelerate nuclear submarine building programs. Other items likely to receive priority treatment include the conventionally powered DX and nuclear-powered DXGM and DLGN escort vessels, the airborne warning and control system, and over-the-horizon radar. Because of certain deficiencies the FB-111 bomber program may be phased out, but Nixon is expected to lend strong support to the development of an advanced manned strategic aircraft and a variety of tactical aircraft. In order to coordinate his weapons development programs closely with defense policy, the President-elect has stated he will revive regular meetings of the National Security Council.

581
Anisin, I. AIR DEFENSE EXERCISE FLAWLESSLY CONDUCTED. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations. no. 467; Aug. 20, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 46,237) p. 49-51.
AS36. U57, no. 46,237
Translated from Krasnaia zvezda, July 25, 1968, p. 1.
Slav Rm

Describes a Soviet air defense exercise that involved radar, computers, fighter planes, and defensive missiles.

582
Antonov, I. WASHINGTON'S ASIA STRATEGY. New times, no. 3, Jan. 22, 1969: 11-14.
D839. N483, 1969

Although President Johnson's "Asian doctrine" has collapsed, the imperialist plans for Asia have not been abandoned; they are being modernized and adapted to the new situation created by the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. According to the new plan, the United States is now building a new strategic front in Asia--a huge arc from the Philippines and Korea to Australia and New Zealand designed as a strong bulwark against Communist infiltration. Instead of interventions and assaults it uses new methods and more flexible approaches. To avoid another Vietnam, President Nixon and his advisers recommend the establishment of a regional collective security system in which Japan would play the leading role and economic aid would be geared to U.S. foreign policy objectives. According to the Philippine journal Graphic, the United States is planning a strong military bloc to replace the three existing organizations and fill an imaginary vacuum in Asia. In reality there is no vacuum because the Asian people are perfectly able to take their affairs in their own hands. While some Asian reactionary forces would like the United States to replace Great Britain after its withdrawal from the area, Japan is not overjoyed about the role it is supposed to play, since it prefers to conclude only regional alliances that are not purely military or anti-Communist.

583
[THE ARMIES OF THE WORLD (1968-1969)] Les forces armées dans le monde (1968-1969) [by] XXX. Revue de défense nationale, v. 24, Nov. 1968: 1701-1714.
D410. R45, v. 24

Quantifies the distribution of national military forces by a tabular representation of the armed forces of the principal powers, regional alliance forces, strategic forces, military forces in the Middle East, and military expenditures of the major powers. The statistics are taken from The Military Balance 1968-1969, which was prepared by the Institute for Strategic Studies. The institute's study indicates that China, because of its unstable internal situation, can probably produce only 70 20-kiloton missiles and a few H-bombs.

584
Ausland, John C. POLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS AND RESOURCES. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Resources and needs of American diplomacy. Philadelphia, 1968. (Its Annals, v. 380, Nov. 1968) p. 97-104.
H1. A4, v. 380

Regardless of present trends toward review of our commitments abroad, it seems certain that the defense establishment will continue to play a major role in the formulation and implementation of United States foreign policy. The next President will face many knotty politico-military problems. If the Department of State is to play its proper leadership role in providing foreign policy guidance, a new look will have to be taken at the needs and resources for the management of those problems. Key issues of major importance must continue to receive the President's personal attention. However, day-to-day co-ordination between the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the White House will have to be improved to handle the heavy volume of problems that must be staffed at a lower level. Further improvements should be made in the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG)-Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) system, particularly in

the field of planning. Interagency task forces will provide the President with needed focusing and flexibility on major problems. In the field, the gap between the ambassador and military commander left by the Kennedy letter of May 29, 1961, should be closed, particularly during any contingency operations. Finally, even more Foreign Service officers should be educated by and exposed directly to the military. (Abstract supplied)

585
Bachtel, Charles F. THE KATUSA PROGRAM. Signal, v. 23, Dec. 1968: 42-44. illus.
UG1.M65, v. 23

History of the Korean Augmentation of the United States Army (KATUSA), a highly successful program that integrates Republic of Korea Army recruits into U.S. Army units. The success of previous attempts to mix sociologically different units has been limited and proportionate to the urgency of the situation. At the onset of KATUSA during the early manpower crisis in the Korean War, close ties developed between the Koreans and the Americans--ties that weathered enemy efforts to disrupt KATUSA with the ancient issue of nationalism. The author attributes the success of KATUSA, "the greatest socio-military experiment of its kind," partly to the indelible nature of bonds formed between men fighting together and partly to the contention that Americans and South Koreans are basically much alike.

586
Baker, Ross K. TROPICAL AFRICA'S NASCENT NAVIES. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 95, Jan. 1969: 64-71. illus.
V1.U8, v. 95

Traces the history and examines the problems of Africa's developing navies. Since African naval strength was negligible under colonial rule, with the coming of independence the new states faced tremendous difficulties in acquiring the equipment and trained personnel to man their navies. Geographic and financial barriers prevented some nations from even attempting to create navies, and others just developed small riverine forces. Only Nigeria, with its fleet of 13 vessels, Ethiopia, with 10 vessels, and Ghana, with seven vessels, have so far developed navies with ocean-going capabilities. Although the small "navies can play only a marginal role in continental defense," they do perform an important function in policing the coastline and provide a valuable training ground for the expansion of commercial maritime enterprises.

587
Baldwin, Hanson W. THE ALARMING DECLINE OF OUR MILITARY POWER. Reader's digest, v. 93, Dec. 1968: 86-90. AP2.R255, v. 93

Unless the Nixon administration acts quickly, the Soviet Union may become the world's greatest military power. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated the Soviet Army's high degree of readiness and efficiency, and intelligence sources now estimate that there are in central Europe 35 Russian divisions, which greatly outnumber the thin and ineffective NATO forces on the central front. Furthermore, the quality of Russian weapons in Vietnam, such as the AK-47 rifle and the 122mm. rocket, is indicative of Russia's military progress. The deterioration of U.S. global military power over the past 6 years can be attributed to both Vietnam and the substitution of computer analysis for professional knowledge in the Pentagon. Tightly centralized control, systems analysis, and cost-effectiveness studies helped slow the development of new weapons. In addition, the Johnson administration's "guns and butter" and "business as usual" policies contributed to America's military decline. The United States has not yet become a second-class power, but President Nixon must understand that there is little substance to diplomatic and political power without military strength.

588
Baltzer, Uwe. [THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET NAVY, 1945-1968] Die Entwicklung der sowjetischen Marine 1945-1968. Marine Rundschau, v. 65, Aug. 1968: 256-281. illus.
V3.M3, v. 65

Traces postwar development of the Soviet Navy, including naval aviation and missilery, and describes its present command structure, specialized weaponry, and strength. Baltzer underlines the completed transformation of the Soviet Navy's basic orientation from defensive to offensive strategy.

589
Baudissin, Wolf, Graf von. [NATO STRATEGY ORIENTED TOWARD PEACEKEEPING; POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN REGARD TO THE STRATEGY OF "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE." NATO-Strategie im Zeichen der Friedenserhaltung; politische und militärische Überlegungen zur Strategie der "flexiblen Reaktion." Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Sept. 10, 1968: 627-638.
D839.E86, v. 23

Discusses principal elements of NATO's present strategic situation, especially the changes that have occurred in the alliance's order of priorities. Von Baudissin considers the strategy of flexible response more complicated but also more in keeping with the alliance's present defense needs than the discarded strategy of massive retaliation would be. However, to be effective, the flexible response strategy must be backed by necessary military means at hand, which are now missing in Western Europe to a considerable degree. Without this and without the political resolution to use appropriate means in an emergency, this strategy would fail.

590
Beecher, William. JAPAN AT A CROSSROADS. Army, v. 18, Dec. 1968: 22-28. illus.
U1.A893, v. 18

Japan faces a dilemma--should it continue its military dependence upon the United States, or should it develop its own military establishment? Japan would like to continue under America's nuclear umbrella, but is concerned "about the price of that protection, including a sizable presence of American military forces in the country." For this reason, controversy over the following issues will ensue: the reduction of American military bases in Japan, the return of Okinawa to Japan, and the renewal of the Japanese-American Security Treaty. Further, Japan must determine "the extent to which [it] should play a heavier leadership role in the Far East," how much larger its military forces should be to protect the country's interests, and whether it should develop nuclear weapons. The nuclear issue is the toughest of Japan's problems. The majority of the people and all the major political parties oppose Japan's manufacture of nuclear weapons, but a number of ranking military and political

leaders feel that acquiring them for security purposes may be a necessity. Thus, although the Japanese Government is ready to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, many officials "want to keep open the option for going nuclear if future security requires it."

591
Beinke, Walter. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IN PERSPECTIVE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Nov. 1968: 47-52. illus. Z5723.U35, v. 48

Defines flexible response as the capability of military forces to react in kind to any enemy threat or attack. Beinke explores the concept's origins, noting that flexible response retains the nuclear deterrent concept fundamental to massive retaliation and increases the role envisioned for conventional conflicts. The author describes the degree of flexibility of this concept and its impact on America's allies and NATO. He concludes that as a peacekeeping strategy flexible response has demonstrated its effectiveness in Laos, Berlin, Thailand, and the Dominican Republic and that its greatest success was in the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis.

592
Cadieux, Léo. GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF CANADA'S DEFENCE POLICY. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. Canadian weekly bulletin, v. 23, Dec. 25, 1968: 1-2, 4. F1034.A3, v. 23

Statement by the Minister of National Defence, Léo Cadieux, to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. The Minister outlines the basic principles of Canada's defense policy--the responsibility to promote and preserve peace in the world and the obligation to work collectively with like-minded nations to attain this goal. Further, Cadieux discusses Canada's role in NATO and the effect of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and maintains that the invasion created a mood of caution and reemphasized the need for defense preparedness. He concludes that the greatest threat to Canada's security comes from the prospect of an intercontinental nuclear war.

593
CHINA SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTS NEW HYDROGEN BOMB TEST. Peking review, v. 12, Jan. 3, 1969: 5-6. DS701.P42, v. 12
Translated from a Hsin hua t'ung hsün shê [New China News Agency] release, Peking. DS777.55.H656

China's successful explosion of a hydrogen bomb over the western region on December 27, 1968, represents another victory for the invincible thought of the great Chairman Mao. Inspired by the principles of the cultural revolution, the Chinese workers, members of the People's Liberation Army, and scientific and technical personnel worked vigorously together to ensure the success of this new test. It is hoped that these groups will endeavor to strengthen their revolutionary spirit and make ever greater strides toward the modernization of China's national defenses. Under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons, but it must continue its nuclear weapons program to break the nuclear monopoly of the American imperialists and Soviet revisionists and thwart their policies of "nuclear colonialism." By countering the nuclear threat of the imperialists and revisionists, China hopes eventually "to achieve the lofty aim of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons."

594
Chopra, Maharaj K. INDIA ON THE EVE OF THE SECOND DEFENSE PLAN. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Jan. 1969: 3-13. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 49

Describes progress made under India's first 5-year defense plan (1964-1969). Significant improvements have been effected in the organization, training, and equipment of India's Armed Forces and in the renovation or construction of defense-related civilian industries. It is hoped that at some time in the near future India will be able to free itself from its present narrow concern with border defense in order to give more thought to problems of regional security. As to nuclear weapons, India puts no faith in Security Council guarantees against the threat of nuclear aggression and is not prepared to be permanently deprived of this vital means of countering Chinese aggression.

595
CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING FOR THE POPULATION--DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations. no. 460; Aug. 5, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 46,084) p. 4-6. AS36.U57, no. 46,084
Translated from Kommunist Tadzhikistana, Apr. 6, 1968, p. 4. Slav Rm

Surveys civil defense measures applicable during an atomic attack. These include specially constructed fallout shelters, circular fascines, basements, silage pits, vegetable storage bins, individual protective devices such as gas masks and cloth dust masks, and antichemical and bandaging packets. The author concludes that the most important factor in safeguarding oneself against weapons is learning how to use the means of protection.

596
CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING FOR THE POPULATION--THREAT OF ATTACK. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations. no. 460; Aug. 5, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 46,084) p. 7-9. AS36.U57, no. 46,084
Translated from Kommunist Tadzhikistana, Apr. 18, 1968, p. 4. Slav Rm

Describes procedures to be used in case of a threat of nuclear attack: to prepare a first aid kit and a small supply of water, listen to the radio for civil defense instruction, turn off gas and electric appliances and check house for fire hazards, smear the house walls with a claylike solution, and organize fire and epidemiological watch over plantings, reservoirs, and forests. Residents of a village must meet and locate citizens evacuated from the cities. The author concludes that protection of the water supply is of paramount importance.

597
Cossaboom, Bruce, and James Hessman. THE MILITARY COMMITTEES IN THE NEW CONGRESS. Armed Forces journal, v. 106, Nov. 16, 1968: 22-23. illus. U1.A66, v. 106

Names the members of the 91st Congress who will probably serve on the committees with jurisdiction over defense appropriations and legislation. A review of the new lineup indicates that most members of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees can be expected to share President-elect Nixon's views on a strong military posture.

598
Cracknell, William H. THE ROLE OF THE U.S. NAVY IN INSHORE WATERS. Naval War College review, v. 21, Nov. 1968: 65-91.
P&GP RR

If the assets and talents generated by the Vietnam conflict in inshore operations are to remain a task of fleet forces, these operations must be included in the Navy's organizational structure. To counter major threats--Communist insurgency in underdeveloped nations with topographical features favorable to inshore operations, Soviet naval expansion in inshore warfare, and Soviet military assistance to furnish inshore naval crafts to Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea, and Egypt--naval military assistance needs to develop the required capabilities within threatened nations. Advisers should instruct these nations in the nonbelligerent employment of an inshore patrol force for search and rescue, medical and mail services, disaster assistance, customs, fisheries control, ferry service, and logistics lift, as well as military uses. Further, the Navy should develop an inshore operations force to furnish ready units, reserve units, and advisers for military assistance programs.

599
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: WHAT NATO'S REACTION SHOULD BE, by a defence correspondent. European review, v. 18, autumn 1968: 10-11.
AP4. E78, v. 18

Because of the interest in Eastern and Western Europe and the neutral countries in some form of supranational European security organization, any revision of NATO's military posture "should be accompanied by political steps designed to ensure that the total action shall not prove counter-productive." An increase in NATO's forces in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia cannot add significantly to the security of NATO's European members. Instead the alliance should begin to move toward establishing a West European security system in spite of De Gaulle's recalcitrance and the Soviet invasion. This system should be charged with creating the machinery to negotiate all disputes and with a degree of supranationality that would make acceptance of its decisions obligatory for member states. The security of the organization could be increased by an American guarantee against an outside attack. Once these political steps are taken, they could have important repercussions in Eastern Europe. The "national independence" movements of some of the smaller East European nations and a "yearning for a revision of the Warsaw Pact" are indicative of a desire for closer integration with Western Europe. The result could be an all-European security system that would have two major objectives: an organization for the pacific settlement of disputes and a joint Soviet-American guarantee of the system against outside attack. The first would be a more realistic undertaking while the second remains a good deal beyond the political horizon.

600
Douglas-Home, Charles. EARLY DAYS TO JUDGE. Survival, v. 10, Nov. 1968: 355-357.
U162. S9, v. 10
Reprinted from the Times, Aug. 27, 1968.
Newsp

The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia does not necessitate enormous increases in NATO military forces. NATO military planners have always had to assume that the Soviet Union would place its own national interests above the goal of political détente, so the invasion did not alter the strategic premises of the alliance. The alliance already has enough troops stationed in central Europe to control minor clashes, and it could enhance its capabilities for countering large-scale threats by improving its ability to mobilize reserve forces. Since "any future tension involving NATO is more likely to occur at sea than on land," Europe would be wiser to concentrate on building up its naval capacities rather than increasing force levels in central Europe.

601
Ebert, Theodor. [CIVIL RESISTANCE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA; ANALYSIS OF ITS CONDITIONS AND ITS ACTION TECHNIQUES] Der zivile Widerstand in der Tschechoslowakei; eine Analyse seiner Bedingungen und Kampftechniken. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Dec. 10, 1968: 865-874. D839. E86, v. 23

Deems the legalization by Czechoslovak statesmen of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia a politically prudent step, for the nation has been ill prepared organizationally for a civil resistance that would not provoke open terror and mass arests by the occupier.

602
Ehrhardt, Carl A. [MOSCOW AS A CATALYST IN NATO'S TRANSFORMATION PROCESS] Moskau als Katalysator im Umwandlungsprocess der NATO. Aussenpolitik, v. 19, Oct. 1968: 581-593.
D839. A885, v. 19

Describes the impact the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia along with Moscow's buildup of conventional forces in Europe has made so far on NATO's efforts to prepare for the alliance's reduction of forces in a possible framework of East-West arms control. Ehrhardt describes the alliance's current efforts to adapt itself to the new Soviet military posture in Europe, which enhances the Soviet Union's potential for interventions.

603
END THE 20 YEAR FREEZE IN EUROPE. Friends Committee on National Legislation. Washington, D.C. Washington newsletter, no. 300, Jan. 1969: 1-4.
JK2391. F7A4, 1969

Argues against U.S. support for NATO, includes a tabular representation of cold war costs for both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, outlines ingredients for a general political settlement in Eastern Europe, and urges that the United States press for such a settlement.

604
ESCALATING TENSION [by] Observer [pseud.] New times, no. 48, Dec. 4, 1968: 8-11.
D839. N483, 1968

The primary function of NATO is to create tension and provoke conflict between East and West so as to establish sanctions for the strengthening of its military position. For the past 2 years the structure and power of NATO have been crumbling; in the wake of anti-Socialist activities in Czechoslovakia, NATO eyed it as a potential new entry to its fold. After the Soviet defense of socialism in Czechoslovakia denied NATO

this chance, the NATO command, claiming that the Czech events had upset the balance of military power in Europe, announced plans for a more aggressive, more militarily strong alliance. A statement from the Brussels meeting of the NATO Council promises "specific measures have been approved in these categories of action [NATO regular, reserve, and local forces, and tactical air forces] for improving the conventional capability of NATO's forces." In particular, "British and West-German representatives were to draw up a special report on the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe." While the theme of military might dates to the conception of NATO, a new proposition emanated from Brussels: that NATO's "sphere of interest" includes nonmember nations--e.g., Yugoslavia and Austria, or so-called grey areas--and that NATO will provide guarantees to these nations, although no such guarantee has been requested. All this activity is a scare tactic to heighten tension so as to justify the military buildup. The Soviet Union, in its insistence on peaceful settlement of differences by negotiation, deplores NATO's actions and will take "appropriate measures to safeguard the security of the states of the socialist community."

605
Felt, H. D. THE CHANGING STRATEGIC NAVAL BALANCE: CHALLENGE ON THE OCEANS. In American Security Council. Washington report, Dec. 23, 1968: 1-4. P&GP RR

Asserts that the Russians are developing an offensive maritime strategy and are attempting to challenge U.S. naval supremacy. Felt points out that the most alarming element of Soviet naval strength is the growth of its submarine force. He states that a decisive change in the strategic naval balance would threaten U.S. security. The United States has the capability to maintain its naval supremacy; the only question is whether it will choose to do so.

606
Felt, H. D. THE STRATEGIC NAVAL BALANCE: THE MERCHANT MARINE COMPONENT. In American Security Council. Washington report, Dec. 30, 1968: 1-4. P&GP RR

Maintains that the Soviet merchant marine is an important component in Russia's drive for world domination and that its expansion poses a serious threat to the free world. While the Soviet merchant fleet has grown, the U.S. merchant marine has declined, and, in comparison to the Soviet Fleet, is in bad condition both quantitatively and qualitatively. Felt concludes that the United States must rebuild its fleet, seek world markets, and reassert its role as maritime leader.

607
Fleischer, Fred. [VIGILANCE ON THE NORTHERN FLANK--A CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN SECURITY] Wachsamkeit an der Nordflanke--ein Beitrag zur europäischen Sicherheit. Einheit, v. 23, no. 8, 1968: 982-993. HX6.E4, v. 23

NATO efforts to strengthen its military position in central Europe and in flanks of this region aim to overturn the existing balance of power between itself and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which it considers unsatisfactory. U.S. global strategy, incorporating NATO strategy, which in turn incorporates adventurous West German forward strategy, attaches growing importance to Norway and Denmark. Popular opinion in these two countries increasingly opposes Scandinavian involvement in NATO; hence NATO's secret plans for strengthening reactionary political forces in Norway and Denmark to secure their full-fledged cooperation within NATO. The dominant role on the NATO northern flank belongs to the West German Armed Forces, which are planning a blitzkrieg for the area--the type of war waged by Israel on the Arab States. Aggressive factions in NATO are trying to influence Sweden to drop its neutrality. However, NATO's efforts to upset the present East-West ratio in central Europe and the Baltic Sea stand no chance, because of the watchfulness and strength of the Warsaw Pact forces, which are ready to cope with the situation.

608
Frey, Hansrudolf. [FINNISH ARMED FORCES] Die finnischen Streitkräfte. Schweizer Soldat; Wehrzeitung, v. 44, Nov. 1968: 9-20. illus. U3.S23, v. 44

Traces the development of the Finnish Armed Forces and describes the present strength and equipment of each service. Special importance in the nation's military posture is attached to coastal artillery. Frey also outlines Finland's contribution in troops to UN peacekeeping forces.

609
Friberg, Mats, and Dan Jonsson. A SIMPLE WAR AND ARMAMENT GAME. Journal of peace research, no. 3, 1968: 233-247. AS9.J6, 1968

Studies empirically a new type of armament game which occupies a position midway between the two earlier methods of gaming and simulation. As independent variables we use information density and breaks, as dependent variables, armament levels and the players' perceptions of them. As to armament levels, we find that in the games played without breaks the general rule is that the higher the information density, the higher the armament level. We put forth three hypotheses, all linked up with a dynamic model of the Richardson type, which explain much of the armaments data. As to perceptions, we find that the tendency to over-estimate increases as armaments increase, with one conspicuous exception: condition--0.2, which has the highest degree of over-estimation, but the lowest armament level of all conditions. Utilizing the Richardson model and three hypotheses borrowed from current psychological theories, this result and the others in that section may be explained. To a remarkably high degree, the Richardson model serves as a unitary basis for comprehension of the game. (Abstract supplied, modified)

610
Geisenheyner, Stefan. THE GROWING THREAT TO NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK. Air Force and space digest, v. 52, Jan. 1969: 40-44. illus. UG633.A65, v. 52

Although the Russians pose no immediate military threat in the Mediterranean, their growing strength in that area could eventually have serious consequences for the West. Until recently the Mediterranean coastline was considered relatively secure from Soviet aggression because of the presence of the U.S. 6th Fleet, the Western orientation of Turkey, Greece,

Italy, France, and Spain, and the neutrality of Yugoslavia, Libya, and Tunisia. Ports were open to the Russians in Egypt, Syria, and Algeria, but before the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 the Russian Fleet paid only sporadic visits to its Arab friends. The swift Israeli victory, though, panicked Russia's Arab allies and caused them to look to the Soviet Union for protection, which resulted in "strong influx of Soviet troops, ships, and aircraft." Politically, the increased Soviet naval presence is dangerous since "it would be almost impossible for Israel to distinguish between Soviet and Arab ships or airfields during an air strike." Moreover, Communist parties in the nations bordering the Mediterranean have profited tremendously from the "strong moral support" offered by the Soviet Fleet. Strategically the Russians are constantly improving their position through the stationing of bombers in Syria, Egypt, and Algeria and enlarging their Mediterranean Fleet. In order "to defend southern Europe the West has no alternative to strengthening its forces in the area."

611
GLOBAL THINKERS WITH AN EYE ON POWER. Business week, no. 2050, Dec. 14, 1968: 129-130, 132.
HC431.B87, 1968

Impressed with the outstanding record of London's Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS), President-elect Richard M. Nixon has expressed an active interest in utilizing the expertise of the organization. While relatively small--the ISS operates on an annual budget of $200,000 compared to Rand Corporation's $24 million--the institute swings a good deal of weight in high political circles. Membership is open to individuals and corporations that "can make a contribution to studying the problems of defense and international security." According to its highly capable director, Alastair Buchan, the institute is more concerned with "pointing up the complexity of problems rather than advocating one viewpoint." However, Buchan himself is a strong NATO supporter and maintains that America must endeavor to retain the confidence of its non-Communist allies while attempting to improve relations with the Soviet Union.

612
Goldman, Roy E. U. S. SPANISH BASE RIGHTS AGREEMENT AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 95, Feb. 1969: 102-104. V1.U8, v. 95

The United States must renew the Executive Base Rights Agreement with Spain by March 26, 1969, or evacuate its bases at Rota. Because of the present situation in Europe that resulted from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the strategic advantage of bases behind the Pyrenees in the event of "a massive military movement into western Europe from the eastward," the retention of Spanish base rights is imperative. The Rota naval base is vital to the disposition of European waters, and its "extensive logistic facilities" include those of the air units that reinforce our posture with regard to the continuing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and eastern Atlantic. Spanish demands prerequisite to extension of the agreement were grandiose at first but have become more rational with the realization that a threat from the East does exist and that Spain alone would be unable to counter military aggression. The alternative to U.S. presence is an agreement with France, but the succession of French domestic crises places it in an unstable position for such a move. The United States, therefore, is Spain's most viable ally, and it is in the best interests of both countries to renew the Base Rights Agreement.

613
Gorshkov, Sergei. AT THE DEFENSIVE FRONTIERS ON THE SEAS. National defence, v. 6, Aug. 1968: 14-15. U1.N15, v. 6

Surveys the role of the navy in Russia's defensive strategy. Sergey Gorshkov, Admiral of the Soviet Navy, asserts that in the face of the imperialist threat the Soviet Union was compelled to build a navy, complete with submarine and aircraft capability, able to conduct long-range operations and strike "blows at the enemy on [the] high seas and at its overseas territories, to defend successfully their own objectives from the sea." He maintains that the Soviet Navy has exercised with the navies of Poland and the German Democratic Republic to determine defensive tactics for Socialist countries on the oceans.

614
Greenberg, D. S. STRATEGIC STUDIES: BRITISH CENTER SAID TO ATTRACT NIXON'S INTEREST. Science, v. 162, Dec. 20, 1968: 1368-1370.
Q1.S35, v. 162

Notes the incoming administration's interest in the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), a London-based nongovernmental strategic research organization. Although located in Britain, the ISS receives about 55 percent of its approximately $200,000 annual budget from American foundations and includes Americans and other Westerners in its membership. It publishes the monthly magazine Survival, issues annual reports on military forces around the world, publishes a series of studies on a wide variety of defense topics called the Adelphi Papers, and sponsors several annual conferences. Its director, Alastair Buchan, asserts it "is not a cold war organization"; however, "there is a Western, often American-oriented center of gravity to most of the studies."

615
Grubbs, Frank E. EXPECTED TARGET DAMAGE FOR A SALVO OF ROUNDS WITH ELLIPTICAL NORMAL DELIVERY AND DAMAGE FUNCTIONS. Operations research, v. 16, Sept./Oct. 1968: 1021-1026.
Q175.O63, v. 16

In this paper we obtain a series expansion for the expected fraction of damage to a circular target when it is assumed that a salvo of n rounds is delivered onto the target area with a noncircular normal or gaussian distribution and the damage function for each round can be represented by a noncircular exponential square fall-off law. The results are easily extended to an elliptical-shaped target. The aim of the paper is to obtain explicit approximations for target damage. (Abstract supplied)

616
Halloran, Richard. JAPAN'S FUTURE ROLE IN PACIFIC SEA POWER. Navy, v. 11, Oct. 1968: 22-26. illus. VA49.N28, v. 11

Considers the probable role of Japan in the future of seapower. Halloran discusses the importance of Japan and Okinawa as bases for U.S. air and naval operations and looks into the question whether the United

States will be forced to withdraw from these bases by rising Japanese nationalism. If the U.S. presence is maintained, Japan probably will increase its security forces, particularly its air defense and naval strength, "in a steady but unspectacular manner." If the United States withdraws or is forced to do so, the Japanese are likely to turn to full-scale rearmament, including nuclear weapons, although the possibility of unarmed neutrality cannot be excluded.

617
Harrigan, Anthony. THE SOVIET STRATEGIC BUILD-UP: FROM THE BALKANS TO OUTER SPACE. In American Security Council. Washington report, Oct. 14, 1968: 1-4. P&GP RR

Emphasizes the need to expand America's strategic nuclear forces to meet the Soviet strategic buildup in central Europe and outer space. The next President must realize the necessity of conducting atmospheric tests, since American information is incomplete regarding the effects of electromagnetic pulses (EMP's) from atomic explosions on communications and other electronic systems. This is particularly important in antimissile defense because a nuclear explosion could wreck electronic elements in U.S. missiles.

618
Hessman, James, and Bruce Cossaboom. THE NIXON DEFENSE PROGRAM. Armed Forces journal, v. 106, Nov. 16, 1968: 4, 6, 8, 10.
UI.A6, v. 106

Nixon experts have projected the President-elect's probable approach to the major defense problems he will face upon assuming office in January. He will want to end the Vietnam War as soon as possible--preferably through a negotiated peace but if necessary through the application of massive conventional military strength. Although he will have to work within the perimeters of the Johnson defense budget for the coming year, the President-elect will probably call for increased military spending in subsequent years to maintain America's strategic superiority. He has promised to revitalize America's declining shipbuilding industry and is expected to initiate extensive new military research and development programs. During the campaign Nixon emphasized the importance of conducting arms control negotiations with the Russians from a position of strength and proposed the conclusion of agreements to prevent nuclear accidents, "the evolution of a strategic doctrine which would stress the non-belligerent side of this country's national security posture," improvements in intergovernmental communications, restrictions on the sale of arms to countries in areas of international tension, and the formation of an arms control coordination body within the NATO framework. Disturbed by the inequality of the draft, Nixon favors its replacement with a volunteer army. "He blames the decline of U.S. power and prestige on the 'whiz-kid' approach to defense policies" and believes that America can best lead the way to world peace as a strong, resolute nation.

619
Hinterhoff, Eugène. THE DELICATE BALANCE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Dec. 1968: 78-85. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 48

The containment strategy of the West has evolved into a passive and unimaginative policy of maintaining the strategic nuclear stalemate and the political status quo. The Soviet Union, of course, is working assiduously to undermine both. The period of Western military superiority is over, and Soviet advances in both offensive and defensive weapons technology now threaten to eliminate the U.S. second-strike capability. In addition, the defensive alliances that constitute the second major component of the Western security system have been eroded, and the Soviet Union has made significant political and military gains in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. This decline of Western conventional and nuclear military strength has rendered ineffectual the central concepts of NATO strategy--deterrence, flexible response, and forward defense. In these circumstances it is certain that Germany will become more insistent in demanding nuclear weapons, and this will increase tensions in NATO. From the Western point of view, the only encouraging factor in the present situation is the weakness of the Warsaw Pact. It is hoped that the invasion of Czechoslovakia will convince the West that it must halt the decline of its military strength. In the short run, however, the only outcome of the invasion has been the advance of Soviet troops deeper into central Europe. If NATO does not take steps to arrest the deterioration of its power, Western Europe may soon be subject to Soviet blackmail. Then the moral fiber of Western leadership and the credibility of the American deterrent will be put to the ultimate test, only this time the situation will be different from the one faced in the Cuban missile crisis, because the West will be confronted with a superior nuclear power.

620
Hollier, Louis S. NUCLEAR POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Dec. 1968: 73-77. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 48

No rational military thinker who is aware of the great destructiveness of nuclear weapons will concede that total war is the only strategic option available to him. Even so, the alternative of limited war with tactical nuclear weapons is almost equally unacceptable because of the difficulty of determining the crossover points from tactical to strategic targets and from limited to general war. On the other hand, if the United States were to choose to refrain from using nuclear weapons altogether, it would be faced with the strong possibility of being perpetually engaged in conventional wars. In this situation, the United States has deliberately avoided spelling out precisely where, when, and on what grounds it will use nuclear weapons. Instead, it has adopted a "calculated policy of uncertainty" backed by the capacity to administer a controlled and appropriate rebuff to aggression at any level. This is the doctrine of flexible response. It implies the primacy of politics in defense decisionmaking and raises in an acute form the problem of finding a proper match of political objectives and available or programmed military means. So far, attempts to apply this doctrine from a defensive posture have failed, most notably in Vietnam. The tactic of entering a conflict at the lowest possible level and then escalating gradually concedes too much to the enemy. What is lacking is a well-considered political strategy and the force to implement it with a quick and decisive counteroffensive. This requirement greatly increases the responsibilities of military leaders since it requires that they be able

to relate military strategy to politics and be ready to carry out missions with military means different from those they have recommended. However, these new challenges are a necessary consequence of modern war.

621
Holmes, John W. FEARFUL SYMMETRY: THE DILEMMAS OF CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. International organization, v. 22, autumn 1968: 821-840. JX1901.I55, v. 22

Examines problems of consultation and coordination in NATO. Holmes argues for NATO's preservation and contends that disappointment in the organization has arisen more "from the dissipation of illusions . . . about a tightly coordinated community and a symmetrical design" than from its failure. He maintains that certain facts should be accepted: A multilateral framework should be the starting point for planning consultation and coordination; in strategic matters the United States is sui generis a part-time NATO member and the center of concentric circles of alliance and association; and no member of any of these circles can be an equal partner in its major decisions. Holmes concludes that the process of consultation should be the alliance's central function, "even though the military structure should be retained insofar as possible . . . to sustain the confidence essential for detente."

622
Howe, Jonathan T. SOVIET BEACHHEAD IN THE THIRD WORLD. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 94, Oct. 1968: 60-67. illus. VI.U8, v. 94

The increased number of Russian amphibious and aircraft carriers indicates that the Soviet Navy is developing a limited-war capability. The decision to build a medium-size carrier, estimated at between 23,000 and 25,000 tons and able to carry from 30 to 35 helicopters, indicates Soviet willingness to invest in the resources necessary for effective intervention. This capability will provide Russia's Third World offensive with greater flexibility and will pose implications for future U.S. Third World policies. The Russian Fleet will prevent the West from exploiting its regional military predominance to suppress local wars of liberation. Moreover, the effectiveness of American peacekeeping operations will be diminished "if Soviet aircraft from carriers also fly over trouble spots or if Soviet surface ships join us in patrols off the shores of a beleaguered nation." Russia's buildup of its limited-war forces might possibly be directed toward China, but it is more probable that the Russians have realized the effectiveness of U.S. efforts in suppressing local wars and the riskiness and ineffectiveness of such indirect methods as arms shipments, third parties, and insurgency operations. The effectiveness of the U.S. Sixth Fleet during the Middle East crisis had an impact on the Russians; therefore they plan to adopt the U.S. method. A thorough reappraisal of U.S. naval needs should be conducted in the fact of this developing Soviet challenge.

623
Hughes, David R. CONTINGENCY PLANNING: A NEW PERSPECTIVE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 94, Nov. 1968: 26-37. VI.U8, v. 94

Although the forces intruding on national political processes lead to a high proportion of the world's conflicts, U.S. planners continue to project future conflicts in terms of outmoded concepts of the "spectrum of war." Modern conflict--"all internationally significant strife, or potential strife"--defined from the standpoint of U.S. involvement distills into four independent variables: principal means employed, national costs incurred, operational political ends, and duration of involvement. Consideration of operational political ends makes the device useful to policymakers but differs from U.S. policy in "the specificity of the conditions we expect to achieve." A three-dimensional graphic representation of the first three variables offers a framework for alternative comparative and aggregative analysis of potential U.S. involvement in international conflict. Application of the fourth variable shows the probable frequency of each type of conflict.

624
Jackson, Henry M. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND WESTERN SECURITY. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Nov. 1968: 43-46. illus. UG633.A65, v. 51

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the military buildup in Central Europe prove that the cold war is far from dead. The Soviet Union has altered the military balance in Central Europe by mobilizing several hundred thousand additional men, adding at least 10 combat-ready divisions, establishing improved and expanded lines for communications, and setting up extensive logistic services to sustain forward deployed forces. This buildup indicates an increasingly aggressive Soviet policy that may affect Rumania, Yugoslavia, and the tense Middle East situation; it might lead to new crises in Western Europe if Moscow attempts to restore some unity to the Warsaw Pact nations. In the wake of the events in Czechoslovakia the United States cannot ignore its primary responsibility vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the maintenance of nuclear superiority. The Soviet Union is a dangerous and unpredictable enemy--a country that leads a five-nation invasion of another country might use military force in pursuing other objectives--and Moscow's drive to reach nuclear parity with the United States is cause for great concern. The Russians are increasing their ICBM force, producing new 16-tube Polaris-type submarines, deploying the Galosh defensive missile system in the Moscow area, and making large investments in mobile long-range forces capable of conventional operations. To combat the Soviet missile threat the United States has correctly chosen to go ahead with tests of a multiple independent reentry vehicle and the construction of a thin ABM system.

625
Jackson, Henry M. DOES THE LEOPARD CHANGE HIS SPOTS? WHO IS NEXT? Vital speeches of the day, v. 35, Dec. 1, 1968: 98-100. PN6121.V52, v. 35

"Delivered before the Military Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, Belgium, November, 1968."

The invasion of Czechoslovakia reaffirmed that Russia is a dangerous and unpredictable opponent. In military terms it demonstrated the Soviet capability for rapid mobilization; moreover, the doctrine issued to support the invasion--that the sovereignty of each Socialist country cannot oppose the interests of world

socialism--laid the foundation "for political pressures, blackmail and possible adventures elsewhere." The invasion and its possible aftereffects have implications for NATO: The alliance's central front defenses must remain in a constant state of readiness; future crises in the NATO area might result from the repression and counteraction in Eastern Europe--Moscow might restore Warsaw Pact unity by creating crises in West Germany and Berlin; and the organization's southern flank is endangered by the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia. Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar, and in the Norwegian Sea is disturbing; the West "cannot be confident that a Soviet Union that invades Czechoslovakia will not use military force to achieve its purposes on other fronts."

626
Jackson, Henry M. THE UNITED STATES AND NATO. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 6, fall 1968: 343-346.
D839.A85, v. 6

The complex political and economic relationships that have grown up between Europe and the United States since World War II have given a content to the Atlantic community idea more solid than mere sentiment, but nevertheless the future of NATO is clouded by doubts and uncertainty. The original purpose of NATO was to stabilize the military situation in Europe in order that issues dividing East and West might be resolved in peace. Today French spokesmen are saying that since the Soviet threat has disappeared, the alliance has outlived its usefulness. It is evident, however, from what is known of expanding Soviet armaments programs, particularly in mobile longrange forces, that this French view is mistaken. The United States would like to see the emergence of a united, independent Europe. It hopes for a genuine European settlement that will end the injustice of a divided Germany on terms compatible with the security of all parties and permit a mutual withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. forces from central Europe. In pursuing these goals, the United States will not insist, against the will of a European majority, that NATO be retained. Nevertheless, it agrees with the Harmel Report that collective defense promotes stability and the conditions necessary to a relaxation of East-West tensions. In the American view, the alliance is still useful, and it would be to the advantage of both the United States and Europe to meet the tasks of the future in close and harmonious association rather than isolation.

627
Jacobs, Walter D. THE SECURITY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. Revue militaire générale, May 1968: 629-639. U2.R48, 1968
Summaries in French and German.

Although some African nations have called for the liquidation of the white minority African governments, the possibility of war in southern Africa is remote. The countries of southern Africa do have defense problems--the existence of the enclaves of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland; common borders with hostile neighbors; and an immense coastline--but they have strong developing economies and modern and well-trained armies. Rhodesia's Air Force has many combat-experienced officers and Canberra bombers, Vampire fighter-bombers, and Hawker Hunter fighters, and its army has developed a system of identifying and isolating enemy infiltrators. The Union of South Africa not only has one of the largest armies in Africa but is deploying an early warning system and constructing rockets and other complex weapons of modern technology. Angola has established a network of agents and operatives that quickly identifies any infiltrator, but Mozambique has a security problem because its proximity to Tanzania is complicated "by the fact that Malawi represents a natural salient." Despite the improbability of an invasion of southern Africa it is "necessary for Western planners to have a continuing evaluation of the security situation in that part of the world."

628
Johnston, W. A. STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS RESEARCH. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization. EMO national digest, v. 8, Aug./Sept. 1968: 2-7. illus.
UA926.C295, v. 8

Reviews the research activity of the Organization's Blast Protection Section in the "reduction of vulnerability of Canadian physical resources and in the prediction of damage to these resources in the event of nuclear attack." The research is designed to provide information for planners as well as to give better information for use later in the planning period.

629
Jukes, G. CHANGES IN SOVIET CONSCRIPTION LAW. Australian outlook, v. 22, Aug. 1968: 204-217.
DU80.A947, v. 22

In October 1967, the Soviet Union adopted a new conscription law to replace the one in force since 1939. Since the new law reduces the period of service for conscripts and extends the scope of deferments and exemptions, it easily lends itself to exploitation in Soviet propaganda as an arms control or disarmament measure. However, in submitting the law to the Supreme Soviet, Marshal Grechko justified it in an opposite sense by arguing that the new rules would contribute substantially to strengthening Soviet defense forces. Changes in the law were made necessary, he said, by "the growing adventurism of imperialism" revealed in increased military preparations in the West, conflict in Vietnam and the Middle East, and growing West German influence in NATO. This explanation is unconvincing. The real motive for the changes in the law was Russia's concern about its future relations with China. At the moment, "the Soviet Union could destroy China as an organised society in the course of an afternoon," and the Chinese know it. But in the 1970's, with a nuclear deterrent of their own, the Chinese might launch a conventional attack on the U.S.S.R. Soviet Army divisions in a high state of readiness are concentrated in the west, while those of low readiness are assigned to remoter areas. Because of their long mobilization times, the latter are useless for the kind of sharp, decisive contest that the Soviet leaders think is most likely in Europe, but in a prolonged conventional war they could be valuable. It seems that the new conscription law is designed primarily to increase the reserve strength of these divisions. Thus it is neither an arms control measure nor a threatening gesture toward NATO. Its purpose is to strengthen Soviet defenses against an attack from China.

630
Kapur, Ashok. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Dec. 1968: 65-72. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 48

The Chinese military intervention of 1962 awakened India to the fact that Communist China, as well as Pakistan, threatens Indian security. At the moment this threat is conventional, but China will have a modest nuclear force deployed by the mid-1970's. This situation requires that U.S.-Indian relations be clearly examined. U.S. policy toward the subcontinent aims at maintaining the military balance between India and Pakistan, preventing an arms race, and minimizing the diversion of development funds to defense programs. Unfortunately, this policy makes it very difficult for India to strengthen its defense posture vis-a-vis China. Currently India is capable of mounting a conventional defense against China or Pakistan but is incapable of prosecuting a sustained offensive against either country. Should India become engaged in a defensive war, a lack of depth in the areas to be defended will make a decisive breakthrough by the enemy a constant threat. As for Chinese nuclear weapons, India has no defense at all against them. U.S. pressure on India to sign the nonproliferation treaty has been accompanied by an implicit commitment to use U.S. power to defend India against Chinese aggression. Moreover, the nuclear signatories of the treaty obligate themselves to suppress nuclear aggression threatened or committed against nonnuclear states. But how useful are these assurances? For India, the only alternatives to an independent nuclear weapons program are a U.S., or a joint U.S.-Soviet, security assurance, but for a number of reasons neither of these alternatives is really practicable. One thing is clear: The focus of the politicomilitary struggle has shifted to Asia and the Pacific, and it is in these regions that U.S. policy will be tested in the coming years.

631
Kielmansegg, Graf von. WARNINGS MUST BE HEEDED. Survival, v. 10, Nov. 1968: 357-360.
U162.39, v. 10
Translated from Die Welt, Aug. 24, 1968.
Newsp

Although the Western Powers should continue to pursue the goal of détente with the East, they must at the same time be ready and willing to meet any crisis quickly and effectively. The deficiencies in the West's present security system that were pointed out by the recent events in Czechoslovakia should be remedied as soon as possible. NATO's current strategy of flexible response is based upon the assumption that there will be adequate military and political warning time for the preparation of appropriate countermeasures. However, as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated, political intentions are almost impossible to assess. While Russia's midsummer military maneuvers in central Europe indicated its potential for swift large-scale troop mobilization in that area, Soviet political intentions were unclear until a few days before the invasion. "If these manoeuvres had been intended as a deployment directed against Western Europe," the political warning signals would have come too late for adequate retaliation. Thus, the Soviet capability for increasing military readiness while disguising the true intentions behind it shows the folly of relying on a strategy that depends upon "speculations about possible political intentions."

632
Kintner, William R., and Harriet Fast Scott, comps. THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION IN SOVIET MILITARY AFFAIRS. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press [1968] 420 p. UA770.K53
Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--Introduction--The revolution in Soviet military affairs--a challenge to American security.--pt. 1. The doctrinal legacy from Khrushchev: The revolution in military affairs and the task of the military press, by Rodion Ya. Malinovsky. The revolution in military affairs and its results, by N. A. Sbitov.--pt. 2. Reaffirmation of the nuclear strategy: On the character and types of wars in the modern era, by K. S. Bochkarev. The regularity of development and changes of methods of armed conflict, by V. V. Glazov.--pt. 3. The adaptation of Clausewitz to nuclear war: On the nature of world nuclear rocket war, by Ye. I. Ribkin. Land forces, their role and future, by V. V. Mochalov. The character and features of nuclear rocket war, by S. V. Malyanchikov. The time factor in modern war, by I. A. Grudinin.--pt. 4. The Soviet armed forces and the XXIII party congress: On contemporary military strategy, by V. D. Sokolovsky and M. I. Cherednichenko.--pt. 5. A blueprint for the future: The dialectics of development and change in forms and methods of armed conflict, by V. Voznenko. On the question of the essence of war, by I. A. Grudinin. Military-technical superiority: The most important factor of the reliable defense of the country, by V. M. Bondarenko. Changes in the content and nature of modern combat, by N. F. Miroshnichenko. On Soviet military doctrine, by I. G. Zavyalov.

Translations of Soviet writings on military doctrine and strategy published since the Cuban missile crisis and intended mainly for Russian military personnel. Presented chronologically, these selections "indicate the Soviet preoccupation with nuclear weapons and their impact upon warfare."

633
Klefisch, Johannes W. [GERMANY AND THE STRATEGY OF THE SEVENTIES (I)] Deutschland und die Strategie der siebziger Jahre (I). Frankfurter Hefte, v. 23, Aug. 1968: 531-539. AP30.F555, v. 23
The second part of this article, published in the Sept. 1968 issue of Frankfurter Hefte, appears as item 745 in this bibliography.

Recent developments in the American-Soviet relationship in regard to ABM systems and weapons capable of penetrating these systems portend a sweeping change in the world political and strategic situation within the next 5 to 8 years, considering that the new weapons will be used as a means of pressure either between the superpowers or on weaker states. The actual state of the race between the effectiveness of "the penetrating weapons" and the ABM systems as well as the contest between the systems themselves will determine each time whether the superpowers or the weaker states, their allies for instance, are to be the prime objects of that pressure. The future will most probably be marked by considerable periods of relative impenetrability of each superpower's defense system, heightening the chances of nuclear blackmail and even of nuclear attacks on territories outside vital areas of the two superpowers. All "in-between" territories, which like Western Europe have been vital to either superpower, will lose their prestige value in a new, out-and-out power politics of the superpowers. Germany or Europe can then easily become the theater of any kind of war, including nuclear, conducted by the superpowers either directly or by proxy. Protection

of the German Federal Republic against such an eventuality should already be Bonn's concern today. In Moscow's view, the German Federal Republic, after China, poses the greatest threat to Soviet security. German-Soviet mutual mistrust will be long lasting even after all of its acute causes are eliminated; hence the Soviet determination to keep Germany impotent forever, politically and militarily.

634
Kostelanetz, Richard. ONE-MAN THINK TANK. New York times magazine, Dec. 1, 1968: 58-59, 82, 86, 88, 92, 94, 96, 105-106, 112, 114, 122, 124. illus.
AP2. N6575, 1968

A character sketch and intellectual portrait of Herman Kahn. Kostelanetz believes that Kahn's major asset as a thinker is an "avant-garde sensibility" that enables him to remain always on the frontiers of thought. His great achievement has been to clarify the new reality of the atomic age, and by measuring its risks and devising policies to meet them he has made the world a more rational, and therefore safer, place to live.

635
Krolikowski, Herbert. NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK. International affairs (Moscow) no. 11, Nov. 1968: 16-21.
D839. I465, 1968

"The programme of the Bonn rulers is: revanchist schemes, neo-Nazism, emergency laws, claims to nuclear weapons and demands for redrawing the existing European frontiers." Their medium is NATO, and their immediate goal is a strong military alliance with strategically-located Scandinavia, which would satisfy imperialist West German expansionist plans and provide a "staging ground for aggression against the Socialist countries." Denmark and Norway, members of NATO and thus subject to its pressures, are the first targets, although their unwillingness to militarize was stated at their inclusion into NATO. Nevertheless, West Germany wields its considerable economic and foreign trade influence in exchange for the military concessions it seeks and is obviously supported in its actions by the United States. Last year President Johnson and Chancellor Kiesinger agreed that the cooperation of the Nordic countries is absolutely essential to strengthen NATO's northern flank and make the Baltic Sea a "jumping-off ground for missile carriers." Coincidental to NATO's concentration on the northern flank is the augmentation of the West German Navy, already among the world's largest. The thrust of the entire maneuver is "for the successful completion (by the forces of imperialism)" of World War II to unify Europe and by weight of numbers overturn the Socialist governments of Eastern Europe. Fortunately, the balance of world sympathy is on the side of peace and socialism.

636
Lyman, Princeton N. KOREA'S INVOLVEMENT IN VIET NAM. Orbis, v. 12, summer 1968: 563-581.
D839. O68, v. 12

Discusses the debate over Korea's commitment to Vietnam and enumerates the reasons for the Korean Government's military involvement in Southeast Asia, among which were the Government's desire to strengthen its relations with the United States, its interest in potential financial benefits from the Vietnam War, and its feeling that Vietnam's security is related to its own. Lyman believes South Korea's role in Vietnam has contributed to the increase in violence along the border with North Korea. He concludes that the involvement in Vietnam has brought Korea additional international prestige and that its participation in the war along with the United States "is accelerating the changes in [U.S.-Korean relations] that were already inherent in Korea's growing economic strength and gradually evolving outlook on foreign policy." Whether this interdependent relationship will develop smoothly remains to be seen.

637
McMahon, John F. STREAMLINING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Jan. 1969: 36-46. illus.
Z6723. U35, v. 49

Proposes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be relieved of their separate service responsibilities so that they can devote their full time to the formulation of national military policy. The present arrangement leads to divided loyalties and imposes an excessive workload on the Chiefs.

638
McNolty, Frank. EXPECTED COVERAGE FOR TARGETS OF NONUNIFORM DENSITY. Operations research, v. 16, Sept./Oct. 1968: 1027-1039.
Q175. O63, v. 16

Presents derivations of expressions for the probability of killing a randomly located point target and for the expected coverage of an area target of variable density. Particular emphasis is placed upon a general situation in which the phase distribution is not necessarily uniform. General distributions are employed to describe the phase, radial, and component behavior of the target and from these functions the distribution of a quadratic form is derived that provides the expected coverage or kill probability. The targeting conditions include a fixed lethal radius (kill-no-kill) when the center of gravity of the weapon impact points coincides with the center of the target density and a variable lethal radius when a weapon bias is present. (Abstract supplied)

639
Martin, Laurence W. HOLDING THE LINE IN EUROPE. Spectator, v. 221, Nov. 1, 1968: 617-618.
AP4. S7, v. 221

The Czechoslovak invasion has illuminated NATO's grave weaknesses. Its conventional forces "in many instances [are] well below supposed strength, underequipped, ill-deployed and beset with all the liaison difficulties of a coalition." This is particularly alarming because NATO's new flexible response strategy emphasizes both the difficulty of using nuclear weapons and the need for conventional forces and points out the inadequacy of its forces vis-a-vis the Russians. While Russia's intentions in the Czechoslovak invasion were probably only to shore up its tottering edifice, NATO's exposed members fear additional invasions in either Yugoslavia or Rumania and question whether "they are far enough across the line to be immune." Coinciding with these anxieties are those over the proposed Soviet-American talks on strategic nuclear weapons, which would have implications for NATO: they would

336-937 O - 69 - 4

symbolize American uneasiness about Russia's nuclear power "at a time when NATO, for all its new strategy, still depends on American readiness to fight nuclear war," and they would tempt Russia "to probe the limits of American tolerance further to the West." These events suggest the wisdom of reaffirming the alliance's solidarity and point out that NATO should maintain its modest degree of deterrence. While rearmament would provoke the Russians and sharpen their anxieties, the remedy of certain force deficiencies--"more mobile forces, more airlift and more assistance to the local forces with their own equipment, in view of the probable technical and political limitations on reinforcement"--would have beneficial effects on the exposed flanks.

640
Martin, Laurence W. RUSSIA'S NAVY--THE DEVELOPING THREAT. Spectator, v. 221, Oct. 4, 1968: 466-467.
AP4.S7, v. 221

The Russian Navy's rapid growth in strength and range of capabilities and the striking Soviet naval deployment in the Mediterranean pose two questions: Are the Russians planning to use their navy to project their power, by force if necessary, into distant areas, and what are they planning in the Middle East? Although the Russians hope to avoid direct conflict with the West and must promote their cause by the political influence of their naval forces, it is possible that a beleaguered Russian leadership, which is influenced by the military and facing trouble near home, might seek triumphs elsewhere. Regardless, the growing naval presence is effective by increasing Russia's political weight and robbing the West of the benefits of a previously unrivaled role in distant ports.

641
Martin, Laurence W. THE SEA IN MODERN STRATEGY. New York, Praeger [1967] 190 p. illus. (Studies in international security, 11)
V103.M3
Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents. --The modern context of seapower. --Naval forces in general war. --Seapower in wars of intervention. --Occasions for limited war at sea. --The conduct of war at sea. --Costs and the naval balance. --Seapower and non-belligerent action. --The future pattern of seapower.

Examines the role of modern navies. Martin asserts that seapower will remain a vital ingredient in safeguarding national security but maintains that modern technology necessitates changes in traditional naval strategy. In determining the proper mix of naval forces, strategists now must consider "the contribution of naval forces to nuclear deterrence and general war, the role of naval power in limited wars on land and sea, and the place of naval forces in peaceful but frequently tense diplomacy."

642
Marzari, Frank. DETERRENCE, NATO'S MILITARY STRATEGY, AND THE EUROPEAN ALLIES. Queen's quarterly, v. 75, autumn 1968: 410-421.
AP5.Q3, v. 75

While more attractive than massive retaliation, the doctrine of flexible response, formally adopted by NATO in December 1967, has a number of significant drawbacks. A successful alliance strategy should provide both an effective deterrent and a defense in the event the former fails. Moreover, it should be geared to the reluctance of the Russians to run serious military risks as well as to the security requirements of the European Allies. By introducing a note of ambiguity, flexible response in its present form tends "to blur 'the marvellous clarity of choice between non-war and destruction' which so far has guaranteed effectively that no probe, incursion or attack would take place." Furthermore, it has contributed both to De Gaulle's insistence on developing an independent nuclear deterrent and France's split from the alliance. Other objectional features of flexible response are its failure to assign an appropriate role to tactical nuclear weapons, and its tendency to weaken the credibility of nuclear retaliation by calling for substantial increases in conventional forces. Thus this doctrine has loosened the cohesion of the alliance and weakened its deterrent. Although the United States may find it useful to build up its own conventional options, it should not impose this strategy upon its European allies. "An unambiguous declaration that tactical nuclear weapons would be used to repel even a limited conventional attack" would better suit European security needs.

643
Max, Alphonse E. SOVIET INTEREST IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Oct. 1968: 92-96. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 48

Describes recent Soviet maritime activity in the South Atlantic Ocean and Antarctica and speculates on its purposes. The Soviet Union is using its modern fisheries fleet and some of its naval vessels to conduct extensive oceanographic surveys in these regions. The strategic value of Cape Horn and the Strait of Magellan and the economic and military potential of the Antarctic Continent are the reasons for this show of interest.

644
Montfort, Colonel-divisionnaire. [WHAT'S NEW AT NATO?] A l'OTAN, quoi de nouveau? Revue militaire suisse, v. 113, Nov. 1968: 545-549.
U2.R5, v. 113

Reports on NATO's current activities and problems. Montfort discusses the NATO exercise "Polar Express," which was conducted during the summer of 1968 to train a mobile force to protect the alliance's southern and northern flanks, and notes that the number of men and equipment involved in this exercise was insignificant compared with the number the Swiss Army employs during its annual exercises. The author also states France's position on disarmament: Nuclear disarmament consists not only of a test ban but of the destruction of existing stockpiles, and it must be accompanied by total conventional disarmament. He draws several conclusions, among which are that the classical balance of power has been replaced by a nuclear balance of terror, that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia exposed NATO's weaknesses, and that NATO's conventional forces must be increased to equal those of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

645
MORE ON THE 'STRATEGIC BALANCE.' Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Dec. 1968: 34.
UG633.A65, v. 51

A reply to James McBride's critique on U.S. strategic forces and their vulnerability to a Soviet multiple independent reentry vehicle system [cited in v. 5, no. 1, item 169 of this bibliography]. The author rejects the argument that as long as the United States maintains an assured destruction capability it will have no need for a major ABM system and stresses that offensive (assured destruction) and defensive (damage limitation) weapons must be kept in balance to ensure deterrence. He explores the cost of effectiveness of strategic weapons and notes that "it is useful to target Soviet missiles in either a first strike or second strike." He disagrees that an ABM system should be deployed outside the United States, because it would become a more tempting target for Soviet missiles.

646
Mukerjee, Dilip. INDIA'S DEFENCE PERSPECTIVES. International affairs (London) v. 44, Oct. 1968: 666-676. JX1.I53, v. 44

China's internal problems and the sharpening of the Sino-Soviet conflict since 1962 will prevent it from launching an all-out attack against India which would draw in other powers interested in maintaining India's independence and integrity. Indian defense planners hold this view despite America's increasing weariness with other people's problems, Britain's withdrawal East of Suez, and "a growing awareness that India's national interest may not always coincide with that of the super-Powers." The Indian strategists assume that their country's size and geopolitical significance are sufficient reasons for the superpowers to be concerned for India's safety from Chinese pressures. Since the Chinese believe India will crumble under the weight of its own internal problems, China's strategy favors localized pressure sufficient to force India into economic and political turmoil. An example of this pressure is the case of the Naga rebels along the India-Burma border, who are receiving military supplies and training in guerrilla tactics from China. Despite Chinese pressures, India and Pakistan might be persuaded, on the basis that both are working toward the same ends, to view their problem with greater realism. Both nations are skeptical of the nonproliferation treaty and have misgivings about the superpowers. They have also lost the financial and moral support of the superpowers and, consequently, will have great difficulty in sustaining military programs.

647
NATO: IN THE WAKE OF ILLUSION. Time, v. 92, Nov. 22, 1968: 18-19. illus. AP2.T37, v. 92

The Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia shattered illusions of immediate accomodation with the Soviet Union and of possible military dilution of NATO. In response to Russian aggressiveness, the United States urged a firm demonstration of NATO's strength but contended that the European partners must carry a greater share of the defense burden. As a result European member states modestly increased their defense budgets; the French promised nothing but showed signs of cooperation. A more difficult task for NATO Ministers was to devise a counter for future Soviet moves--they found it impossible to agree on retaliatory measures but finally did issue a forceful communique, which warned that NATO would defend its members against armed attack and that Soviet intervention affecting either the European situation or the Mediterranean situation "would create an international crisis with grave consequences." At present U.S. planners are considering the military options open to them if the Russians were to invade another Communist or neutral East European state. The Russians demonstrated "that such contingency plans might well be needed" by claiming the right to intervene "in 'any socialist country' where the forces of imperialism . . . capitalism and bourgeois revisionism threaten to make a comeback." Further, they adamantly defended their Mediterranean fleet buildup.

648
NEW REALITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. Time, v. 92, Nov. 22, 1968: 19-20. AP2.T37, v. 92

Notes the increased presence of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean and its impact upon Western strategy. According to the commander of NATO forces in southern Europe, the greatest importance of the Soviet Mediterranean flotilla is psychological and political, even though a potential military threat does exist. Possible situations in which Soviet seapower might be used are a coup attempt in Egypt or Syria, a blockade against Israel for Egypt, a pro-Soviet upheaval in Albania, or a Soviet power play against Yugoslavia. The establishment of the "Maritime Air Forces, Mediterranean (MAIRAIRMED), the special new NATO naval air arm created to coordinate the watch on the Russians watching NATO," is an attempt to maintain the balance of power in the area.

649
1968 GREENBOOK: A STATUS REPORT ON THE U.S. ARMY. Army, v. 18, Nov. 1968: 19-184. illus. Ul.A893, v. 18

Presents status reports by U.S. Army Commands and a special section on Vietnam, 1968. Photographs of commanding officers and a guide to Army equipment and weapons are included.

650
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Council. THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE; FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE. Report, December 1967. Submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, pursuant to S. Res. 54, 90th Congress, to the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968. 3 p. UA646.3.N6

At head of title: 90th Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

"[First] issued as an annex to the Council's December 14th communiqué."

Examines NATO's future tasks and confirms the alliance's importance in promoting détente and strengthening peace. NATO's role in achieving a stable European order, overcoming the division of Germany, working toward disarmament, obtaining practical arms control measures, and dealing with conflicts arising outside the NATO area is emphasized.

651
Örvik, Nils. NATO, NAFTA AND THE SMALLER ALLIES. Orbis, v. 12, summer 1968: 455-464. D839.O68, v. 12

Maintaining the viability of the Atlantic alliance in the face of mounting problems depends on whether

common objectives, a reciprocity of contributions in carrying out these objectives, and a unity of leadership exist within NATO. In the immediate postwar era the alliance fulfilled these requirements: its common goal was the containment of Soviet expansion in Europe, territories were given to the larger powers for bases and installations in return for protection against the Soviet threat, and leadership was unified by the military and political predominance of the United States. Today, however, the original goal of containing the Soviet Union has little meaning for most NATO members, and the alliance is now being confronted by divisions that contribute to its political and economic erosion. Reciprocity between NATO's larger and smaller powers is on the wane because there is no need for the security guarantees of the large capital investments that smaller powers received after the war. In addition, the needs of the larger powers can now be met more effectively by neutral nations, which can act as mediators in place of small alined powers and deny Russia access to their territories without formal guarantees of assistance. Furthermore, the unity of leadership is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in light of Far East tensions. Despite these negative assertions, the alliance has not outlived its usefulness but must be reorganized on a regional basis if NATO is going to cope with the differences between its members. A solution is the creation of a North Atlantic free trade area, which would formulate its own security and economic goals in conjunction with the Common Market and serve as a peripheral warning system--a "mini-NATO."

652
PACKARD'S CHOICE. Electronics, v. 42, Jan. 20, 1969: 45-46. TK7800.E4384, v. 42

The appointment of David Packard as Deputy Secretary of Defense has aroused a good deal of controversy because of his close association with the defense industry. Instead of selling his 29-percent interest in the Hewlett-Packard instrument company, which does about one-third of its business with defense and Government contractors, he has offered to place his shares in a short-term educational trust. Moreover, he has served on the boards of corporations associated with defense operations and has often criticized Pentagon pricing policies as being too cost conscious. Thus, although he has emphasized military research and development over substantial increases in weaponry, he "will be watched closely by those who fear the military-industrial complex" if his appointment is confirmed.

653
Pemberton, R. F. THE AIR FORCES IN PARLIAMENT. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 8, winter 1968: 325-328. UG635.G7A1252, v. 8

Discusses the implications of further cuts in British defense expenditures announced in the defense White Paper of July 11, 1968. The budget reductions will result in a substantial decrease in armed force levels, particularly in the Far East and Persian Gulf areas. In order to maintain the capability for responding to future troubles in these areas, strategic planners must endeavor to enhance the mobility of British forces, which will be very difficult "if the present policy of the Government is carried out." Moreover, in view of the renewed Communist threat as evidenced by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the planned armed support for NATO will be inadequate.

654
PENTAGON GETS A TOUGH PRAGMATIST. Business week, no. 2050, Dec. 14, 1968: 134-135. HC431.B87, 1968

Sketches the professional career and defense philosophy of the new Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird. Elected to Congress in 1952, Laird soon became a House Republican leader. Like his predecessor, Robert S. McNamara, he knows "how to gain and use power." However, he does not share McNamara's philosophy of strategic parity with the Russians; instead, he advocates enhancing America's military superiority over the Soviet Union. However, this tough position is "tempered by fiscal conservatism, political pragmatism, and a belief that the U.S. must retrench from its 'world's policeman' role."

655
Power, Thomas S. DETERRENCE OR DEFEAT? Ordnance, v. 53, Nov./Dec. 1968: 265-267. UF1.O67, v. 53

The United States must maintain a deterrent posture of convincing nuclear superiority. This conclusion is drawn from certain assumptions: There is an international Communist conspiracy whose goal is world domination; and if the Communists fail to subvert the free world peacefully, they will resort to nuclear blackmail, nuclear war, or both. Some consider these assumptions invalid, but the United States "cannot afford to gamble on their being right"; impractical theories such as overkill, détente, minimum deterrence, and finite deterrence, must be discarded. The policy shift from nuclear superiority to nuclear parity must be stopped; the United States must rebuild its strategic forces. If its superior force is to be effective, the United States must have the military capability to achieve victory under any circumstance, must let the world know its strength, and must deter potential aggressors "with the military force it will have left after being subjected to a surprise attack" not by the force it has. The crisis is here! The United States cannot continue to use diametrically opposed strategies--nuclear superiority and nuclear disarmament--without risking nuclear war. Strength ensures peace; weakness encourages war.

656
Robinson, James A. NATO: NOW IS THE TIME FOR ALL GOOD MEMBERS . . . In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 95, Jan. 1969: 38-47. illus. V1.U8, v. 95

Although the resurgence of European nationalism under the leadership of President de Gaulle and the presumed decline of the Soviet threat are partly responsible for the diminishing cohesion and cooperation in NATO affairs, they do not fully explain NATO's current difficulties. According to a theory of collective action developed by Professor Mancur Olson, Jr., NATO's problems can be attributed primarily to deficiencies in its basic structure. Olson classified organizations by their outcomes--either collective or private. Collective outcomes cannot be denied any potential consumer, and private outcomes are available only to members of the organization that provides them. Although initially membership in NATO produced both private (national security) and collective (deterrence of Soviet aggression) benefits, now NATO defense is "virtually exclusively collective." Since nonmembers also profit from the NATO deterrent,

motivations for burden sharing have declined. As a voluntary organization, NATO cannot coerce its members into sharing the costs of collective services, particularly since the European members realize the United States is "so committed to defense that it will provide the outcome at its own expense if necessary." This interpretation of NATO's weaknesses is reinforced by the results of an experiment conducted at the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, in which "two organizations bearing a 'face validity' resemblance to alliances" were simulated, with one offering collective outcomes and the other offering both private and collective outcomes. Both organizations were subjected to the same "threat," but the organization that provided a mixed outcome displayed far greater cohesion. Unfortunately most analysts of NATO's internal conflicts "emphasize the number and substance of functions, often apparently without recognizing the differing effects of collective and private benefits." If Dr. Olson's theory is valid, NATO could best be revitalized by the institution of a program of shared private benefits, perhaps beginning with a program of technology sharing among the members.

657
Roche, John P. CAN A FREE SOCIETY FIGHT A LIMITED WAR? New leader, v. 51, Oct. 21, 1968: 6-11. HX1.N37, v. 51

Questions whether a free society can fight a limited war, in light of the Vietnam experience, but maintains that flexible response is still a sound alternative to isolationism and massive retaliation. Roche concludes that if America's commitment to limited war is undermined and a return to the "Age of Dulles" is undertaken, the results will be tragic.

658
Roderick, Harry E. CIVIL DEFENSE ATTACK WARNING. Signal, v. 23, Dec. 1968: 16, 18-21. illus. UG1.M65, v. 23

Examines each of the civil defense attack warning systems studied by the Office of Civil Defense in the three media capable of mass alert: electric power systems, telephone systems, and radio systems. Feasibility and cost factors point to a form of the radio system as the most effective means of overall national alert. By 1973 the Decision Information Distribution System for disseminating alert messages to Federal, State, and local centers is expected to be operative nationally. From the local centers the most comprehensive alert system will combine several warning devices--outdoor sirens, public address systems, broadcast alerts, and telephone warnings--to establish the credibility of the alert with minimal delay in taking emergency measures.

659
Rostow, Eugene V. LIMITED WAR AND LIMITED PEACE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 59, Nov. 11, 1968: 498-507. JX232.A33, v. 59
"Address made at the State College of Arkansas, Conway, Ark., on Oct. 11," 1968.

Discusses the problems of limited war in the context of postwar U.S. foreign policy. Rostow argues that outmoded political attitudes derived from America's historical experience of alternating periods of isolated peace and total war continue to prevent a large number of Americans from seeing the world as it is today or accepting the kinds of responsibilities and limitations this world imposes. Consequently, one of the most urgent and important tasks facing U.S. policymakers has been that of "persuading the American people to understand and accept the 20th century." Fortunately, the American leadership has succeeded in winning majority support for a realistic U.S. foreign policy. Since World War II American policy has aimed at maintaining a stable balance of power vis-a-vis the Communist bloc as a prelude to eventual détente. Containment is one of the two key elements in this policy. Containment, of course, implies commitments; commitments require credibility; and credibility in the nuclear age entails, in the words of President Johnson, "limited objectives, limited means, but unlimited patience and determination to achieve them."

660
RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Life, v. 65, Nov. 29, 1968: 22-31. illus. AP2.L547, v. 65

Examines the Soviet presence in the Middle East. By gaining a foothold in this area, the Russians hope "to turn NATO's southern flank and to gain a position from which they can interdict . . . Western oil supply lines." The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and their arms shipments and economic aid to Arab countries indicate their determination to dominate the Middle East.

661
Schilling, Hartmut. [WORLD IMPERIALISM, WEST GERMAN NEOCOLONIALISM AND THE AFRICAN SOUTH] Der Weltimperialismus, der westdeutsche Neokolonialismus und der afrikanische Süden. Dokumentation der Zeit; Informations-Archiv, v. 20, no. no. 410, 1968: 15-21. DD261.D4, v. 20
Revised version of the "main opening paper," read at the scientific conference "Against Racism and Neocolonialism--For the Liberation of Africa's South," held May 22-25, 1968, in Berlin.

Undertakes to prove with references to numerous sources, both Eastern and Western, the political and military support of the South African apartheid regime by American and West German "imperialists" who want to use South Africa as an operational base for military suppression of African liberation movements. South Africa represents an important aggressive outpost for American global strategy in a confrontation between imperialism and the Socialist world camp, and West Germany and South Africa are secretly cooperating in various nuclear projects and the production of missiles and gas weapons.

662
Schröder, Gerhard. NATO ON THE ALERT BUT STILL SEEKS EAST-WEST DÉTENTE. In Germany (Federal Republic, 1949-) Presse- und Informationsamt. Bulletin, a weekly survey of German affairs, v. 16, Dec. 3, 1968: 343-345. DD259.A35, v. 16
Official translation of an article based on a statement of policy made to the parliament of the German Federal Republic on Nov. 29, 1968.

Discusses West Germany's and NATO's defense and security policies in the light of strategic political changes brought about by Soviet military intervention in

Czechoslovakia. Schröder considers the invasion of Czechoslovakia a part of the Soviet policy of expansion, which involves an area from the North Sea to the Mediterranean.

663
Servais, André. [BELGIUM'S MILITARY EFFORT--AND DETERRENCE] L'effort militaire belge et la dissuasion. Revue militaire générale, May 1968: 575-589. U2.R48, 1968
Summaries in English and German.

Reviews Belgium's military contribution to NATO. At present, Belgium has 100,000 soldiers in the alliance, but after the reorganization plan it will contribute 60,000 men. Servais believes the distinction between nuclear and conventional forces is being eliminated, and all industrial nations will soon be able to produce nuclear weapons. He concludes that Europe must have a defense organization adapted to modern technological methods that includes a strategic nuclear force and a conventional force equipped with tactical weapons.

664
Singh, Arjan. AIR FORCE DESTINED TO PLAY VITAL ROLE IN MODERN OPERATIONS. National defence, v. 6, Aug. 1968: 11-12.
U1.N15, v. 6

Praises the expansion of India's Air Force and notes its importance in modern military operations. Singh emphasizes that the hostility of India's neighbors makes imperative the maintenance of operational preparedness.

665
Spaak, Paul Henri. "FEDERAL UNION OF NATO NATIONS AUDACIOUS, BUT NOT UNREASONABLE," SAYS SPAAK. Freedom & union, v. 23, Nov./Dec. 1968: 9-14. illus.
JX1901.F6, v. 23

Stresses the continuing Soviet threat to world stability as demonstrated by Russia's invasion of Czechoslovakia and its incursions into the Middle East and the importance of bolstering the Atlantic alliance to contain this threat. Although Spaak did not advocate returning to harsh cold war policies, he warned that in practicing peaceful coexistence the West must recognize that "the communists have in no way renounced their doctrine nor their dream of world domination." The West can benefit from peaceful coexistence as long as Europe and the United States cooperate to deter Communist aggression.

666
Stannard, A. F. B. MUNICIPAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization. EMO national digest, v. 8, Aug./Sept. 1968: 10-13, 19. UA926.C295, v. 8

Summary of findings and recommendations of the study "Organizing Municipal Governments for Civil Defense," made by the American Municipal Association in 1963. Problems of organization, planning and implementation of civil defense programs, training, manpower, equipment, shelter availability and utilization, financial support, legal problems, intergovernmental problems, and national policy considerations were reviewed in this study of six cities.

667
Starner, Frances L. SEARCH FOR SURVIVAL. Far Eastern economic review, v. 61, Sept. 19, 1968: 553-555. illus. HC411.F18, v. 61

Examines the problems for Singapore's and Malaysia's security created by Britain's intended withdrawal in 1971 and the possibility of a reduced American presence in Asia. Starner points out that, although both Asian governments realize the necessity of cooperating to ensure their future stability and security, they do not view threats to their security in the same terms. Ideological and economic differences separate the two countries; personal and political differences exacerbate the friction between them. Starner concludes that, although both are concerned by the British withdrawal, Singapore, unlike Malaysia, has little inclination to look back and seems determined to meet its challenges.

668
[THE STATE OF THE FRENCH "FORCE DE FRAPPE"] Stand der französischen Force de Frappe. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Nov. 15, 1968: 556-558.
U3.W38, v. 12

The conception of the new French Defence Planning is no doubt a decisive factor in the establishment of the strategic nuclear operational units. It was only in 1956 that the French government decided to undertake first studies for producing her own atomic weapons. Seven years later the final decision was taken to establish France's own strategic nuclear forces, and thus the much discussed Force de Frappe was called to life. A period of 12 years was considered necessary for establishing an intimidation power appropriate for the country. In the meantime the first generation of nuclear arms [has been] ready for operation [for] two years. The second generation is being built up, and the development of the third generation is well under way. (Abstract supplied, modified)

669
Stikker, Dirk U. EFFECT OF POLITICAL FACTORS ON THE FUTURE STRENGTH OF NATO. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 6, fall 1968: 331-342.
D839.A85, v. 6

Examines current political issues in dispute between the United States and Western Europe and attempts to estimate their significance for the future of the Atlantic community. Stikker summarizes the various positions on the question whether a conflict of interest exists between the Atlantic community idea and European unity. He concludes that it does not, but that in present circumstances neither program is feasible. Political loyalties remain centered in the nation and the struggle between supranationalism, and "l'Europe de Patries," which is really a contest for power in Europe and for influence vis-a-vis the superpowers, will continue for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, barring a limited European politicomilitary union outside NATO, and unacceptable to the United States, such as a European nuclear force based on a Franco-German or Anglo-French arrangement, political, military, and economic cooperation between the United States and Europe is still possible and desirable.

670
Stockwin, Harvey. THE SUM OF FIVE NEGATIVES. Far Eastern economic review, v. 61, Sept. 26, 1968: 629-631. illus. HC411.F18, v. 61

Discusses reaction to Conservative opposition leader Edward Heath's pledge of a continuing British role in Southeast Asian defense and emphasizes the general indecision toward future security arrangements shown by Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.

671
Teplinskii, B. THE MEDITERRANEAN AND NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK. New times, no. 49, Dec. 11, 1968: 1-4. illus. D839.N483, 1968

The NATO strategists feel that the present arrangement of NATO territory falls short of their "geostrategic" requirements and that its southern flank is unprotected--hence their interest in the Mediterranean area, where the U.S. 6th Fleet is stationed. They plan to restore the continuity of NATO's territory, which was broken by the withdrawal of France, by including Yugoslavia, which is now on the high priority list, and Austria. The territory would then extend from West Germany to Italy, Greece, and Turkey, and thus NATO would also control the Adriatic Sea. The vacuum created on the Iberian Peninsula by France's withdrawal has been filled by a special Iberian Atlantic Command, with headquarters in Lisbon; NATO has military bases in Spain, including one at Gibraltar; and the main bulk of its forces is in Italy, where it has established a submarine base in Naples. While the NATO forces in the Mediterranean are substantial, they apparently are not strong enough to carry out NATO's and the Pentagon's aggressive plans. Therefore the old project for a Mediterranean NATO squadron patterned on the multinational naval force now operating in the Atlantic is again under consideration. The foreign press maintains that the 6th Fleet is designed as a threat of massive "tactical" strikes at "targets in the southern part of the Soviet Union and in other countries of the Socialist community." Moreover the United States plans to set up a submarine base in Greece in 1969 and, according to the Italian Paese Sera, create a cordon of island bases through the Balearic Islands to Sardinia, Malta, Crete, and Cyprus and thus establish a beachhead for "permanent intervention" against the Socialist countries. However, the United States is no longer the master of the Mediterranean area, and the Warsaw Pact countries are watching its machinations and are ready to prevent undertakings like those which the United States has previously made in Lebanon, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece and any steps that would endanger the security of the Socialist countries.

672
Thoulouze, Aérienne A. THE FRENCH AIR FORCE. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 8, winter 1968: 269-275. illus. UG635.G7A1252, v. 8

Summarizes the structure and capabilities of the French Air Force (FAF). Organized into six commands, the FAF is comprised of strategic, tactical, defense, and transport forces. In 1968 its personnel totaled 110,793, and it operated on a budget equal to 475 million pounds. Although the FAF places top priority on its strategic deterrent, it also recognizes the need to maintain a less sophisticated combat force. In order to achieve the versatility required within the limits of its financial resources, the FAF is collaborating with the British in the development of a multipurpose strategic aircraft, a long-range tactical aircraft, a series of three helicopters, and an air-to-surface missile.

673
Tiwari, S. N. SOUTHEAST ASIA IN INDIA'S DEFENSIVE FRAMEWORK. Southeast Asia quarterly, v. 3, July 1968: 8-22. P&GP RR

Southeast Asia's geographical location and economic resources are immensely important for India's defense and prosperity. In general the region serves as a buffer zone between China and India, a land bridge between India and Australia, and a link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Specifically, each country within the region has or can have strategic importance for India--Burma and India possess a common land and water border, anti-Communist and anti-Chinese Thailand could help India fight Communist China, the Indo-Chinese countries exert pressure upon China and provide a barrier against enemy attempts to engulf Southeast Asia and India, Indonesia provides a link between the Malayan mainland and the northern tip of Australia, Malaysia and Singapore ensure India's entry into the East, and the Philippines, although distant from India, could serve as a base to divert the attention of a belligerent power from India. Economically the Southeast Asian countries provide natural resources for Indian industry, foodstuffs for India's enormous population, and a market for Indian manufactures. The Indian Government must keep Chinese influence in the region at a minimum and strengthen its own ties with the area.

674
Uezumi, Minoru. THE CONSERVATIVE STRATEGY FOR 1970. Japan Socialist review, no. 164, Sept. 15, 1968: 23-48. HX9.J3, 1968

Outlines the various military strategies and foreign policies espoused by the different factions of Japan's Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP). Operating under the delusion of the "Communist threat" the rightwing group of the LDP seeks more stringent internal security measures and closer military cooperation with the United States in combating the "perils" of communism in Japan and throughout Asia. The goals of the leftwing faction most closely resemble those of the Western bourgeoisie; it desires to protect the interests of the individual in a free society through the expansion of trade and the buildup of Japan's self-defense forces. The middle group is primarily interested in "increasing Japan's prestige in the world" and gradually reducing dependence upon the United States without harming relations between the two nations. The Sato government appears to be most heavily influenced by the rightwing faction of the LDP, since the Prime Minister has increased Japan's commitment to U.S. strategic aims in Asia rather than promote the trend toward independence begun by the late Prime Minister Ikeda.

675
UNVEILING BRITISH DEFENCE RESEARCH, by our parliamentary correspondent. Nature (London) v. 220, Nov. 23, 1968: 741-742. Q1.N2, v. 220

Because of natural conservatism and the feeling that defense is not the best subject for party differences, there has never been a committee in the House of Commons specifically appointed to study British defense policy. However, a House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology has recently been reappointed, and although its primary task is the study of defense research, its chairman, Arthur Palmer, is hoping that this "committee will be able to get at defence policy through the back door." Indeed,

optimism is high because the committee's terms of reference have been so widely defined. The committee's investigation of Great Britain's defense research operations is almost complete, and a final report will probably be published at the beginning of 1969. Although the committee has yet to give any indication of its thinking on British defense research, it would hardly be doing its duty if it did not identify the faults in research organization and operations. For example, it may believe the British Government's share in research efforts, which is estimated at 70 percent, is too large. In the United States the situation is the reverse with only 30 percent of the defense research sponsored by Government agencies. Since government scientists in Great Britain are civil servants with the security of tenure and cannot easily be redeployed, any process to change the balance in Britain is bound to be slow and controlled by recruitment policy. Another example of what the committee may do is to point out the distinction between research work that has no industrial application and work in radar and electronics that can now be done by industry. The science and technology committee has been reappointed in record time and, according to its chairman, has become a fixture on the parliamentary scene despite cancellation of the agriculture committee's investigations. One reason for Palmer's optimism is the liaison committee organized by the chairmen of the various select committees. This committee has been able to pressure the traditionally dilatory whips into getting the select committees set up quickly. "Clearly it takes a committee to beat the system."

676
Verberie. [THE TRUE PURPOSE OF NATO (RESPONSE TO GENERAL JOHN HACKETT, COMMANDER OF THE NORTHERN GROUP)] Le véritable objectif de l'OTAN (réponse au General sir John Hackett, commandant du groupe d'armées du Nord) Revue militaire générale, no. 8, Oct. 1968: 323-331.
U2.R48, 1968

Although NATO's conventional forces are numerically inferior to Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, alliance plans should be based not on the acceptance of a conventional defensive battle that the West could have no hope of winning, but on the determination to employ nuclear weapons in the event of Soviet aggression. The decision to use nuclear weapons should be accompanied by an important act of escalation to eliminate any doubt as to the West's unwillingness to submit to aggression for fear of nuclear destruction.

677
Vidiasova, L. NATO ON THE EVE OF 1969. International affairs (Moscow) no. 10, Oct. 1968: 17-24.
D839.I465, 1968

By 1966, NATO's erosion had advanced so far that in an article in Foreign Affairs, July 1966, American foreign affairs specialists Herman Kahn and William Pfaff drew a picture of NATO's complete disintegration. However, recent events such as the fresh failures of the U.S. aggression in Vietnam, the sociopolitical upheavals in many NATO countries, and the violent reaction to the events in Czechoslovakia impelled the United States to restore Europe to a higher priority in its foreign policy and to revive NATO as an instrument of that policy. The modernization of NATO required the assignment of new tasks, such as the easing of international tensions and the promotion of an East-West détente, to transform it into a seeming instrument of peace. The real political motive behind this policy was the desire of the NATO leaders, especially of the United States, to introduce direct control over the development of relations between NATO countries and the Socialist countries. In these plans the Federal Republic of Germany played a special role. During the 14 years of its membership in NATO, this country became NATO's striking force. By now it determines NATO policy and relations among its members and is making an effort to become the chief U.S. partner in Europe and an instrumental force in framing NATO's nuclear strategy. In the future Germany might plan to act on its own in waging limited wars and gain access to nuclear weapons for this purpose. It probably hopes both to become a leading factor in a future European community with its own nuclear force and to formulate its policy. However, the projection of the "United Europe" models is originally American, and many political scientists are convinced that this community should include Great Britain. All the European unification plans have a common aim: to use NATO's modernization both as a pretext to cement Western Europe into a spearhead against the Socialist countries and as a magnet to attract East European countries. Zbigniew Brzezinski's "East-West reconciliation" plan, which cynically outlines U.S. imperialist objectives, reveals more about these intentions. But Brzezinski forgets that, as long as NATO exists, the Socialist countries will enhance their own military potential and consolidate military cooperation within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which remains a powerful factor in the struggle for European security and general peace.

678
Vought, Donald B. SOLDIERS MUST BE STATESMEN. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Oct. 1968: 79-84. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 48

A strong antimilitary current in the American political tradition and the military professional's natural disinclination to become involved in politics have together discouraged American military men from acquainting themselves with even the rudiments of political science. Yet even a brief glance at American military history is sufficient to show that this separation of military from political thought has been costly for the United States. The truth is that military operations cannot be divorced from the political environment in which they take place without greatly increasing the danger of costly strategic or tactical errors. In undermining the mystique of the citizen-soldier, the World Wars and the cold war proved the advisability of maintaining a highly trained regular army of professional military men, and further provoked growing recognition of the need to train military men in the principles of politics. The arguments that this would be ethically wrong or wasteful of the officers' time have been fully refuted by current events. Today it seems that only internal inertia prevents the Army from establishing an adequate program of political training for its officers.

679
Walker, Robert M. THE MILITARY ANALYST IN RESEARCH WAR GAMING. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Jan. 1969: 22-30. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 49

Outlines the principles and methods of research war gaming. Walker uses a tank duel research problem for

illustration. He stresses particularly the point that the players in research war games must be experienced military professionals if the findings of the game are to have battlefield validity.

680
WEST GERMAN TROOP MANEUVERS CRITICIZED. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on Eastern Europe: Political, Sociological, and Military Affairs. no. 27; Sept. 6, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 46,363) p. 24-25.
AS36. U57, no. 46,363

"Summary of military political review by Lieutenant Colonel Hans Ziems; Potsdam, Maerkische Volksstimme, German, 10 August 1968, p. 4."

Criticizes recent West German troop maneuvers, declares that they were directed mainly against the German Democratic Republic, and asserts that East German citizens observed these events with grave concern.

681
[WHERE DO NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT STAND?] Où en sont l'OTAN et le Pacte de Varsovie? [by] J. G. Perspectives, v. 24, Nov. 30, 1968: [item 1] 3-4. HC10. P4, v. 24

Relations between Warsaw Pact members have improved since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, but there is a surprising absence of cohesion among NATO members. Alliance members are reluctant to pay the costs for increases in conventional forces and armaments for fear that an addition to NATO's present forces might damage chances for an East-West détente. West Germany, which has bought 88 Phantom jets from the United States, refuses to share the expenses in the maintenance of American and British troops on its soil. NATO members have agreed on proposed underground airfields in Germany and Holland and are going ahead with the formation of a joint Mediterranean naval patrol, but the organization's military posture is weak, specifically in West Germany, where there is a shortage of 5,000 officers and 30,000 enlisted men. The only action taken at the winter session at Brussels was a promise to improve the quality, efficiency, and deployment of NATO forces in the defense area.

682
Wiegele, Thomas C. THE ORIGINS OF THE MLF CONCEPT, 1957-1960. Orbis, v. 12, summer 1968: 465-489. D839. O68, v. 12

Traces the origins of the multilateral nuclear force (MLF) concept, which was the result of NATO discussions on the security of America's NATO allies and the maintenance of alliance cohesion. In fact the U.S. plan for the MLF constituted the entire substance of U.S. diplomacy within the alliance during the Kennedy administration. The idea came from Senator Henry Jackson, who criticized the Eisenhower administration in 1957 for proceeding too slowly with the development of American missiles. From 1957 to 1960 the United States and its NATO allies discussed myriad proposals in an attempt to create a multilateral force but failed to agree on a working program. In 1960 the United States continued to maintain rigid control over its nuclear weapons, but the idea of a nuclear fleet remained, and, when this concept was announced before the NATO Council in 1963, it "was to shake the foundations of the Atlantic Alliance."

683
Witze, Claude. NATO FACES A CRITICAL YEAR [editorial] Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Dec. 1968: 8. UG633. A65, v. 51

In 1969 NATO might have to prove its deterrent value because of both Russia's naval activity in the Middle East and the increasing strength of the Warsaw Pact forces in central Europe. NATO is deploying a new Mediterranean task force, composed of American, British, and Italian patrol planes and capable of switching to combat operations if necessary, to maintain a surveillance on the Soviet naval buildup. Although it is too early to predict the response of the NATO Ministerial Council to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, it should be based on an understanding of Communist capabilities, not on a guess about Communist intentions. Capabilities can be developed and conceived over a period of years, but intentions can be changed at the whim of the Soviet leaders.

D. CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

1. Biological

684
Akerfeldt, S., and others. RADIOPROTECTIVE AGENTS: FURTHER RESULTS WITH AMIDOPHOSPHOROTHIOATE AND RELATED COMPOUNDS. Radiation research, v. 35, July 1968: 61-67. illus.
QC770. R3, v. 35

Describes the results of experiments with mice to test the effectiveness of amidophosphorothioate and some of its derivatives as radioprotective agents. Diammonium amidophosphorothioate, with a dose-reduction factor of 2.3, is a very effective radioprotective agent. None of the derivatives gave results as good as those from the parent compound.

685
Bird, Peter M. STUDIES OF FALLOUT ^{137}Cs IN THE CANADIAN NORTH. Archives of environmental health, v. 17, Oct. 1968: 631-638. illus.
RC963. H22, v. 17

Discusses the results of recent investigations of the deposition levels of cesium-137 in northern Canada and the food chains by which it is transferred to man. The studies provide information on the lichen-caribou (or reindeer)-man food chain and on cesium-137 metabolism in human beings. They also make clear that cesium-137 levels in Canada are well below that considered harmful. Further study is needed of the urinary method of cesium surveillance and the movement of radioactive products from environments through food chains to man.

686
Blake, A. H. RADIOLOGICAL DEFENCE IN CANADA. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization. EMO national digest, v. 8, Oct./Nov. 1968: 1-3, 16. illus. UA926. C295, v. 8

Describes the phenomenon of fallout and the planning, organization, procedures, and training necessary to implement an effective radiological defense system. Blake mentions several national and international councils on radiological defense--among them,

the Canadian Interdepartmental Radiological Defence Working Group, which "studies the problems of radiation hazards and provides guidance to governments and industry on the total requirement for Radiological Defence."

687
Blake, A. H. RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION REPORT. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization. EMO national digest, v. 8, Aug./Sept. 1968: 8-9.
UA926.C295, v. 8

Summarizes the May 1968 meeting of the International Radiation Protection Association. Discussions and papers were addressed to the topic "Radiological Protection of the Public in a Nuclear Mass Disaster."

688
Boffey, Philip M. NERVE GAS: DUGWAY ACCIDENT LINKED TO UTAH SHEEP KILL. Science, v. 162, Dec. 27, 1968: 1460-1464.
Q1.S35, v. 162

Relates the evidence that seems to indicate that the 6,000 sheep killed last March in Skull Valley, Utah, died of a nerve agent released during an aircraft spray test at Dugway Proving Ground, the Army's chief site for field testing chemical and biological weapons. The Army has consistently refused to release its report on the incident, but investigators working for the Department of Agriculture and the Public Health Service have revealed that they discovered traces of the toxic substance in the dead sheep and in nearby vegetation and snow water. Although the commander of Dugway was quoted last December as denying that the nerve gas killed the sheep, the Army has accepted legal responsibility for the deaths by paying the owners of the sheep for their losses and has tightened up its procedures for testing lethal agents at Dugway. "In retrospect, the Army can clearly be blamed for a lack of caution in handling the deadly nerve agents, as well as a lack of candor in informing the public about the cause of the incident."

689
CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING FOR THE POPULATION--TYPES OF WEAPONS. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations. no. 460; Aug. 5, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 46,084) p. 1-3. AS36.U57, no. 46,084
Translated from Kommunist Tadzhikistana, Mar. 29, 1968, p. 4. Slav Rm

Discusses the damage-causing factors of a nuclear blast--shock wave, thermal radiation, initial radiation, and radioactive contamination--and the effects of chemical and biological weapons. The author concludes that bacteriological weapons are very treacherous and that it is important to detect them in time to alert medical and veterinary institutions.

690
Clarke, Robin. WE ALL FALL DOWN: THE PROSPECT OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE. London, Allen Lane, 1968. 201 p.
UG447.8.C554
Bibliography: p. 193-196.

Surveys the history and present status of chemical and biological weapons. Clarke examines the objectives of such weapons, the types that are now or may eventually be developed, and the potential dangers that they present. He concludes that scientists offer the only ray of hope for effectively halting the development of these destructive weapons, which if used on a massive scale could plunge mankind back into the Dark Ages. "By denying their support to any classified defensive or to any offensive work on either kind of weapon, they could effectively remove the threat of massive chemical or biological war in the future."

691
Cole, Leonard J., and William E. Davis. CHEMICAL RADIOPROTECTION OF HEMOPOIETIC COLONY-FORMING CELLS: COMPARATIVE EFFECT OF AET, ANOXIA, AND URETHAN. Radiation research, v. 36, Dec. 1968: 555-562. QC770.R3, v. 36

The bone marrow colony-forming unit (CFU) technique of Till and McCulloch was employed to test the radioprotective effect of AET, anoxia, urethan on marrow cells irradiated in vivo. For AET and anoxia, a dose-reduction factor of 1.9 to 2.1 was found. Since the marrow cells were assayed for CFU content immediately after irradiation of the donor, the observed effect can be interpreted as a "true" radiation dose reduction. By contrast, urethan injection did not increase the survival of marrow CFU assayed immediately after the whole-body x-irradiation. However, both urethan and AET afforded radioprotection of endogenous spleen colony count. It is concluded that the mechanism of radioprotection by urethan is fundamentally different from that of AET or anoxia. (Abstract supplied)

692
D'Emidio, Joseph A. NAVY ANTIPOLLUTION PROGRAM. Military engineer, v. 61, Jan./Feb. 1969: 25-27. illus. TA1.P85, v. 61

Describes the Navy's pollution abatement program. Under the direction of the Commander of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, the Navy has launched a coordinated effort to correct pollution hazards caused by the discharge of untreated shipboard sewage, oil spills from naval vessels and shore installations, and smoke generated at firefighting training schools. Until recently these problems were inadequately treated because of a general unconcern about the gravity of the situation, lack of funds, and the absence of central policy guidelines for pollution control. However, with the passage of the Clean Air Act and the Water Quality Act, the situation has changed, and the Navy, along with other Federal agencies, is deeply concerned with preventing its facilities from adversely affecting the environment.

693
EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION. UN monthly chronicle, v. 5, Nov. 1968: 21-23.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 5

Announces the consideration by the U.N. Special Political Committee of the annual report of the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and its adoption of a draft resolution that praises the report and requests the Scientific Committee to continue its endeavors. Committee members noted that the report was an outstanding example of international cooperation and expressed their concern over the hazards of atomic radiation, whatever its source.

694
Fehér, Julia G., and L. Sztanyik. STUDY OF THE RADIOPROTECTIVE EFFECT OF 5-METHOXYTRYPTAMINE ON HAEMOPOIETIC STEM CELLS. Radiation biology, v. 14, no. 3, 1968: 257-262.
QH652.I55, v. 14

The radioprotective effect of 5-methoxytryptamine (Mexamin) was studied on the survival of colony-forming cells. The exogenous method was used in the dose-range 195 to 389 rads, and the endogenous method in the range 486 to 925 rads. The combination of the two methods makes possible reliable determination of the radioprotective effect of Mexamin both in the low and high dose-range. The slope of the curves suggests that the radioprotective effect of Mexamin is not a simple dose-reduction effect. (Abstract supplied)

695
Ginsberg, Nathan J., Maxwell Dauer, and Karl H. Slotta. MELITTIN USED AS A PROTECTIVE AGENT AGAINST X-IRRADIATION. Nature (London) v. 220, Dec. 28, 1968: 1334. Q1.N2, v. 220

Describes experiments using mice to test the effectiveness of melittin as a radioprotective agent. The tests established that melittin gives "statistically significant" protection against X-irradiation and suggested new avenues for physiological and pharmacological research.

696
Hanson, Wayne C. FALLOUT RADIONUCLIDES IN NORTHERN ALASKAN ECOSYSTEMS. Archives of environmental health, v. 17, Oct. 1968: 639-648. illus.
RC963.H22, v. 17

Describes the results of recent investigations of the cycling properties of strontium-90 and cesium-137 in Alaskan arctic ecosystems. Although fallout levels in arctic regions are only one-fourth to one-half those of temperate regions, a lichen-caribou (or reindeer)-man food chain sometimes raises the body burden of radionuclides among northern populations to levels 50 to 100 times that of peoples in the temperate zones. These concentrations do not appear high enough to be harmful but do provide an opportunity for further study of the cycling properties of biologic systems.

697
Kennedy, William V. CBN DEFENSE IN THE NAVY. Ordnance, v. 53, Nov./Dec. 1968: 246-248.
UF1.O67, v. 53

Examines problems of defense in chemical-biological naval (CBN) warfare and briefly surveys the Navy's CBN defense program. Kennedy concludes that since CBN operations conducted against ships with inadequate air filtration equipment may seriously impair or completely damage a ship's operating efficiency, CBN agents may be "the cheapest form of offensive action available against naval targets in terms both of resources required to attack and method of delivery." The Navy remains heavily dependent upon the Army's chemical warfare agencies for equipment, materials, and research for CBN defense.

698
Maisin, J. R., and others. REDUCTION OF SHORT- AND LONG-TERM RADIATION LETHALITY BY MIXTURES OF CHEMICAL PROTECTORS. Radiation research, v. 35, July 1968: 26-44. illus.
QC770.R3, v. 35

Describes the results of experiments with mice to test the effectiveness of various mixtures of known radioprotective agents. The mixtures tested were more effective and, in some cases, less toxic than was each of the agents given separately. Dose-reduction factors of 2.8 and more were obtained.

699
Mamuro, T., and T. Matsunami. PLUTONIUM-238 IN FALLOUT. Science, v. 163, Jan. 31, 1969: 465-467.
Q1.S35, v. 163

The observed variation in the activity ratio of plutonium-238 to plutonium-239 plus plutonium-240 in rainwater in Japan over the period from 1961 through 1968 seems to indicate that the influence of the plutonium-238 released by the burnup of the nuclear auxiliary power generator (SNAP-9A) became noticeable within about 6 months and that variation in the isotopic ratio with time is affected by nuclear debris produced in the latest explosions as well as by the plutonium-238 released from the SNAP-9A generator. (Abstract supplied)

700
Messerschmidt, Otfried. [RADIATION PROTECTION OF THE POPULATION DURING A NUCLEAR DISASTER] Strahlenschutz der Bevölkerung bei einer Nuklearkatastrophe. Wehrmedizinische Monatsschrift, v. 12, Oct. 1968: 419-420. P&GP RR

Second part of a report on the symposium of Fachverband für Strahlenschutz, the Swiss branch of the International Radiation Association, held on May 27 through June 1, 1968, at Interlaken, Switzerland. For the first part see item 219 in v. 5, no. 1, of this bibliography.

Summarizes the conclusions of the symposium's seven committees about radiation protection, measurement of radioactive contamination, and biological effects of radiation.

701
Nelson, Bryce. ARMS CONTROL: DEMAND FOR DECISIONS. . . . AND CBW. Science, v. 162, Dec. 6, 1968: 1102, 1106-1108.
Q1.S35, v. 162

During the past 2 years increasing public attention has been focused on the dangers of chemical and biological warfare (CBW). Poland and Canada recently submitted a joint resolution before the United Nations that requested the preparation of a study on the effects of chemical and biological weapons and called upon all states to observe the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting bacteriological warfare. In August 1968, Great Britain proposed that the Geneva Protocol be supplemented by a new agreement on microbiological weapons. Believing that the use of chemical agents is already too established to be effectively controlled, the British Government advocated a ban on the utilization, production, and development of the even more feared microbiological agents. Partially motivated by the British suggestion, Senator Joseph D. Tydings of Maryland advocated the need for controls against CBW in a speech presented at the Edgewood CBW research installation in his home state. His fellow Senators are considering the convention of special hearings on CBW during the forthcoming session and the resubmission of

the 1925 Geneva Protocol for Senate approval. In addition, private citizens have shown increased concern about CBW as evidenced by the formation of the Mid-Atlantic Committee on Fort Detrick, which advocates "transforming Detrick from a biological warfare center to a world center for infectious disease research." Moreover, television specials and books, as well as the Vietnam War, have recently drawn public attention on the problems of controlling the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons. These problems must be solved before countries in all parts of the world are armed with these exceedingly deadly weapons.

702
Nelson, Bryce. HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM: AAAS BOARD SEEKS FIELD STUDY. Science, v. 163, Jan. 3, 1969: 58-59. Ql.S35, v. 163

At a meeting in Dallas last December the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) reaffirmed its lack of confidence in the Defense Department's position that the use of herbicides in Vietnam will not have serious ecological consequences. The association adopted a resolution calling for an investigation of the wartime use of herbicides and the establishment of an AAAS ad hoc committee of representatives of national and international scientific organizations to plan a field study on the effects of herbicides. While the association has succeeded in promoting a general review of the literature on herbicides by the Midwest Research Institute, it has as yet been unsuccessful in its 2-year attempt to promote a thorough on-the-spot study of the ecological hazards of defoliants in Vietnam. The AAAS position was backed by a report by Fred Tschirley of the U.S. Agricultural Research Department, who conducted a 1-month study of herbicides in Vietnam at the request of the State Department. From his limited observations he concluded that herbicides have caused serious ecological changes in Vietnam and should be investigated in depth as soon as possible. Because of wartime hazards the proposed AAAS study will probably not materialize until the end of the Vietnam hostilities.

703
Nottingham, Judith. NEW AND MORE DEADLY WEAPONS. Pt. 1. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. Pax et libertas, v. 33, July/Sept. 1968: 29-30. P&GP RR

Chemical weapons are being used in direct contravention of existing international law--in Yemen by Egypt and in Vietnam by the United States--and are no longer a future possibility but a present reality. In Vietnam "riot control" gas used by the United States has been responsible for some deaths, and defoliants have destroyed not only jungles but essential crops. Nearly 50 percent of the arable land of South Vietnam has been exposed to toxic chemicals. Once the use of these weapons is accepted, more-lethal gases will be introduced. Indeed, the U.S. stockpile of deadly nerve gases is almost ready for operational use. Biological weapons, however, are still in the early stages of development.

704
Plant, Robert. THE DANGEROUS ATOM. World health, Jan. 1969: 14-18. illus.
RA421.W63W6, 1969

Calls attention to the dangers of excessive radiation. Although the fatal dosage for man is about 600 to 700 roentgens, immediate or delayed bodily injuries and genetic damage can be experienced from much lower dosages. Medical and industrial workers who receive regular dosages of radiation from their work are most susceptible to its damaging effects, but the overall population is exposed to radiation from both natural and artificial sources. In addition to cosmic and terrestrial rays, man is subjected to the radioactivity produced by various electrical appliances, medical techniques, and fallout from aboveground tests of nuclear weapons. While "man knows that he must accept the dangers of his natural environment," he can and should act to reduce the "hazards created by the human will."

705
Rubbo, Sydney D. THE LETHAL KNIFE--CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. Australian quarterly, v. 40, Dec. 1968: 21-28.
DU80.A95, v. 40

Although science itself may be neutral, scientists are not and must recognize their responsibility for the awesome consequences of continued research in the field of chemical and biological warfare (CBW). Because CBW agents are cheap, can be manufactured in relative secrecy, are difficult to defend against, and cause no material damage, they may soon become included in the arsenals of both major and minor powers. Chemical weapons have been greatly refined since they were first used on a massive scale during World War I. Today there are a great variety of these deadly weapons, which range from the painful nettle gasses to the psychic poisons such as LSD, and they can be dispersed from great distances over broad areas by bombs, missiles, and artillery. Biological weapons have never been deployed in war, but, if research in this area continues at its present rate, "the operational potential of biological weapons is likely to outstrip nuclear facilities in the not-too-distant future." Despite their strategic advangages, nations have so far refrained from experimenting with CBW agents in limited warfare because the ultimate effects of such weapons cannot be controlled, adequate defenses against possible CBW reprisals have not been perfected, and means have not yet been devised to insure proper meteorological conditions for the attack. Furthermore, they are restrained by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of toxic gasses and bacteriological agents in warfare. Since technological advances may eventually erase the first three restraints, the final barrier to CBW is the Protocol, which must be expanded to include undeclared wars, anticrop and antianimal agents, and other biological agents besides bacteria if it is to hold up. It is hoped that disarmament measures to eliminate CBW fears can eventually be reached; through mustering public support for these measures scientists could contribute greatly to their successful enactment.

706
Sherwell, Jennifer. COMBINED CHEMICAL AND HYPOXIC PROTECTION AGAINST WHOLE-BODY X-IRRADIATION IN THE NESTLING RAT. Radiation research, v. 36, Dec. 1968: 508-520. illus.
QC770.R3, v. 36

Litters of 8- to 10-day-old nestling rats were protected against whole-body x-irradiation by cysteamine, AET, and deep hypothermia, singly, and by a combination of cysteamine pretreatment and deep hypothermia.

The different treatments were randomized among littermates to minimize animal variation. A comparison of the $LD_{50(30)}$ values obtained for the different treatments gave a dose-reduction factor of 3.3 for the combined treatment, which was significantly greater than the factor for hypothermia alone, 2.6, or that for cysteamine alone, 1.4. Cysteamine therefore provided additional protection in the fully hypoxic (hypothermic) animal. Judged from the histological appearance of the gonads of the surviving male nestling rats, killed 30 days after irradiation, hypothermia afforded some protection to the germinal epithelium. Cysteamine, although injected when the testes were abdominal, had no demonstrable protective effect. (Abstract supplied)

707
Singh, Tarlok. NUCLEAR RADIATIONS AND HEALTH. Science reporter, v. 5, Sept. 1968: 443-446. illus.
Q1.S797, v. 5

Describes the health hazards posed by ionizing radiation. Singh discusses the major types of radiation hazards, their biochemical and physiological effects, maximum permissible dose rates under various conditions of exposure, precautionary and protective measures, and therapy.

708
Sugahara, Tsutomu, and Tomizo Tanaka. PROTECTION AGAINST WHOLE BODY X-IRRADIATION BY ADRENOCHROME MONOGUANYLHYDRAZONE METHANESUPHONATE IN MICE. Nature (London) v. 220, Oct. 19, 1968: 271-272.
Q1.N2, v. 220

Describes experiments with mice to test the effectiveness of an adrenochrome derivative in protecting against radiation exposure. To date, no radioprotective chemical sufficiently nontoxic for clinical use has been discovered, but the experiments described by the authors offer some hope of success.

709
SURVIVING LETHAL DOSE OF RADIATION. Medical world news, v. 9, Apr. 5, 1968: 21-22. illus.
R11.M864, v. 9

Describes successful therapy for three victims of accidental exposure to whole-body X-irradiation. Through a combination of bone marrow and platelet transplants, massive doses of antibiotics, and the total prophylaxis of patient and environment, all three men were saved. According to Dr. Niel Wald of the University of Pittsburgh's radiological health division, the success of the therapy proved that a community hospital can give effective treatment to radiation victims, and that "the increasing use of nuclear energy in industry, and the threat of nuclear warfare, makes this ability vital."

2. Economic

710
Agarwala, Amar N. ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE. New York, Asia Publishing House [1966] 126 p. (Allahabad University magazine students' publication aid series, 1)
HC440.D4A35, 1966

Partial contents. --The nature of total mobilization. --The objective and size of economic mobilization in India. --The anatomy of India's defence budget at the level of total mobilization. --The strategy of mobilization. --Mobilization of public enthusiasm. --Appendix.

Presents a model of total resource mobilization for Indian national defense and purports both to demonstrate that India's economy has considerable capacity to support a major war effort and to provoke thinking on the noneconomic and economic aspects of resource mobilization. Winning public confidence and constructively using public enthusiasm for defense are extremely important in resource mobilization; therefore, Agarwala suggests concrete ways to arouse enthusiasm and an organizational structure to put it to use. While acknowledging that India has always believed in a nonalinement policy, he points to the political realities: China and Pakistan have committed aggressions against India, the Western countries have shown indifference to the Indian cause, and the Soviet Union has remained on India's side. Noting that this will affect India's foreign policy, he maintains that nonalinement is not a static concept--"its contents will have to reflect the changing facts of the world scene and the requirements of [India's] national security and welfare."

711
Arnold, William F., and Alfred Rosenblatt. STRATEGIC PROJECTS GET GREEN LIGHT. Electronics, v. 42, Feb. 3, 1969: 119-123.
TK7800.E4384, v. 42

Previews the Pentagon's proposed spending program for the coming fiscal year. In the wake of reduced wartime expenses the Defense Department hopes to win congressional approval for the development of new aircraft, missiles, and warships. While the planned decreases in Vietnam-oriented spending mean a loss of $200 million for the electronics industry, the new "electronics-laden projects" included in the $83 billion budget should more than make up the difference.

712
Canada. Dept. of Defence Production. CANADIAN DEFENCE PRODUCTS. [2d ed.] Ottawa [Queen's Printer] 1967. xvi, 160, 12, 248, 94 p. illus.
UF535.C2A54 1967b
First ed. 1964, issued by Industry Directory Section.

Compilation of data describing the capabilities and products of Canada's defense industry. Part 1 lists the various commodities and their manufacturers, part 2 lists special services performed by different companies, part 3 contains illustrations and detailed descriptions of various military devices produced in Canada, and part 4 is an alphabetical index of the firms listed in the book.

713
DEFENSE PROFITS UNDER ATTACK AND FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS, TOO. Space/aeronautics, v. 50, Dec. 1968: 28-30, 32. illus.
TL501.A786, v. 50

Recent hearings on defense procurement practices by Senator William Proxmire's Joint Economic Committee have touched off demands for an extensive investigation of these practices. Proxmire was particularly critical of the Government's handling of the C-5A jet transport project, which may end up exceeding its target cost by 100 percent. Department of Defense spokesmen blame the C-5A fiasco upon

unexpected labor and materials costs and technical difficulties; however, industry representatives claim the fault lies with the inequities of total package, fixed price contracting policies. Under the current system, business is often forced to take high financial risks "in many cases where there are likely to be technical unknowns well beyond what might be called the anticipated unknowns." While most industry spokesmen do not advocate returning to the "admitted excesses of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracting," they would like to see the present system modified so that the price is fixed beyond the stage when the item is still just defined on paper. In addition to focusing upon the Defense Department's contracting problems, the hearings also highlighted the confusion surrounding the question of defense profits. Because of the complexities of the defense industry, the profit margin is difficult to calculate--some economists arrive at a figure of 3 percent, whereas others come out with 17.5 percent, far above the 10.6 percent average for the nondefense industry. Thus the Government will probably launch a new study of defense profits as part of its overall attempt to understand how the defense industry really works.

714
Gerasimov, Gennadii. [PROFESSOR GALBRAITH'S FINDINGS AND ERRORS] Erkenntnisse und Irrtümer des Professors John Galbraith. Sowjetunion heute, v. 13, Aug. 1, 1968: 55.
DK266.A2S784, v. 13

Review of John Kenneth Galbraith's The New Industrial State, annotated as item 9 in v. 5, no. 1, of this bibliography. HC106.5.G33

The convergence theory, which proclaims that modern technological and economic progress draws capitalism and Socialist industrial societies closer together and makes their ideological differences irrelevant, was expounded by others long before Galbraith started generalizing it and treating it as a revelation in his new book. He rightly considers the replacement of a chaotic marketplace economy by a planned economy a necessary characteristic of such convergence. But he ignores the equally important prerequisite, the abandonment of bourgeois-capitalist rule. Without it no real convergence--resulting from the transformation of monopolistic capitalism into state-monopolistic capitalism (capitalism's highest stage of development)--can ever take place, as Lenin explained. Galbraith underestimates the importance of the question of ownership of the means of production. He thus wrongly ascribes to the Soviet defense industry a great influence on the nation's industrial-economic system. However, he gives an accurate picture of the influential and destructive role the American defense industry plays in the U.S. industrial-economic system.

715
Hellmann, Rainer. [FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY; LOYALTY CONFLICTS OF MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES] Auslandsinvestitionen und europäische Souveränität; der Loyalitätskonflikt der "multinationalen" Gesellschaften. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Sept. 25, 1968: 676-684.
D839.E86, v. 23

Points out the foreign policy and other implications for a recipient country of investments therein by foreign, particularly American, private companies. For instance, President Johnson's invocation in 1968 of the 1917 Banking Act in order to direct American companies to "repatriate" about two-thirds of their European subsidiaries' income to the United States encroached on the sovereignty of the European states involved, not only on their economic policy. Instructions by American parent companies to their subsidiaries in France not to fill Chinese orders for goods that fall under the American embargo to Red China were in conflict with French foreign policy toward that country. A solution to the problem would be greater independence of multinational companies from the governments of their parent companies. Progress in this direction is unfortunately very slow.

716
Hirschfeld, Oswald. ["GRADATED PRESENCE" OF TROOPS AND MORALE] "Abgestufte Präsenz" bei Mann und Moral. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Nov. 15, 1968: 546-547. U3.W38, v. 12

The resolution by the Bundestag Defense Committee for the procurement of 88 Phantom reconnaissance aircraft from the United States brings into public light the unsatisfactory condition of the nation's armaments. The decision, which was motivated by German-American agreement on aiding the American balance of payments for stationing American troops in Germany, does a disservice to the development of the West German aerospace industry, which needs governmental contracts badly. Arms procurements motivated in this way are disadvantageous not only to the development of West Germany's own defense industry but to the real needs of the nation's armed forces as well: As a result, the Bundeswehr is armed very unevenly, and its 12 divisions are only partially operational.

717
Johnsen, Katherine. DEFENSE EFFORT HELD PROFITS KEY. Aviation week & space technology, v. 89, Oct. 21, 1968: 105-106.
TL501.A8, v. 89

A recent decision by the U.S. Tax Court in favor of Offner Products Corporation has established "a new precedent for litigation to overrule the excessive profits determinations of the Renegotiation Board." Offner reported a 34 percent profit on its 1954 sales of an electronic fuel that it developed for jet engines, but the Renegotiation Board reduced the profit margin to 25 percent and requested a $75,000 refund. In the past the courts have generally upheld the Board's decisions. However, in the Offner case it was decided that the extent of risk involved and the size of the contribution to the defense effort can override the importance of profit percentages in determining reasonable profits on defense contracts.

718
$100 BILLION SHOPPING LIST FOR ARMS. U.S. news and world report, v. 65, Nov. 25, 1968: 66-68.
JK1.U65, v. 65

Cost estimates and concise descriptions of 13 major U.S. weapons procurement programs. The Vietnam War has reduced the rate of procurement for new and replacement weapons systems, with a resulting backlog of orders estimated at about $100 billion. Pentagon officials believe that this procurement lag has reached dangerous proportions, particularly in light of the recent expansion of Soviet military capability in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean and Norwegian Seas. The existence of this backlog all but eliminates the possibility of military spending cuts after the Vietnam War.

719
PEACE WON'T HURT--IF IT'S NOT ABRUPT. Magazine of Wall Street and business analyst, v. 123, Oct. 26, 1968: 9-10. HG4501.M3, v. 123

A speculative discussion of the economic consequences that would result from termination of the Vietnam War. An end to the hostilities is not expected to cause serious deflationary or employment problems.

720
Root, Franklin R. THE "TECHNOLOGY GAP" BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE. Naval War College review, v. 21, Nov. 1968: 45-56. P&GP RR

Compares American and European industry and their respective research and development (R&D) capabilities to show that U.S. economic domination in Europe is a myth. Root finds that although considerably more American than European R&D is devoted to atomic, space, and defense industries "the time-lag before commercial application is probably between 5 to 10 years so that the impact of space research has had little effect so far on the competitive posture of U.S. business in Europe." Moreover, "much of this R. &D. makes no direct contribution to the civilian economy although its longrun influence may be great." He suggests that in the spirit of nationalism European countries will continue to resent American companies in Europe, however, as long as they are viewed as "instruments of U.S. foreign policy."

721
Shenaev, V. [V. I. LENIN ON GERMAN IMPERALISM AND THE PRESENT-DAY IMPERIALISM OF WEST GERMANY] V. I. Lenin o germanskom imperializme i sovremennyi imperializm FRG. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 12, 1968: 16-30. HC10.M5357, 1968

Lenin's works [discuss] a characteristic of German imperialism on the eve of and during the First World War. Exceptional concentration of economic and political power, aggressiveness, spirit of revanche were and continue to be German imperialism's distinguishing features. The high organisation of German [financial] capital accelerated the growth of monopolies and the centralisation of capital, production and circulation. Directly and through their unions the monopolies participate in the elaboration and implementation of the country's economic policy. The striving for foreign economic expansion has always been a typical feature of German imperialism. The losses incurred during the two world wars undermined its international positions but the rehabilitation process proceeded relatively rapidly. One of the features distinguishing West Germany's foreign economic expansion is the wide participation in it by the state. Having attained the second place in the capitalist world system, German imperialism with its extremely aggressive nature has become a dangerous hotbed of international tension. (Abstract supplied, modified)

722
Thomas, Georg R. [HISTORY OF THE GERMAN DEFENSE AND ARMAMENTS ECONOMY, 1918-1943/45] Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft (1918-1943/45). Hrsg. von Wolfgang Birkenfeld [Boppard a. Rh., Boldt, 1966] xv, 552 p. illus. (Schriften des Bundesarchivs, 14) UF535.G3T46

723
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Subcommittee on Legislation. COMMERCIAL PLOWSHARE SERVICES. Hearings, Ninetieth Congress, second session. H.R. 18448 and S. 3783. July 19, 1968. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968. 444 p. illus. KF25.A854 1968

Presents statements by subcommittee witnesses and background material pertaining to hearings on the House and Senate bills to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and to authorize the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to provide "services involving the detonation of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes." Dr. Gerald F. Tape and Joseph F. Hennessey represented the Atomic Energy Commission, and Adrian S. Fisher represented the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) at the proceedings. Appended are the text of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty; explanatory remarks by Representative Craig Hosmer, ranking House minority member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; statements by President Johnson and representatives from private industry; texts of various feasibility studies on the industrial applications of nuclear explosives; and Joint Committee correspondence with the AEC and ACDA.

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Efforts in defense and armaments economy before the beginning of mobilization in 1939.--pt. 2. Efforts in defense and armaments economy from the beginning of the 1939 mobilization till the end of the year 1941.--pt. 3. Efforts in defense and armaments economy during the war years 1942 and 1943.--Appendix.

Assessment of German rearmament efforts from 1918 to 1945 by one of their principal administrators. General Thomas, whose role in Germany's armaments before and during the World War II is extensively appraised in an unsigned 38-page preface to the book, considers in detail changes in the nation's defense and armaments economy that occurred in that period, particularly during the war. A 152-page appendix gives the texts of numerous documents.

3. Ethical and Social

724
Bettelheim, Bruno. THE ULTIMATE LIMIT. Midway, v. 9, autumn 1968: 3-25. AP2.M553, v. 9

Thoughts occasioned by the publication of Robert J. Lifton's Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima. Bettelheim's concern is to understand the causes and consequences of mass violence. He takes frequent exception to Lifton's explanations of the intrapsychic origin and meaning of psychic reaction formations commonly found in persons who have been exposed to "extreme situations"--that is, circumstances in which the habitual adaptive mechanisms and values of these persons were no longer adequate to protect the ego or preserve life. Lifton's paradigm of these extreme situations is the nuclear attack; Bettelheim's is the concentration camp. Bettelheim is particularly critical of those who have become so mesmerized by the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and their capacity to inflict mass death that they tend to forget that men can also be "processed" to death in equally great numbers by totalitarian regimes. He also reproaches present-day peace movements for defining their goal

negatively as simply an absence of war and hence ignoring the conditions that are responsible for violence. In this respect they are repeating the mistake of those well-intentioned men of the 1930's who sought "peace in our time" and unwittingly aided Hitler in his conquest of power.

725
Greenberg, D. S. CBW: BRITAIN HOLDS OPEN HOUSE AT ITS BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CENTER. Science, v. 162, Nov. 15, 1968: 781-783.
Q1. S35, v. 162

In response to extensive public criticism, the Microbiological Research Establishment (MRE) operated by the Ministry of Defence at Porton Down, England, invited about 1,500 citizens to inspect many of its laboratories during a 3-day visiting period in October. Through movies, exhibits, and lectures MRE representatives attempted to convince their guests that their organization's military role is confined to the defensive aspects of biological warfare. Britain's vulnerability to biological attack and the need for classified research to reduce this vulnerability were stressed by MRE's director, Gordon Smith, during a press conference at the beginning of the 3-day session. While MRE's venture into public relations succeeded in improving its image, the British Government continues to be plagued by public protests against research in biological warfare.

726
Hays, S. H., and Thomas A. Rehm. THE MILITARY IN THE FREE SOCIETY. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 95, Feb. 1969: 26-36. illus. V1. U8, v. 95

Discusses the military ethic--"a distinct core of norms . . . that clearly contrasts with those prevalent in the civilian community"--with regard to the internal affairs of the military organization and its relations with political and industrial institutions. Despite criticism that the ethic is outdated, it continues to fulfill its functions in providing an efficient military structure. The rapidly increasing social change, however, is enlarging the gap between social and military values that must be bridged by the youth entering military service; the student revolution protests the accepted values of society that are the basis for the more stringent military code. The resolution of the dichotomy, therefore, must begin with a reorientation of the social order, rather than in the military circles that currently attempt to contend with the problem.

727
Mekhanik, G. [THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION UNDER CAPITALISM] Sotsial'nye izderzhki nauchno-tekhnicheskoi revolutsii pri kapitalizme. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 12, 1968: 31-41. HC10. M5357, 1968

Under state-monopoly capitalism the scientific and technological revolution constantly encounters roadblocks. They are inherent in the nature of the relations of production of that social system. These roadblocks are--to a greater or less extent--being overcome, but only at an enormous cost to society. This is demonstrated strikingly by the subordination of science to military purposes. While some of the achievements in [the] military sphere can be used in the national economy, the expenditure on them is predominantly non-productive. The results of the scientific monopolies [effort is] to increase their economic might. The monopolies shift an ever greater portion of the expenditure on research--this essential condition of technological progress--to the shoulders of society. This is paralleled by a coalescence of the elite in research work and industry with the monopolies and the formation of an industrial-military-scientific complex. Corruption permeates the ranks of research workers. Under capitalism the results of the scientific and technological revolution often endanger the health, even the life of the present and of future generations. The forces underlying the scientific and technological revolution have outgrown the framework of capitalist society. Only socialism can place modern scientific and technological achievements at the service of all of mankind. (Abstract supplied, modified)

728
O'Hanlon, Daniel J. THE MORALITY OF WAR. Peace, v. 3, spring/summer 1968: 29-30.
P&GP RR

Theologians have long discussed the question of a "just war" in order to enable individuals to judge for themselves whether a war is right or wrong instead of relying completely on the judgment of their government. Since war is obviously evil, it cannot be morally justified unless it can be proved that it is intended to prevent an even greater evil. Any person in doubt about the morality of a given war must refuse to become directly involved in it.

729
PSYCHIC TRAUMATIZATION THROUGH SOCIAL CATASTROPHE. International journal of psycho-analysis, v. 49, pts. 2-3, 1968: 298-329.
BF173. A2I6, v. 49

Contents. --Contribution to symposium on psychic traumatization through social catastrophe, by H. Z. Winnik. --The confrontation with death, by E. de Wind. --Late psychic sequelae of man-made disaster, by E. Simenauer. --Dissociative phenomena in former concentration camp inmates, by Ruth Jaffe. --Clinical observations on the "survivor syndrome," by William G. Niederland. --Some observations on the latency of symptoms in patients suffering from persecution sequelae, by Alfred Lorenzer. --A psychogenetic factor in the recurrence of war, by Martin Wangh. --Re-somatization of affects in survivors of persecution, by Klaus D. Hoppe. --Development arrest as a result of Nazi persecution during adolescence, by Hans F. Fink.

Papers presented to a symposium of the 25th International Psycho-Analytical Conference, Copenhagen, Denmark, July 23-28, 1967. The participants address themselves to theoretical and therapeutic problems encountered in the diagnosis and treatment of patients psychically traumatized through involvement in man-made social disasters. Most of the material considered is drawn by practicing analysts from clinical observations of emotional, cognitive, perceptual, and other disturbances in survivors of Nazi persecution, but broad conclusions are drawn relevant to the response of human beings to any social calamity, most particularly war.

730
Rosell, Leif. CHILDREN'S VIEWS OF WAR AND PEACE. Journal of peace research, no. 3, 1968: 268-276.
AS9. J6, 1968

Studies from a sociological point of view some development patterns of views on war and peace among 200 children. Data indicate that political socialization with respect to participation begins early. Activity (participation) is for all age-groups oriented toward secondary-group. Girls are less active than boys, especially towards secondary-group. The dimensions of war perceived are mainly "war-processes" and "consequences," which correlate negatively, respectively positively, with age. We assume that children are socialized to think more about consequences and less about concrete aspects of war, with age. Girls seem to think less about "war-processes" and more about "consequences" than do boys. Perceptions of conflict were found to be correlated with the different intellectual stages of the children. The concept of peace was mainly perceived by all age-groups as negation of war, or as a state of stillness, silence, etc., and not as a process towards integration. Thus, children mainly perceived "negative peace." One explanation might be that normative or descriptive expectations put to children are elementary and not adapted to the intellectual capacity at varying age-levels. Any socialization to the will to defend does not seem to have occurred in the age-interval studied. But correlated with sex and activity, some interesting patterns appear, which lead us to assume that perceptions of the will to defend change in childhood, such that the older the child grows, the more will he perceive the will to defend as a universal instead of a particularistic norm. (Abstract supplied)

731
Sibley, Mulford Q. NONVIOLENCE AND REVOLUTION. Humanist, v. 28, Nov./Dec. 1968: 3-6.
B821. A1H8, v. 28

Violence tends to impair the achievement of revolutionary ends. Those who use violence generally abandon their original revolutionary objectives and become "caught up in the imperatives of their method." To preserve their revolutionary gains, they are forced to establish a repressive regime, and "paradoxically, the hierarchical structures developed by those who wage wars of liberation become . . . similar to those of the reactionaries and imperialists from whom they are ostensibly seeking emancipation." Progress toward an egalitarian society has been achieved more by nonviolent than by violent action. Nonviolence involves a "collective refusal . . . to cooperate with oppression and exploitation"; this method uses many types of actions--from legislative to mass disciplined civil disobedience--to gain objectives. As violent revolutions have failed measurably to achieve their objectives, so has war. The human costs of war have been far greater than any good achieved. Thus, both violent revolution and war are condemned, regardless of their objectives. Once man realizes this and acts accordingly, the earth's greatest revolution will occur.

732
Wangh, Martin. A PSYCHOGENETIC FACTOR IN THE RECURRENCE OF WAR. International journal of psycho-analysis, v. 49, pts. 2-3, 1968: 319-323.
BF173. A2I6, v. 49

The manner in which experiences of persecution or war deform the personality through psychic traumatization seems to be this: The sado-masochistic stimuli that characterize dangerous or oppressive situations evoke various ego-regressive defensive reactions in the soldier or victim. This has the consequence that repressed sado-masochistic ideations from the past consonant with the external stimuli escape repression, merge with the external stimuli, and are powerfully and lastingly cathected. When the traumatic situation is terminated, this cathected material cannot be fully re-repressed, and the traumatized individual continues to be highly vulnerable to the impact of renewed stress since it can easily cause a failure of the partial re-repression. In stressful circumstances he will feel a strong impulse to reenact the earlier traumatic experience, perhaps with the purpose of reasserting his proven capacity to survive the original danger by reliving the threatening experience and once again, he hopes, surviving. One permanently recurring occasion for stress in a society is at the moment of generational turnover. At a point 20 years or so after a major war political leadership may still be in the hands of an older generation, but the foundations of political action will rest on men in their forties--men of the generation who actually fought the last major war, and whose sons are now reaching maturity. Under severe social stress--for example, economic crisis or status vulnerability--these men will be predisposed by the repetition compulsion to resort to the use of force. They will be tempted to use their sons as proxies in the relived experience and to encourage the oedipal inclinations of the young to identify with a soldier-father. In this situation, the moral scruples and uncertain sense of reality of the citizen are easily undermined by war propaganda so that anxiety defenses of splitting and projection can be harnessed to martial purposes. Doubtless, psychological predispositions growing out of a former war are not the sole factor leading to renewed conflict, but even so they are too important to be neglected in any study of the dynamics of war and peace. Through historical insight the ego can attain mastery over its wartime traumatizations and thus erect at least one barrier to the recurrence of war.

4. Other

733
Artsimovitch, L. A. THE MODERN PHYSICIST AND THE CASE FOR SCIENCE POLITICS. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, Nov. 1968: 23, 41-48.
TK9145. A84, v. 24
Translated from Novyi mir, no. 1, 1967.
Slav Rm

Explains how and why modern physics has developed from "an innocent form of curiosity into the source of dazzling achievements and an instrument of the gravest danger for us and future generations" and what the implications of this transformation are for physics itself and public policy. The major stimulus to the growth of "big physics" has been the large-scale support rendered to that science by governments interested in its practical contribution to national defense. In some respects this public intrusion into scientific work has been harmful to the scientific enterprise, but the truth must be admitted that the intellectual and material costs of research in physics have risen to the point where government financing is indispensable. In this situation scientific work of all kinds needs to be centrally organized and controlled, and a "science politics" becomes necessary to decide such issues as the level of government spending for science and the

336-937 O - 69 - 5

distribution of emphasis in research programs. As to the influence of great power scientific competition on progress in physics, the stimulus is effective even though it frequently leads to the building of "useless monuments to immature ideas." Since research findings are rapidly disseminated throughout the scientific community, it is unnecessary for a great power to try to remain in the vanguard of scientific research in all fields. Moreover, it is costly and seldom rewarding to attempt to follow a competitor into an area of research in which he has already demonstrated his supremacy.

734
Betts, Austin W. ARMY SUPPORT OF RESEARCH IN THE UNIVERSITIES. Signal, v. 23, Dec. 1968: 11-12, 14-15. UG1.M65, v. 23

Address "presented to the Washington, D. C. chapter of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association on October 3, 1968."

The United States "must deal from a position of strength when called on to negotiate with the communists." Maintaining such a position requires that the most advanced technology be available to the Department of Defense, and the prime source of basic research is the university. The current college trend, which in the interests of defense security must be reversed, is to reject Goverment research support. Demonstrations against military research by militant antiwar students and liberal professors cost the university more than the monetary gains of defense dollars. Universities must recognize that student cries for academic freedom are irrelevant to the research situation and that our defense posture depends upon a continuance of exchange between the military and the university.

735
Brown, Frederic J. CHEMICAL WARFARE; A STUDY IN RESTRAINTS. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1968. 355 p.
UG447.B73

Partial contents. --Record of use. --Fears for the future: escalation. --Drafting the peace. --American industry and propaganda. --The Washington Arms Conference. --The problem of civil defense. --Unrealistic threat perception. --Public opposition. --A tenuous legal restraint. --Reevaluation after Pearl Harbor. --The success of minimum deterrence. --The new environment in 1945. --Summary and conclusions. --Bibliography. --Index.

Endeavors "to develop an understanding of the nature of restraints that prevent employment of a [chemical] weapon in war through a detailed examination of American chemical warfare policy." Brown notes that by the time the Second World War came "chemical warfare had become hopelessly bogged down in a quagmire of conflicting objectives, inconsistent policies, and inadequate programs." The author adds that chemical weapons were not used in World War II because the other belligerents did not initiate their use. He concludes that U.S. chemical warfare policy offers little solace to anyone concerned with the increased production of chemical weapons.

736
Brown, William M. ON REORGANIZING AFTER NUCLEAR ATTACK. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization. EMO national digest, v. 8, Oct./Nov. 1968: 4-8, 17.
UA926.C295, v. 8

Examines postattack research and focuses upon possible problems of reorganization following a nuclear attack. Brown demonstrates that systems collapse and loss of national control may constitute the major threat from nuclear war but argues that appropriate countermeasures may substantially reduce it.

737
Bru, Alain, and Lucien Poirier. [DETERRENCE AND ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE. PT. 1] Dissuasion et défense anti-missiles. Revue de défense nationale, v. 24, Nov. 1968: 1638-1652.
D410.R45, v. 24

Argues that the deterrence effect of a nuclear strike varies in proportion to the logarithm of losses that would be inflicted by this strike on the territory of the eventual aggressor. The authors estimate a country's tolerance for loss of lives during a war through the use of graphs. They maintain that casualties appear intolerable only after a war and that World War I would not have occurred had the French and German Governments known the number of casualties their respective countries would sustain.

738
Brunner, Dominique. [NUCLEAR STRATEGY AT THE CROSSROADS] La stratégie nucléaire à la croisée des chemins. Revue militaire suisse, v. 113, Sept. 1968: 445-453. U2.R5, v. 113

A Soviet-American nuclear arms limitation agreement would not prohibit either superpower from possessing an ABM system, and it is likely that both will retain their defense systems as a safeguard from attack by a third nuclear power, notably Communist China. Although discussions on future strategy indicate that a thin ABM system would not adequately protect America from a nuclear attack, this is the best and least expensive solution to America's nuclear defense that leaves a path open for future arms control negotiations with Russia. A "thick" ABM would incite the Soviet Union to increase its own defenses. However, the thin ABM has not satisfied everybody. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, some members of Congress, and a number of strategists argue that it is within the realm of technology to build an ABM system that would assure the American people a maximum degree of protection. They maintain that a thick ABM would deter an attack from both large and small nuclear powers, and many Americans advocate a thick ABM because their history has taught them that their country is invincible. Recent Soviet armament efforts are unclear, but the Soviet Union is at least aiming at an ability to penetrate future American strategic defenses. The Russian SS-9, which has a multiple warhead and great maneuverability in its ballistic trajectory path, is evidence of this. However, in light of previous experience the Russians should be wary of creating another "missile gap." This would cause the Americans to redouble their strategic efforts and leave the Russians trailing once again in the missile race, thus erasing any hope for an arms control agreement.

739
Clifford, Clark M. POWER FOR PEACE. Ordnance, v. 53, Nov./Dec. 1968: 262-264. illus.
UF1.O67, v. 53

The recent events in Czechoslovakia and the post-World War II experience demonstrate that the United States must deal from a position of military strength to

ensure world peace. Belief in such a strategy confirms the need for a continued U.S. military presence in Western Europe and has governed the decisions to test the multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) principle and to support Sentinel deployment. Neither the ABM nor the MIRV decision will harm U.S.-Soviet talks on arms limitation; the ABM decision will probably "improve the chances of talks and the negotiating climate, should such talks take place." Further, because of "the financial stringencies under which we must operate . . . it [is] more important than ever that we get the maximum value for every defense dollar that we spend"; Project Prime, the new Defense Department expense accounting system will aid in this task. Finally, certain developments that provide hope for finding "a solution to our most vexing short-range problem--peace in Vietnam" include President Johnson's bombing limitation, which led to the Paris peace talks; the decision to limit U.S. troop strength to 549,500; and preparations for the Armed Forces of Vietnam to maintain a greater share of the military burden if peaceful settlement remains elusive.

740
THE CONSTRUCTIVE USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES [by] Edward Teller [and others] New York, McGraw-Hill [1968] 320 p. illus., maps.
TK9153.C6

Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents.--The nuclear explosion.--Aspects of energy transfer.--Nuclear radiation.--Plowshare tests and phenomenology of nuclear explosions.--Industrial uses of nuclear explosives: earth moving.--Other industrial uses of nuclear explosives.--Scientific applications of nuclear explosions.

Summarizes research on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives and examines the engineering technology involved. Special attention is devoted to the industrial uses and scientific applications of such explosives.

741
Critchfield, Richard. LESSONS OF VIETNAM. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Resources and needs of American diplomacy. Philadelphia, 1968. (Its Annals, v. 380, Nov. 1968) p. 125-134.
H1.A4, v. 380

One of the most urgent problems facing the next Secretary of State is how to develop a politically oriented counterinsurgency doctrine and a Foreign Service capable of implementing it, in which top priority is put on defeating political subversion, rather than the enemy's military forces. The United States military establishment has been somewhat discredited in Vietnam, not for failing to do its job, but because the State Department has failed to face and solve the problem of political subversion. This allowed Hanoi to apply successfully Lenin's principle of "exploiting internal contradictions in the enemy camp" to divide and weaken the American and South Vietnamese societies. From mid-1963 until its subversion was arrested and partly countered in mid-1968, Hanoi exploited a serious internal contradiction created by the seizure of state power in Saigon by a self-serving cabal of North Vietnamese refugees, thus effectively denying the South Vietnamese people the right to self-determination, although this was the political basis of the American war effort. The development of a successful counterstrategy, and the personnel to carry it out, will depend on the new administration's ability to understand the enemy--thinking, strategy, and tactics--and to assert supreme political authority in future counterinsurgency efforts, whether they occur in Vietnam, elsewhere or--and the same doctrine will have application--in the United States itself. (Abstract supplied)

742
Gill, R. Rockingham. EUROPE'S MILITARY BALANCE AFTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA. East Europe, v. 17, Oct. 1968: 17-21. illus.
DR1.N363, v. 17

Argues that in the final analysis the military advantages for the Soviet Union gained from the invasion of Czechoslovakia have been greatly overestimated. The Soviet Army now confronts the best equipped army in Europe, the loyalty of the 14 Czechoslovak divisions has been completely undermined, and the Rumanian Armed Forces have been alienated. The invasion put Yugoslavia on guard especially in the Adriatic Sea, where Russia might claim access to Yugoslav harbors for its warships. Finally, it is questionable whether "political solutions imposed at the end of a gun are really enduring." Gill concludes that, although the military balance has been jolted slightly in favor of the U.S.S.R. in terms of territorial occupancy, the global strategic balance has been altered only imperceptibly.

743
Inglis, David R. H-BOMBS IN THE BACK YARD. Saturday review, v. 51, Dec. 21, 1968: 11-12, 44.
Z1219.S25, v. 51

The Army's plan to deploy ABM systems complete with Spartan missiles near densely populated cities is disturbing. In the event of nuclear war, the sites might draw enemy fire to the city, or an H-bomb warhead installed at the site might accidentally explode. The Army argues that because of the currently popular counterpopulation strategy the enemy would attack population centers anyway regardless of ABM site location. "But, who knows, the Soviet high command might believe in counterforce ten years from now," and the cities could escape destruction if ABM sites were located in the open country. If the enemy were to apply both counterforce and counterpopulation strategies simultaneously, "we will have helped them kill two birds with one stone" by placing ABM sites near the cities. The Huntsville, Ala., missile center information officer argues that there has never been an accidental nuclear explosion and that "control devices are so good and so involved that an accidental explosion is not a danger," but the chance should not be taken. In fact, an accidental explosion seems more likely than either a Chinese missile attack or an accidental missile launching by an armed foreign power. Spartan missile sites placed in the open country could intercept an accidentally launched missile just as quickly, and eliminate danger to the cities. Although congressional debate on site location was limited, there is evidence that Members of Congress, who generally support only the limited Sentinel system, felt the missiles would be deployed away from the population centers. The Army's selection of large cities as bases for the Spartan missiles indicates that it is "jumping the gun on a Congressional decision and acquiring sites for the larger anti-Soviet system, under the guise of limited Sentinel deployment." The problem shows the folly of trying to achieve national safety through an ABM system--national defense will be best assured through international agreements limiting nuclear arms and prohibiting proliferation of nuclear weapons and "by otherwise 'taming the atom.'"

744
Kalb, Marvin. "ENOUGH, COMRADES!" New republic, v. 159, Sept. 14, 1968: 10-15.
AP2. N624, v. 159

Lists the events which led to the Soviet decision to move troops into Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968, and discusses the implications of this decision. Late in 1967 the moderate wing of the Czech Communist Party launched a liberalization campaign that alarmed the more conservative party members even though the reforms were not directed at pushing Czechoslovakia out of the Communist orbit. Fearing that "the contagious, heady effect of a little freedom in Czechoslovakia" might spread into the rest of the Communist bloc, the Kremlin leaders gave in to the hard-liners' demands and ordered troops across the Czech border. The Soviet intervention intensified the split in the world Communist movement and seriously retarded efforts to reach an East-West détente. Hoping for a Moscow summit meeting, Washington refrained from interfering in the Czech crisis during the period before the Soviet intervention, but this dream has now been "put on ice."

745
Klefisch, Johannes W. [DO WE NEED NUCLEAR WEAPONS? GERMANY AND THE STRATEGY OF THE SEVENTIES (2)] Brauchen wir Atomwaffen? Deutschland und die Strategie der siebziger Jahre (II). Frankfurter Hefte, v. 23, Sept. 1968: 611-620.
AP30. F555, v. 23

The first part of this article, published in the Aug. 1968 issue of Frankfurter Hefte, appears as item item 633 in this bibliography.

Certain prognoses can be made in regard both to the direct interaction of world powers and to their vertical policy--i.e., their use of weaker nations in their mutual world contest--on the basis of the current state and foreseeable development of their arms race. Should Soviet and American ABM systems become relatively impenetrable, direct political and military pressure will be ineffective between the world powers. It will, however, be possible for each of them to bring about territorial or psychological gains at the expense of the other through its vertical policy. A different situation, in which an unabated race between the world powers in breakthrough weapons repeatedly debases their ABM systems without really upsetting their balance of power, will necessarily be ephemeral, because of progressing arms technology, which finally will, produce disproportionality between the world powers' defense and offense systems or between their offensive weapons alone. This situation will cause them to resort to drastic measures in their horizontal and vertical nuclear policies in a way similar to that of the late forties and the fifties, but on a much bigger scale. Severe changes, pregnant with crises, will then conduce the strengthening of alliances. Further, important factors affecting the impact of these developments on Germany will be the policies of "nuclear semi-powers" and nuclear proliferation. Germany's becoming a nuclear state, whether independently or through allied arms sharing, would almost certainly confirm its total annihilation by the Soviet Union or by Soviet proxies, who, for that eventuality, will be armed by Moscow with nuclear weapons. Because of such a possibility, German nuclear armaments, or nuclear arms sharing, would have no deterrence value at all. Dangers for Germany inherent in the world powers' vertical policies, both in periods of disproportionality and those of the effective defense systems, would make alliances an unreliable basis for the nation's lasting security. The optimal solution to the problem would be a supranational authority vested with adequate executive powers to maintain peace; the next best solution would be a regional arms control system.

746
Mansfield, Peter. EGYPT SINCE JUNE 1967. World today, v. 24, Oct. 1968: 414-420.
D410. W63, v. 24

Egypt's losses in the June 1967 war have had surprisingly little impact on the nation's economy, but for the regime the political costs of military defeat have been high. With the army's privileged position in the state undermined and Nasser's personal authority reduced, widespread discontent on both the Left and Right has welled to the surface. Under pressure, censorship has been relaxed, a partial reorganization of the structure of the state carried out, a new government formed, and a new national program submitted to the people for approval on a referendum. There has also been some discussion of economic reforms, obviously influenced by recent trends in Eastern Europe. But it is notoriously difficult for an authoritarian regime to divest itself of power, and it is still too early to tell if there has been any real evolution of Egypt's political system. If the above changes turn out to be superficial, a serious popular outbreak against the regime is likely before too long. A combination of luck and prudence cushioned the economic effects of the war but did nothing to help Nasser solve the crucial problem of how to avoid war with Israel without losing his hold on the Arab masses. In this situation, his words certainly will continue to be more militant than his policies. Unfortunately his room for domestic political maneuver has been reduced along with his authority, while his responsibilities--solving Egypt's many problems--remain as burdensome as before.

747
Murphy, Charles J. DECISION TIME FOR TACTICAL AIR POWER. Fortune, v. 78, Dec. 1968: 142-145, 180, 182, 184. illus. HF5001. F7, v. 78

Discusses the decision to invest billions in the program for the F-111, the 1,600-mile-an-hour fighter-bomber. Former Defense Secretary McNamara's plan to use variants of the F-111 to serve both Air Force and Navy has failed; the Navy has abandoned its version, and the Air Force one is principally useful only for the mission of interdiction. Although the plan performs that mission brilliantly, it is far too costly when used in Vietnam for that alone. Now the armed services have laid before the Secretary of Defense and Congress ambitious and costly new plans for advanced machines that they want no later than the mid-1970's. But their pleas for new billions may be drowned out by surging civilian demands for social programs of unprecedented size. Meanwhile, plane inventories are depleted and the Soviet tactical air forces are growing stronger. Failing congressional approval, the Air Force may sink to second-class status. And even with that approval, the country is in for an unpleasant interval before a new generation of tactical planes become operational. (Abstract supplied, modified)

748
NATIONAL SERVICE AND U.S. DEFENSE. Current history, v. 55, Aug. 1968: 65-102, 106-111.
D410. C82, v. 55

Contents. --National needs and national service, by Donald J. Eberly. --National service and the American tradition, by Edward F. Hall. --Society, the individual and national service, by Sol Tax. --The case for compulsory national service, by Margaret Mead. --The pros

and cons of a voluntary army, by John Mirtrisin. --Random selection: an alternative to selective service, by Edward M. Kennedy. --National Service programs abroad, by Terrence Cullinan.

Seeks answers to how the United States can best meet its future needs for defense and social welfare. Arising from the desire to find a more equitable system of selective service, the concept of national service is examined from many aspects. Eberly advocates an organized and administered national service program and examines the problems involved in establishing it. Hall sets national service in the context of the American tradition and discusses the possibility of establishing a compulsory national service system. Tax maintains that selective conscription of any form conflicts with American values of liberty and equality; he both examines the possibility of a voluntary national service and proposes a model for a national service system. Mead advocates compulsory national service with options of military service or activities like VISTA and the Peace Corps. Mitrisin presents arguments for and against a voluntary army and compares it to both the lottery and compulsory national service. Kennedy explains random selection and advocates it as an alternative to the Selective Service System. Cullinan looks at national service programs abroad and states that they appear "to be a rapidly growing phenomenon internationally."

749
Nelson, Bryce. ABM: SENATORS REQUEST OUTSIDE SCIENTIFIC ADVICE IN CLOSED SESSION. Science, v. 162, Dec. 20, 1968: 1374-1375.
Q1. S35, v. 162

Senator John S. Cooper, an opponent of the U. S. deployment of the ABM, initiated a closed debate in the Senate on October 2, 1968, regarding the scientific advice on the ABM presented to Richard Russell's Armed Services Committee. In response to Senator Cooper's questions, Russell said that the Russians have slowed down their deployment of an ABM system around Moscow and admitted that in the past his committee had mistakenly appropriated funds for programs costing over one billion dollars that never became operational. A heated exchange then ensued between Senators Fulbright and Russell during which the former questioned the latter's failure to bring in any witnesses to the hearings on the ABM except those of the administration. Fulbright emphasized the importance of obtaining external scientific advice in major defense decisions. He noted that the scientists mentioned by Senators Cooper and John O. Pastore as supporting the ABM "have been kind of tame members of the establishment for many years." Senator Philip A. Hart backed up Fulbright by quoting a telegram in which the Nation's top scientists asserted that an ABM system will not add to U. S. security. Russell reacted by criticizing these scientists for not showing up for the committee hearings in person. Following the debate the Senate voted 45 to 25 in favor of the ABM appropriation. The anti-ABM Senators attributed their failure partly to the fears engendered by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the pork barrel benefits of ABM contracts; they expressed their resolve to continue their fight into the next session of Congress, when the scientists denounced by Russell for not appearing in person before his committee are expected to testify.

750
NEW NUCLEAR STANDBY TEST PLAN PROPOSED. Aviation week & space technology, v. 89, Oct. 21, 1968: 107. TL501. A8, v. 89

Text of Senator Jackson's presentation was published in the Congressional Record of Sept. 25, 1968.
J11. R5

Drawing on information gathered by the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee and the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, Senator Henry M. Jackson disclosed the preparation of a new standby program for atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons by the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission. In reporting the objectives of the new program to the Senate, Jackson stated that underground testing does not satisfactorily demonstrate all nuclear explosion phenomena. Under the new readiness program, if the 1963 test ban treaty were abrogated atmospheric testing would be resumed to determine the survivability of reentry vehicles, evaluate the effects of high atmosphere nuclear explosions on ABM radar, obtain information on the electromagnetic fields created by nuclear explosions, and appraise the effects of nuclear explosions on hardened weapons systems and ships.

751
NO MORE VIETNAMS?: THE WAR AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Atlantic monthly, v. 222, Nov. 1968: 99-114, 116; Dec.: 97-103, 108-122, 125. AP2. A8, v. 222

Excerpts from the proceedings of a conference, "Vietnam: Lessons and Mislessons," convened by the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs, June 1968.

Debate on the theory, practice, and history of American intervention abroad with Vietnam as the reference point. The discussion examines the prospects for a serviceable U. S. foreign policy that would minimize future Vietnams. Adam Yarmolinsky and Theodore Draper discuss the origins of America's Vietnam involvement and examine theories of limited war; other participants question their positions. Stanley Hoffman and Ithiel de Sola Pool offer conflicting views concerning America's use of its power. Samuel Huntington proposes a case for continuing America's world role after Vietnam and for a new emphasis on aid to strengthen the political stability of underdeveloped countries and Eqbal Ahmad, a Third World native, attacks his comments. James C. Thompson "offers a plan for a post-Vietnam foreign policy of 'low posture,' aimed at avoiding extremes of interventionism and isolationism, and Edwin Reischauer leads a series of responses."

752
PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES: PLOWSHARE PROGRAMME. In Australia. Atomic Energy Commission. Report. 16th; 1967/68. Canberra, Govt. Print. Off. p. 24-33. illus.
HD9698. A8A3, v. 16

Discusses Project Plowshare's importance in Australia's future development. A breakdown of such Plowshare projects as Gasbuggy, Bronco, and Dragon Trail is given, and the author concludes that recent mineral discoveries in Australia's remote areas, where few natural harbors exist, could create many opportunities to apply Plowshare's techniques.

753
PRO AND CON DISCUSSION: SHOULD THE U. S. DEPLOY NOW AN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM? Congressional digest, v. 47, Nov. 1968: 268-287. JK1. C65, v. 47

Excerpts from addresses presented during congressional floor debates on military authorization and

appropriations bills. The opinions expressed by the eight Senators and four Representatives summarized the principal arguments for and against U.S. deployment of an ABM system. Proponents of deployment stressed the importance of the ABM in preserving national security, whereas the opponents questioned the technical feasibility of an ABM system and insisted that America's best defense is the maintenance of its assured destruction capability.

754
Schlesinger, James R. THE "SOFT" FACTORS IN SYSTEMS STUDIES. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, Nov. 1968: 12-17.
TK9145. A84, v. 24

The alleged failure of military systems studies to take account of political, social, and other "soft" factors affecting U.S. security and a supposedly single-minded implementation of the results of these studies by decisionmakers are being cited as major reasons for recent setbacks in American foreign policy. These criticisms require careful attention. Analysts certainly recognize that political and social inputs cannot be permanently excluded, but they have never pressed this point on the assumption that in the political and bureaucratic world where decisions are made the soft factors are adequately--perhaps more than adequately--represented. This assumption is false. A competent technical study often becomes a departmental position without any consideration of the political factors involved. Yet political factors are a crucial input to any military policy decision. Perhaps the most important of these political inputs is the assessment of the enemy--particularly, of the way he is likely to respond to U.S. initiatives. At one time it was thought that the Russians were "commie rats who only understand force." The current view is that Soviet officials are as urbane and civilized as Americans and just as interested in resolving the differences that divide the two nations. Neither view is definitive, but the shift in emphasis has already had a profound and far-reaching impact on U.S. military decisions. For example, some weapons developments have been rejected on the ground that they would make arms control more difficult or perhaps intensify the arms race. The military analyst has no objection in principle to the values implicit in these decisions. He is obliged, however, to see that the results of technical studies are not blurred by these additional considerations and to press the view that decisions of such importance should be based on more than mere intuition. On the other hand, he must recognize that the options he identifies in the course of an analysis may exaggerate the real flexibility permitted by a situation and that the correctness of a policy decision depends finally on the level of political sophistication of the policymaker.

755
Smith, A. R. DEFENCE MANPOWER STUDIES. Operational research quarterly, v. 19, Sept. 1968: 257-273.
Q175. O59, v. 19

An important characteristic of the Defence Manpower Studies Unit (DMSU) is that it seeks to be both an operational research unit and an integral part of management. The arguments for this dual role are based on experience and particularly on the experience of the Naval Manpower Department. The relevant history of this Department is described, and examples of its tasks given. The Armed Forces, taken together, absorb a substantial part of the national manpower resources at the recruiting ages, but also contribute to national trained manpower. The DMSU therefore, is paying considerable attention to macro-scale aspects. Some of the work of the new Unit is relevant to the work of other government departments, universities, and industry. Examples are given. (Abstract supplied, modified)

756
Snow, C. P. SCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT. Science and technology, no. 85, Jan. 1969: 31-46.
Q1. I587, 1969

Makes a case for greater participation of scientists and engineers in government. According to Snow, it is characteristic of all advanced industrial societies that the major decisions are being made in secret by small groups of men with insufficient knowledge of what those decisions depend upon and what their outcome will be. He suggests that the decisions relating to the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction were of this kind. If more scientists and engineers could be persuaded to participate in government at all levels, the dangers inherent in this system of "closed politics" could be reduced considerably. In addition, the presence of more scientists in political affairs would help to counter the current tendency among Western societies to adopt "existential" rather than "future-directed" attitudes toward politics.

757
Taylor, Richard K. CZECH REVOLUTION: RESISTING THE INVADERS. Liberation, v. 13, Oct. 1968: 21-23. illus.
P&GP RR

The remarkable response of the Czech people to the Warsaw Pact invasion, if carefully studied, reveals a number of creative substitutes for the old-fashioned methods of violent resistance. While their response did not force the invaders to abandon their drive for domination, it shows certain gains, both immediate and long range. The Czechoslovak reform and the subsequent invasion had a strong impact on both the Soviet intellectuals, such as Sakharov and Mrs. Yurii Daniel, and the populace--Soviet descriptions did not fool intelligent Russians. The invasion disrupted the unity of the world Communist movement and had an immediate effect on the invaders. Despite the lightning speed of the invasion and its undisputable capacity to crush any resistance, the Soviet Union, confronted with a complete unity of the leaders and population, was unable to establish a puppet regime. Moreover, the Russians feared that by crushing the unexpected nonviolent resistance they would evoke the long-range hatred of the Czechoslovak population and give their enemies further ammunition for anti-Communist and anti-Soviet propaganda. One of the most creative responses was the establishment of the clandestine mass media, which provided communication between the resistance leaders and the populace, thus safeguarding their unity and unified action. Another innovative contribution was the use of argument, humor, and derision in contacts with the invading troops. This method not only persuaded the soldiers that they were not welcome as saviors from counterrevolution but raised doubts about the rightfulness of the invasion. Another important factor was the courage with which the Czech people faced without emotion the Soviet guns aimed at them, disobeyed the Soviet-imposed curfew, and organized strikes and sit-in demonstrations. The Czechoslovak experience seems to indicate that "with sufficient motivation and creative leadership widespread nonviolent resistance, using a great variety of innovative methods and without a pacifist philosophical underpinning, can achieve significant gains against a modern invading army." Its main features are "unity, communication, noncooperation, dialogue and courage."

III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

758
Bartoš, Milan. THE AGGRESSION ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Review of international affairs, v. 19, Sept. 5, 1968: 3-5. D839.R4, v. 19

The occupation of Czechoslovakia by the troops of the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization is a classic example of aggression. This legal aspect of the invasion was recognized in the U.N. Security Council during the first voting on the matter, and no Soviet veto can change it. The agreements that will follow the invasion will be political rather than legal, and later jurists must determine if these agreements reflect the will of the parties and do not adversely affect Czechoslovakia's right to sovereign equality and territorial integrity--the essential rights that every U.N. member possesses and which cannot be renounced. Moreover, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which has been linked with the occupation, is, according to official explanation, a defensive military pact designed to counterbalance NATO. If its members, as they now pretend, have a right to intervene by force in the international affairs of other members, the Warsaw Treaty Organization cannot claim to be a defensive pact; and if some secret clause that gives them this right has been attached to the treaty, the pact is not permissible within the system of the U.N. Charter. The charter permits only regional pacts that do not violate the basic aims and principles of the United Nations and that are designed to protect the U.N. members' natural right to legitimate defense in cases of armed attack for the period before the United Nations takes steps to protect them. All the members of such a pact must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity or political independence of other member states, and this stipulation of the U.N. Charter cannot be altered by other agreements. Accordingly, what happened in Czechoslovakia is a violation of the U.N. Charter. The stationing of foreign troops on the territory of a U.N. member state has been discussed often in the United Nations, but no solution has been found. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has advocated consistently that the presence of foreign troops on a member state's territory without the country's consent constitutes a violation of its territorial integrity.

759
Christol, Carl Q. COMMUNIST CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW--STRATEGY AND TACTICS. Western political quarterly, v. 21, Sept. 1968: 456-467. JA1.W4, v. 21

China's approach to international law can be studied at the verbal, action, and motivational levels of Chinese policy. On the verbal level, China clearly subscribes to international law. At the same time, however, it takes strong exception to prevailing Western interpretations of the nature of this law and asserts that the principles of peaceful coexistence--chiefly sovereignty, equality, and nonintervention--together define a specifically Socialist approach to international jurisprudence. Some Chinese writers argue that in addition to the separate Socialist and capitalist systems there exists a worldwide legal order binding capitalist and Socialist states alike, while others argue that the deep historical contradictions dividing imperialist and worker nations prevent a universal system from developing. The Chinese also accept some international law in practice, but here a distinction must be made between those legal rules governing routine matters of mutual concern with other states and those touching upon fundamental national interests. In the former case, the Chinese generally conform to legal expectations. In fact, however, there are few reasons for trusting the Chinese to keep their international agreements, for at the motivational level, strong feelings of insecurity color the Chinese approach to international law. Totalitarian regimes suffer from extreme introversion and an inability to engage in the give-and-take of international bargaining. China is no exception, and as a consequence the regime is stifling every motive for conformity to the international legal order. Marxism-Leninism-Maoism denies the possibility of a real community of interest between Socialist and capitalist states and concludes that relations between them must remain informal and occasional. International law may help China to preserve an uneasy peace with the West and to compromise or minimize its conflicts with other Socialist countries, but for some time to come the predominant Chinese approach to the international legal order is likely to remain "largely negative, defensive, and opportunistic."

760
Falk, Richard A. LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD. Princeton, N.J. [Published for the Center of International Studies by] Princeton University Press, 1968. xvi, 610 p. JX1952.F25
Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents.--pt. 1. A statement of outlook: The future of world order; a comparison of reformist and revolutionary perspectives. The regulation of international conflict by means of law. McDougal and Feliciano on law and minimum world public order.--pt. 2. Civil strife, intervention, and minor coercion: The international law of internal war; problems and prospects. United States practice and the doctrines of nonintervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. United States intervention in Cuba at the Bay of Pigs and international law. The legal status of the United States involvement in the Viet Nam War. The legal status of the United States involvement in the Viet Nam War; a continuing inquiry. Operation Stanleyville; a lesson in Third World politics. On legislative intervention by the United Nations in the internal affairs of sovereign states. On regulating international propaganda; a plea for moderate aims.--pt. 3. Nuclear weapons: The Shimoda case; a legal appraisal of the atomic attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Minimizing the use of nuclear weapons. Thoughts in

support of a no-first-use proposal.--pt. 4. A disarming world: The control of international violence in a disarming world.

Studies the "relevance of international law to the management of international violence." In emphasizing the preeminence of the sovereign state in international affairs, Falk demonstrates "the relative inability of international institutions to cope adequately with the dominant patterns of international violence." Through pointing out weaknesses in the system and examining the most serious challenges to contemporary world order, Falk hopes to create a climate of understanding that will promote the changes needed to strengthen "the ordering capacities of the international system."

761
Ferencz, Benjamin B. WAR CRIMES LAW AND THE VIETNAM WAR. American University law review, v. 17, June 1968: 403-423.
LL

Examines the Nuremberg precepts to measure the legality of the Vietnam conflict. According to Ferencz, it has not been definitely established that the Vietnam hostilities constitute a "Crime against Peace" under international law. He argues that no violation of the Geneva Declaration or obligation to declare war is apparent and that both Congress and the Constitution have sanctioned American military involvement. The author asserts that the United States could contribute to a more peaceful world and demonstrate both respect for the rule of international law and confidence in its Vietnam course by creating a new international forum where the Vietnam action could be reviewed to determine its consistency with the laws of civilization.

762
Findley, Paul. END THE VIETNAM WAR THROUGH RULE OF LAW. Social science, v. 43, June 1968: 133-138. H1.S55, v. 43

The United States has not explored one possibly very beneficial avenue to resolving the Vietnam conflict: submit the legal issues to adjudication by the International Court of Justice and agree to abide by the results. If North Vietnam should oppose such a move, the United States should make the offer anyway and attempt to secure an advisory opinion from the court through the United Nations General Assembly. The fundamental issues in Vietnam are legal as well as political. They involve interpretations of the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Accords of 1954, and the SEATO Treaty. We have been attempting to impose our interpretation of these international agreements by force, as has the enemy. Should the court rule against the United States and order our withdrawal, it would be a disengagement with honor, bowing to the rule of law in the world community. Should the court rule in favor of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States, our position in the international community would be immeasurably stronger, and that of Hanoi weaker. Referring the matter to the court would be in line with our outspoken tradition of settling disputes by the rule of law and offer a strong and persuasive precedent for the future. (Abstract supplied)

763
Hansen, Rodney V. DEFINING AGGRESSION--UNITED STATES POLICY. Naval War College review, v. 21, Dec. 1968: 80-110. P&GP RR

U.S. opposition to a Soviet proposal in the United Nations calling for a definition of aggression is not so much a denial of the value of such a definition as resistance to Soviet pressure to act immediately. The history of the development of official U.S. policy toward the legality of criminal war, beginning with the Hague Convention of 1899, indicates that the United States has consistently regarded wars of aggression as international crimes. The Soviet draft definition of aggression, an enumeration of situations of direct, indirect, economic, and ideological aggression, would facilitate the determination of the aggressor party in any conflict examined by the United Nations. The definition also includes "excuses" that not be used to justify an aggressive act. However, because Soviet application of the definition to cases of alleged U.S. aggression would be completely objective and recognize no extenuating circumstances, it is in the best interests of American foreign policy to continue to oppose the resolution. In the Cuban missile crisis, for example, the quarantine of Cuba, under the Soviet definition, would constitute a "naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State," and the United States would be unalterably guilty of aggression. Because of the recent decline of U.S. influence in U.N. affairs, such a definition in such a circumstance, while not affecting the votes of strongly pro-Western states, could cause the borderline nations to vote against the United States. In addition, at the same time that Russia decries American opposition to the definition, overt acts of Soviet aggression continue. Therefore, with the current complexion of the United Nations and in consideration of her overall foreign policy, the United States best interests dictate a continuing opposition to Soviet pressure for passage.

764
Mercer, A. G. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS. Pacific viewpoint, v. 9, May 1968: 51-68.
AS741. P3, v. 9

Adresses itself to the legality of the French nuclear tests in the South Pacific in the light of such international law institutions as the freedom of the high seas and the rights of colonial peoples. Mercer contends that, since the partial test ban treaty, from which France abstained, is legislative rather than declaratory of customary international law and anticipated critical health hazards have not materialized as a consequence of the French nuclear tests, they have not violated any established rule of international law.

765
Uschakow, Alexander. [MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE LAW OF NATIONS] Die militärische Intervention in der Tschechoslowakei und das Völkerrecht. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Nov. 10, 1968: 773-782.
D839. E86, v. 23

Examines Soviet justification of the intervention in Czechoslovakia in the light of such things as the United Nations Charter, the Warsaw Pact, and "the so-called Socialist law of nations." Uschakow contends that the intervention proved the frailty of the interdependence theory in international law--the theory that the existence of nation-states accounts for the occurrence of interventions.

B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

766
Boissier, Léopold. WAR AND PEACE. International review of the Red Cross, v. 8, Sept. 1968: 447-449. HV560.I56, v. 8

Comments on requests that urge the International Committee of the Red Cross to widen its functions to include promoting peace. Boissier, while not excluding the possibility of widening Committee functions in the future, maintains that for the moment the Committee should carry out its traditional task and contribute to the peaceful settlement of international conflicts "by the example of charity and solidarity which it sets."

767
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ISSUES BEFORE THE 23RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY. New York, 1968. 208 p. (International conciliation, no. 569) JX1907.A8, no. 569

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Political questions: Middle East. Peacekeeping. Disarmament and arms control; nonproliferation. Outer space. Sea-bed. Palestine refugees.--pt. 2. Colonial countries and peoples: Namibia (South West Africa). Southern Rhodesia. Portuguese territories. Small territories. Muscat and Oman.--pt. 3. Human rights: Future United Nations role.--pt. 4. Economic and social questions: Food and population.--pt. 5. Legal questions: International law and friendly relations. Defining aggression.

Examines issues confronting the 23rd General Assembly of the United Nations. The editor predicts that the body's major preoccupations will be southern Africa and the economic disparities between northern and southern countries.

768
Carroll, Raymond. THE U.N. AND ISRAEL: 'THE DECK IS STACKED.' Newsweek, v. 73, Jan. 13, 1969: 38. AP2.N6772, v. 73

Charges by the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, Yosef Tekoah, of "moral, political and juridical bankruptcy" in the Security Council typify a longstanding rift between Israel and the United Nations. One of the chief causes of the disenchantment is that Israel feels, with justification, that "the deck is stacked against us." In the Security Council, pro-Arab sentiment is stable at about one-third of the membership--the number needed to block any measures favorable to Israel or critical of Arab actions. This legal structural stacking partially explains the U.N. inability to halt Arab aggression, a continuous threat to Israel's security dating back to its creation in 1948. On the other hand, the U.N. attitude toward Israel is less than warm as a result of Israel's determination to put a final military end to Arab aggression. Since Israel discovered its military superiority to the Arabs it has been prone to seek military reprisal before bringing a case to the United Nations for negotiation. Israel would be prudent to reconcile its position with the U.N. because "the time will inevitably come when they [the Arabs] will not be so weak and disorganized," and Israel may need U.N. sympathy.

769
Cheever, Daniel S. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN OCEAN DEVELOPMENT. International organization, v. 22, summer 1968: 629-648. JX1901.I55, v. 22

The Malta proposal to the United Nations calling for the creation of an international agency to assume jurisdiction over the seabed and ocean floor has presented a challenge to the development of international organization. To date, international organization has played an insignificant role in exploiting the ocean's resources; national agencies working under the international rule of law have been more effective. The fragmentation of world political power and the resultant problems of national security limit the use of international organization for this purpose, but the potential exists for its effective utilization. To realize the goals of the Malta proposal, certain steps should be taken: nations should renounce exclusive sovereign rights to the sea bottom and its resources, should agree that these resources "be used as a 'common good' in the interest of mankind," should make certain that the seabed be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, and should agree to the creation of an international organization to deal with the oceans as a whole. At present, international organization is "too weak as a governmental or administrative mechanism to manage the sea directly," and premature control is likely to create controversy. The first task for international organization is to develop ground rules for ocean exploitation and "to improve national capabilities through international harmonization to the point of global coordination."

770
Greenberg, D. S. PEACE RESEARCH: SIPRI, IN SWEDEN, IS MAKING A ROLE FOR ITSELF. Science, v. 162, Dec. 27, 1968: 1465-1466. Q1.S35, v. 162

Although young and only partially staffed, the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research (SIPRI) has shown considerable promise as an organization intent on "puncturing the rationales that have been constructed to justify rigidities in Big Power positions." Originally called the Swedish International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI is headquartered in Stockholm and funded by the Swedish Government but administered as an independent international organization. Its director, British economist Robert R. Neild, oversees a full-time staff drawn from five nations and is a member of the governing board, which is appointed by the Swedish Government and composed of representatives from Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Britain, Holland, and Norway. The Institute's major accomplishment so far was the convocation of an international conference of seismology experts, which concluded that newly developed detection "capabilities leave room for only a small residue of uncertainty" in distinguishing between manmade and natural underground disturbances. SIPRI is also studying techniques for policing the production of chemical and biological weapons; working on an annual reference aid on weapons development, military expenditures, and military actions; examining the issues involved in international exploitation of the oceans; and preparing a comprehensive study of the international arms trade, with an emphasis on transactions between the big powers and the less developed countries. Although "truth, knowledge, and rationality are yet to carry much weight in international power relations," SIPRI hopes that its efforts will provide the information needed when "politics evolves to a stage where sound information can swing the balance."

771
Morkhandikar, R. S. UN AS A FACTOR IN INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY. Quest, no. 59, Oct./Dec. 1968: 40-47. AP8.Q4, 1968

Although India's support of the U.N. has been vocal and articulate, India "has opposed or cold-shouldered attempts at the development of the operational capacity of the institution." It opposed the collective security aspect of the Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950), impeded efforts to institutionalize the peacekeeping procedure, cold-shouldered a resolution calling for free elections in Hungary (1956), and refused to abide by a decision of the International Court of Justice concerning Portugal's right of passage to its enclaves in India. Although it has supported most of the resolutions establishing peacekeeping forces, it has abstained on such vital finance resolutions as the U.N. bond issue and the question of penalties for defaulted payments. India refuses to pay for the upkeep of peacekeeping forces because the peacekeeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East were not normal activities of the U.N. and therefore not subject to the ordinary expenses of the organization. India's role in the U.N. is determined by how much the organization can serve the government's needs in the formulation and implementation of its foreign policy. However, its view of the U.N. is important because "the direction that the U.N. takes, and the vigour with which it acts, will depend to a large extent upon the kind and quality of support given to it by the non-aligned countries."

772
Myrdal, Gunnar. TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE. International organization, v. 22, summer 1968: 617-628. JX1901.I55, v. 22

Examines the role of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in promoting European cooperation. The cold war has not yet ended, and therefore intergovernmental relations in Europe are precarious. According to Myrdal, the adverse political conditions under which the Commission works, while limiting its activity, also provide ECE with an opportunity to act as "an organized matrix for preserving and strengthening the links between countries on both sides of the divide" and enable it to aid in building a sounder Europe and a peaceful world.

773
Rusk, Dean. SECRETARY RUSK ADDRESSES THE U.N. In U.S. Dept. of State. News letter, no. 90, Oct. 1968: 2-6. illus. JX1.U542, 1968

Address before the U.N. General Assembly, Oct. 2, 1968.

Briefly reviews pressing world problems, citing specifically the invasion of Czechoslovakia, threats against the Federal Republic of Germany, the Vietnam War, the Middle East conflict, and the need for progress in arms control and for international cooperation in economic and social development. Rusk affirms the American people's support for the United Nations and maintains that they will continue to work within the organization's framework for the peace and welfare of its members.

774
Sedin, L. THE DUTY OF THE UNITED NATIONS. Soviet Union, no. 12 (225) 1968: 1. DK266.A2S574, 1968

Although the U.N. Charter proclaims that the members of the U.N. are determined to save future generations from the scourge of war, no fewer than 73 armed conflicts have occurred during the 20 years since the organization's founding. In view of this unhappy situation and wanting to demonstrate the Soviet Union's faith in the U.N. and desire for international cooperation, the Soviet Union's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, proposed that the first meeting of the 23d session of the U.N. General Assembly begin its work by discussing the most urgent problems of world peace--the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. The Soviet Union feels that the U.N. has yet to realize its potential as an instrument for maintaining world peace and security. Its most urgent duty is, of course, stopping the arms race and achieving general and complete disarmament. Other obligations are to stabilize the political situation in Southeast Asia, liquidate the consequences of Israel's 1968 aggression, and establish a lasting peace in the Middle East. The Jarring mission disclosed the existence of some realistic possibilities for guaranteeing territorial integrity and political independence to each country in this area. The Western Powers, instead of supporting Mr. Gromyko's proposals, wanted to discuss the Czechoslovak question. Such a discussion can bring them only embarrassment. Their attempt to interfere with the internal affairs of the Socialist countries cannot change the fact that they are responsible for the arms race, the aggression in Vietnam, the dangerous situation in the Middle East, the growth of militarism in Germany, and the increased tension in Europe. No reasonable nation will follow them into the cul-de-sac of another cold war.

775
Taylor, Paul. THE FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER: A DEFENCE. Political studies, v. 16, Oct. 1968: 393-410. JA1.P63, v. 16

Considers the major issues involved in the debate on functionalism and emergence of the international society. Taylor discusses contemporary literature on the subject and gives reasons why the functionalist approach to the problem of international order easily opens itself to attack. For instance, one difficulty is that functionalism deliberately shuns from systematic descriptive analysis; another, "that there is still insufficient evidence to test the central Functionalist hypothesis that man will learn from the experience of international co-operation and begin to owe loyalty to those institutions which best satisfy his welfare needs."

776
Tuckerman, Anne. UN: KEEPING THE POWDER DRY. Nation, v. 207, Dec. 2, 1968: 582-583. AP2.N2, v. 207

Brief comment on the U.N.'s political role, especially in obtaining a Middle East settlement. In the foreseeable future, although the U.N. will remain available for informal diplomatic approaches and will maintain an effective peace-keeping mechanism, its most constructive activity will be devoted to international cooperation in the technical and social fields.

777
UNITED NATIONS YEARBOOK 1966. New York, United Nations Office of Public Information [1968] 1226 p.
JA51. U5, 1966
Selected documentary references.

Partial contents. --Questions concerning the uses of atomic energy. --Prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations. --Status of implementation of declaration on inadmissibility of intervention in domestic affairs of states. --Peaceful settlement of disputes. --International Co-operation Year. --Questions relating to Africa. --Questions relating to the Americas. --Questions relating to Asia and the Far East. --Questions relating to the Middle East. --The world economic situation. --Industrial development. --Land reform. --Questions relating to transmission of information on non-self-governing territories. --The International Court of Justice. --United Nations programme of assistance to promote teaching and knowledge of international law. --The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). --Appendices. --Subject index. --Index of names.

Summary of U.N. endeavors during 1966 in political and security, economic and social, legal, and administrative questions.

778
Young, Oran R. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. International organization, v. 22, autumn 1968: 902-922.
JX1901. I55, v. 22

Examines the interaction between the United Nations and the international system. Young states that the current confusion surrounding the U.N. has resulted from the rapidly changing nature of the international system. He suggests various plausible, alternative patterns of evolution in this system and views the effect of each upon the world organization.

C. INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

779
Adams, T. W., and Alvin J. Cottrell. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS. Orbis, v. 12, summer 1968: 490-503. D839. O68, v. 12

Considerable credit must be given to the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for stifling open conflict in that island. This force "provides impartial guarantees and protection to both sides over an extended period of time" and creates an atmosphere in which a permanent settlement can be sought in an honorable and face-saving manner. However, although UNFICYP has succeeded in reducing hostilities between the Greek and Turkish Cypriotes, it has contributed very little to a final settlement. When the Greeks and Turks are brought together at the conference table reason seldom prevails. Peacemaking, however, should not be confused with peacekeeping--the former belongs to the diplomats and the latter to the military. At present, UNFICYP is presiding over an uneasy calm that could explode at any moment, and its role in Cyprus can be appreciated because it is "the only buffer preventing an outbreak of full-scale war on the island, which could in turn easily escalate into a conflict of sweeping international proportions." UNFICYP has also helped to prevent the United States, which is walking a diplomatic tightrope over Cyprus, from making difficult politico-military decisions that would alienate Greece or Turkey, both members of NATO.

780
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. PEACE-KEEPING. In its Issues before the 23rd General Assembly. New York, 1968. (International conciliation, no. 569) p. 23-27.
JX1907. A8, no. 569

Discusses the problems in establishing a durable framework for U.N. peacekeeping operations. Progress in obtaining concensus on peacekeeping issues has been slow, but the recent submission of a report on U.N. military observer missions makes cautious optimism seem more justified now than previously.

781
Goyer, J. P. CANADIAN REVIEW OF UN PEACE-KEEPING. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. Canadian weekly bulletin, v. 24, Jan. 8, 1969: 1-2, 6.
F1034. A3, v. 24
Statement made in the Special Political Committee on the Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Dec. 17, 1968.

Reviews the state of peacekeeping operations during the United Nations 23d session and stresses the importance of observer missions by noting their successes in Cyprus and Pakistan. Goyer believes there may be other occasions when observer missions will make constructive contributions to international peace and security. Further, the author discusses the questions of financing these missions and of giving the Military Staff Committee a more active role in peacekeeping operations. He hopes that, despite divisions in the past over these questions, future peacekeeping operations will be carried out on a generally acceptable basis.

782
REVIEW OF THE QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS. In United Nations Yearbook 1966. New York, United Nations Office of Public Information [1968] p. 52-61. JA51. U5, 1966

Reviews several proposals on peacekeeping operations that were considered by the U.N. General Assembly. Included is a report by the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, to which the General Assembly assigned the task of undertaking a comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations.

D. OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

783
[ALTERNATIVES FOR EUROPE; MODELS OF POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SEVENTIES] Alternativen für Europa; Modelle möglicher Entwicklungen in den siebziger Jahren. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Dec. 10, 1968: 851-864. D839. E86, v. 23

Broaches models of Europe in the seventies--one of "weakened bipolarity," another of a "disintegrated

Europe," still another of "regional groupings," and others of a "European core," "containment of Europe's center," and a "neutral belt on the Soviet perimeter." The study sprang from an analysis of previously prepared models: "Modèles de sécurité européenne" by the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, Paris, published in issue no. 6, 1967, of Politique Étrangère, and Europe's Future--Europe's Choices, prepared by the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, to be published in 1969. Unlike these other works this study assumes that security problems do not comprise "the only possible point of departure for the solution of Europe's political issues," but takes economic and political factors as starting points as well. In light of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia the study sees little chance "for a substantial change in [a present] course in regard to a new all-European security system."

784
Baumgartel, Howard. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY AND WAR. Social action (Delhi), v. 18, July/Aug. 1968: 286-298. HN681.S58, v. 18

Surveys some recent work of American psychologists and behavioral scientists on the causes of war and the means to avoid it. Baumgartel finds that theorists and researchers are doing much creative work on these problems but that they lack an adequate basic theory, without which it is all but impossible to come to grips with the enormous complexities of international behavior. Nevertheless, he retains his faith that science will ultimately give humanity knowledge useful in avoiding war.

785
Brickman, Harry R. THE PSYCHEDELIC "HIP SCENE": RETURN OF THE DEATH INSTINCT. American journal of psychiatry, v. 125, Dec. 1968: 766-772. RC321.A52, v. 125

The author discusses the relationship between the psychedelic experience and the nonviolent ethic of the growing "hippy" subculture within the frame of reference of Freud's death instinct theory, which held that externalization of the life and death instincts through aggressiveness prevents self-destruction of the individual. The psychedelic episode and the experience of ego dissolution ("dying") are seen as confirming the basic unity of life and death, thus eliminating the individual's need to externalize destructiveness. (Abstract supplied)

786
Cooper, Daniel I. TECHNOLOGY'S CONTRIBUTION TO KEEPING THE PEACE NEEDS TO GROW . . . [editorial] Science and technology, Oct. 1968: 9. Q1.I587, 1968

A positive feedback loop that consists of a cycle of threat perceptions and defensive reactions thereto is one factor that leads nations into war. The defensive preparations of one nation are perceived as a threat by other nations, who respond by strengthening their own defenses. This reaction is then perceived by the first nation as a new threat that requires further defense preparations, and the whole cycle begins again at a higher level of armaments. This interaction system might be more stable if the margin of error in threat perception were reduced on all sides or if the participants were brought to a better understanding of the interaction process and induced to adopt more rational rules of judgment and behavior. A joint U.S.-Soviet institute for the study of arms control and disarmament, staffed by the senior defense officials of both nations, would contribute in a number of important ways to such a rationalization of the international security system. At a later date it would also be useful for proposing joint plans for disarmament. The one danger is that "rationalization" might be mistaken for "legitimization." This would be tragic because abhorrence of war is ultimately the only real guarantee of peace. A question that needs to be answered is why men hate war and yet continue to wage it. On this matter, the contributions of behavioral scientists, poets, and philosophers are needed. The United States ought to set aside 0.1 percent (about $80 million) of the defense budget for research into the causes of agression. These studies offer the best hope that the world can break out of the vicious cycle described above.

787
Critchlow, James. ZIG-ZAGS AND CLASHES. Commonweal, v. 88, Sept. 20, 1968: 628-630. AP2.C6897, v. 88

The course of Soviet politics will be determined by the outcome of the present conflict "between liberal reformers and conservative defenders of the status quo." The liberals' strongest case to date is an essay by nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov that calls for an international accord between East and West and true cooperation in overcoming world problems. Among the questions considered by Sakharov are the stockpiling of nuclear weapons despite the attainment of an overkill capacity long ago; the Vietnam and Middle East situations; the threats to intellectual liberty, particularly from censorship; and "police dictatorships which thrive on racism and anti-intellectualism." For each crisis he lays the blame where it is due--East or West. To the West the essay is the first sincere appeal from a prominent Soviet citizen for a rapprochement "without the competitive 'we'll bury you' formulas of Marxism-Leninism." However, the lack of official recognition of the plea by Western governments is a great disappointment to the Soviet intellectuals. Although a vehement denunciation of the propositions in Izvestiia indicated that Sakharov does not speak for the Soviet Government, the widespread support of the plan in intellectual circles encourages hope that the power of the intelligentsia may soon influence a liberalization of the Soviet position. In view of such a possibility the Western Powers should support Sakharov with the positive response he seeks.

788
[GERMAN-SOVIET EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF RENUNCIATION OF FORCE] Der deutsch-sowjetische Meinungsaustausch zur Frage des Gewaltverzichts. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Aug. 25, 1968: D 361-386. D839.E86, v. 23

Texts of official communications between the German Federal Republic and the Soviet Union from February 7, 1967, through July 5, 1968, on a mutual renunciation of force, which the Federal Republic proposed be formally made by the two countries and other East European states. According to Moscow such renunciation would be meaningless without Bonn's recognition of the German Democratic Republic and the postwar German boundaries.

789
Handzik, Helmut. [THE "GERMAN CONFEDERATION"; A MODEL FOR SETTLEMENT OF INTRA-GERMAN RELATIONS?] Der "Deutsche Bund": ein Modell für die Regelung der innerdeutschen Beziehungen? Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Nov. 10, 1968: 793-802.
D839. E86, v. 23

Examines the confederation model for Germany conceived by the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère and published in issue no. 6, 1967, of Politique Étrangère. Handzik deems the model unrealizable in terms of reconciling the confederation's international law personality with the freedom of foreign policy action that the plan envisages for both East and West Germany. The Centre's suggestions for an arms control and inspection system in the federation were apparently inspired by the example of the Rhine Federation of 1806-1813 rather than by the first "Deutscher Bund" (German Confederation). The proposed arrangements would practically deprive confederated Germany of independent foreign and military policies and would only induce foreign interventions in the country.

790
Hass, Ernst. COMMON OPPONENT SOUGHT . . . AND FOUND? Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, Nov. 1968: 8-11. TK9145. A84, v. 24

If the survival of mankind were threatened by a common enemy, quarreling among nations would cease, and international cooperation--even world government--would become the order of the day. A new theory of the ice ages propounded by J. T. Wilson in 1964 may have identified this common enemy. According to Wilson's theory, the ice ages were caused by the sudden sliding of the Antarctic ice cap into the southern seas--an event, which, in addition to long-term climatic sequelae, generated worldwide tidal waves and a rise of 20 to 30 meters in the ocean level. Were this to happen today, half of the human race would perish; unfortunately there is some evidence that it will happen and in the very near future. This threat offers a serious challenge to mankind--one that can be met only by pooling all of man's intellectual and material resources. The growth of the ice cap must be stopped and steps taken to guard against increases in the level of the seas. What if Wilson's theory is incorrect? It makes little difference since, if man undertakes the appropriate preventative measures, it can never be known whether he was right or wrong, just as in an analogous case it can never be known whether the buildup of nuclear arsenals has prevented nuclear war. In the meantime man will have derived great benefits from the common struggle. In particular, the enormous quantity of resources consumed would make it impossible to continue the arms race, and the diversion of water from the oceans into great land depressions would open up hitherto barren regions to agriculture. It may prove impossible for the powerful of this earth to decide on common action, but if they do all mankind will be the beneficiary.

791
Hunck, Joseph M. [ASIA FOR THE TIME AFTER VIETNAM] Asien für die Zeit nach Vietnam. Aussenpolitik, v. 19, Oct. 1968: 599-608.
D839. A885, v. 19

Explains the aversion of South Asian and Southeast Asian states to the formation of military-oriented regional organizations by reference to their firm belief that consolidation of their own economies should take precedence over national security considerations.

792
Jo, Yung-hwan. REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND JAPAN'S ROLE. Journal of politics, v. 30, Aug. 1968: 780-797.
JA1. J6, v. 30

Japan has played a relatively insignificant role in Asian affairs until recently, but the new trend toward regional cooperation has provided the country with an opportunity to occupy a leading position in the region's development. In 1966 Japan participated actively in various international institutions of regional cooperation; e.g., the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia and the Ministerial Meeting for Asian and Pacific Cooperation. Moreover, the nation participated in the formation of the Asian Development Bank, shared technical and management skills with other Asian countries, and took an active part in such cooperative ventures as the lower Mekong River Basin development project. The Southeast Asian nations have responded positively to these regional activities and Japan's leadership role in them. In considering the possibility of establishing an integrated regional organization such as a common market in Asia, the existence of both centripetal and centrifugal forces working for and against regional integration must be noted. However, since both the United States and the U. N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East have been supporting moves to overcome the centrifugal forces, Asian leaders have a good opportunity to progress toward regional coordination if not toward integration. If Japan hopes to attain a position of leadership in an integrated Asia, the Government must examine various proposals for establishing a regional organization. One such plan proposes to set up four subregional mechanisms with Japan as a member of each: The "Pacific Community" would consist of Canada, the United States, New Zealand, Australia, and Japan and would provide economic assistance to the other zones; the "Northeast Community" would consist of South Korea, Formosa, Hong Kong, and Japan; the "Riparian Community" would consist of South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, and Japan; and the "Malphilindo Community" would consist of Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Japan. As a core nation Japan "would be expected to build bridges not only between the 'developed' Pacific zone and the three 'developing' zones, but also among the latter three." In bidding for Southeast Asian leadership, "Japan's path will certainly cross with that of Communist China and India," but certain factors seem to suggest that the Japanese model is more appropriate for Southeast Asian development than that of India, China, or any superpower. Further, even though Japan is under the U. S. protective shield, its ability to pursue a policy of quasi-nonalinement and thereby serve as a bridge between East and West places it in a unique position, which "could be an asset . . . for the development of Asian regionalism."

793
Le Vine, Victor T. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Judaism, v. 17, fall 1968: 491-500.
BM1. J8, v. 17

Peace in the Middle East will come not through Arab-Israeli agreement on certain definable issues but through either outside imposition, a radical change in

the objective conditions of the conflict, or an Arab-imposed Carthaginian peace. This conclusion is drawn from balancing those events and developments favorable to a negotiated settlement against those pointing to an intensification of hostilities. The signs of increasing hostility outweigh the hopeful trends, making impossible a settlement based on a rational adjustment of interests. One possibility for a peaceful solution is an imposed peace, which would take place under two conditions: either another Arab-Israeli war that would threaten the vital interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union, or major power disinterest sufficient for the United States or marginal powers to force the Arabs and Israelis into a settlement. The former condition is the more plausible: if a future conflict threatens to escalate into a major conflagration, then "the unacceptable costs of continuing the conflict might persuade the great powers to defuse the area by imposing peace." The most likely settlement of the conflict involves some radical change--gradual or sudden--in the conditions underlying the hostility. Political or economic catastrophes affecting Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Israel that would make impossible a continuance of the conflict are examples of such sudden changes. The continuing disintegration of the Arab bloc, which makes unity and strength for another military confrontation difficult, is an example of a gradual change. The last alternative for peace--an Arab-imposed Carthaginian peace--could become a reality if the Arabs were to win the next or some future round. If this happened, a great power conflagration could be touched off through the use of missiles; by a Soviet-U.S. naval confrontation in the Mediterranean or the imminent defeat of one side; through an attack, either unprovoked or accidental, on the military personnel, installations, or ships of the United States and the Soviet Union; or by the large-scale use of Soviet volunteers in the Arab armies. If this analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict is correct, then "Jews in the United States and elsewhere ought to devote their time to convincing their respective governments to use whatever means at their disposal to [prevent] another Arab-Israeli war. Arms to Israel is a good cause, but hardly one designed to make the road to peace any smoother."

794
[MODELS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY] Modèles de sécurité européenne. Politique étrangère, v. 32, no. 6, 1967: 519-541. JX3.P6, v. 32

A German translation of this article appears in the Jan. 25, 1968, issue of Europa-Archiv.
D839.E86

Develops three European security models: one for East-West détente, another for entente, and a third for cooperation between East and West European nations. According to the study, solution of the German question is a prerequisite of European peace and security.

795
Paterson, William E. A CRITICAL VIEW OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Contemporary review, v. 213, Oct. 1968: 200-204. AP4.C7, v. 213

Criticizes the functional approach to international peace. Functionalists argue that by circumventing politics an integrated, and hence peaceful, international community can be established even though a political will toward integration does not exist. Unfortunately, politics cannot be bypassed in this fashion, and, as an examination of current trends in Western Europe reveals, functionalism, after moderate initial successes, is now in full retreat before a resurgent concern with political questions among European states.

796
Pax Christi. Netherlands. [PROBLEMS OF PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, IN CONNECTION WITH "PACEM IN TERRIS"] Problèmes de la paix a l'ère atomique, en route avec "Pacem in terris." [Translation by Pierre Brachin] Preface by Mgr. Gouyon . . . Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, 1967. 159 p. (Spiritualité)
BT736.4.P384

Partial contents. --The revolution in armaments technology. --For a power ethic. --To act in a world of contradiction. --The courage of recognizing the complexity of the problem. --The task of the church. --The task of the Christian in the world. --The task of a Catholic movement for peace. --Disarmament. --Peaceful coexistence. --The rights of man. --An international organization for well-being. --What can we do?

Argues that man has been overwhelmed by the technological revolution and has become subservient to a power ethic that emphasizes the production of weapons of mass destruction. The author notes that the technological revolution has given man unprecendented powers to create and destroy and that man continues to reason, live, and act in relation to national aspirations rather than worldly ones. He adds that this revolution has progressed so rapidly that it has left man without any moral force or spiritual incentive to cope with his destructive powers. The author concludes that man must search his own soul to find salvation and to resist the temptations put before him by a power-conscious society.

797
Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warsaw. EUROPEAN SECURITY. Polish perspectives, v. 11, Aug./Sept. 1968: 13-22.
DK401.P7947, v. 11

"A paper prepared by the Polish Institute of International Affairs, and presented in May 1968 to the Conference of Heads and Representatives of European Institutes of International Affairs and at the Pugwash Conference in Marianské Lázne, Czechoslovakia."

Considers the division of Europe into two antagonistic groupings an artificial barrier that violates the Continent's long tradition of economic and cultural cooperation between its nations. A Communist threat to Western Europe is a myth in which "hardly any realistic statesman believes any longer." West German territorial claims and imperialist aspirations aimed at upsetting the postwar equilibrium in Europe pose a real danger to European peace and security. The existing balance of forces in Europe should serve as a point of departure to lay down viable foundations for European peace and security. Important prerequisites for that task should be renunciation of the use of force or the threat of force in mutual relations between states, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, implementation of partial disarmament measures to reduce the chance of war, and development of "cooperation between states in various fields of international intercourse."

798
Rabinowitch, Eugene. THE SAKHAROV MANIFESTO: PROGRESS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, Nov. 1968: 2-7.
TK9145. A84, v. 24

A summary and discussion of the Sakharov manifesto. Rabinowitch believes that this document, with its endorsement of the theory of convergence and its call for moral rather than political or economic competition between capitalist and Communist systems, expresses the political sentiments of a significant number of Soviet scientists. While Sakharov's expectations concerning the rate of progress toward U.S.-Soviet rapprochement, control of the arms race, and a concerted attack on world poverty may be overly optimistic, his description of the path that this progress must necessarily take is sound, and his pamphlet gives expression to "a new and powerful voice for reason and hope."

799
Schmid, Herman. PEACE RESEARCH AND POLITICS. Journal of peace research, no. 3, 1968: 217-232.
AS9. J6, 1968

This article is an elaboration of a number of viewpoints presented at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, in January 1968.

Traces the origin of peace research and stresses its applied nature. A model of three types of applied social science is represented and used to distinguish between international relations of the traditional type, peace research, and what could be called revolution research. The value problems of a value-oriented discipline are discussed, with the conclusion that peace research in the final analysis is based on a negative concept of peace in line with the institutional needs of the power-holders of the international system. Schmid argues that peace research supports the existing social order, and that this is expressed both in its theory and in its institutional needs of close cooperation with decision-makers. The article proposes a change of peace research from research for control and integration of the international system, towards research for liberation and revolution. He concludes that the concept of positive peace is devoid of concrete content, and that conflict by and large is seen by peace researchers as something negative. The tendency to conflict reductionism is related to the subjectivistic definition of conflict which characterizes peace research, as well as to the heavy emphasis on conflict resolution. An objectivistic, structural model of conflict is presented as a contrast. (Abstract supplied, modified)

800
Wiberg, Håkan. SOCIAL POSITION AND PEACE PHILOSOPHY. Journal of peace research, no. 3, 1968: 277-292. AS9. J6, 1968

Discusses the use of an index of social position (a center-periphery index) for such a special population as politically involved students. Two different indices, with different emphasis on past and present, are tried. The data came from 514 members of political student associations at Lund University. The indices were validated against two hypotheses, stating that the center should be higher on social participation, and that the center should be higher on opinion-holding. The first hypothesis was confirmed, and better confirmed by a past-oriented than by a present-oriented index, while the second hypothesis was rather left undecided. The absolutism-gradualism hypothesis, stating that the periphery should be more prone to suggest radical change in foreign policy, was confirmed. The hypothesis was supported that the center would more favor proposals including interaction at a "middle" level(organizational, national), while the periphery would be more positive to proposals suggesting interaction at the lower (individual, primary group) and uppermost (international) level. Political affiliation was shown to be more strongly related to choice of peace philosophy than social position. The effects of political affiliation and of social position appear to be independent of each other: therefore, it was here possible to reject the idea that differences due to political affiliation are merely amplified effects of the differences due to social position. The peace philosophy clusters discovered were better definable in political terms than in terms of social position, although social position was also clearly relevant for sorting the findings out. The philosophies that are adhered to rather than other philosophies appear in the same cluster, the conservative. Whether this indicates differences in causal beliefs, in definitions of peace, or in value orientation is left as a problem for further research. (Abstract supplied)

801
Winter, Martin. [INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM IN VIENNA ON QUESTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY] Internationales Kolloquium zu Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit in Wien. Dokumentation der Zeit; Informations-Archiv, v. 20, no. 408, 1968: 23-24.
DD261. D4, v. 20

Reports on the conference, organized by the International Institute for Peace, Vienna, on "the blocs, the German question, and the future of Europe." The conference was attended by scholars from Belgium, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, Canada, Norway, Austria, Poland, Switzerland, and West Germany. Winter gives short summaries of the papers read and the discussion at the conference. Some participants stressed the potential role of existing military blocs in a gradual solution to the European security problems.

802
Wischnewski, Hans-Juergen. AID TO DEVELOPING ASIA. Far Eastern economic review, v. 62, Oct. 3, 1968: 22-23. HC411. F18, v. 62

Second article in a section on German relations with Asia.

Reviews the Federal Republic of Germany's aid program to developing Asian countries. In the near future the East-West conflict will pale in comparison to the north-south conflict. Political crises resulting from the gap between the rich northern nations and the poor southern nations will threaten future world peace; thus, whoever helps to bridge this gap will aid in securing peace. The Federal Republic, viewing its development policy as a contribution toward global peace, hopes to provide increased assistance to the Third World.

IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

803
Axon, Gordon.V. THE UNITED STATES IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY. Pakistan horizon, v. 21, no. 3, 1968: [235]-240. DS376. P32, v. 21

Most Americans believe that the United States earned its position of affluence and international importance solely through the hard work and courage of its population and are generally unwilling "to abdicate privileges for the sake of justice" at home or abroad. They fail to recognize that America also owes its successful development to the availability of abundant natural resources and the opportunities for dissastisfied individuals to move elsewhere--factors which "obscured the class distintions [,] the true vested power interests, and the almost mechanical expansion which took place in the country." The momentum of expansion has carried the United States into overseas commitments that are unrealistic in view of the world power structure today. Tradition has also nurtured the problems of class differences and racial biases that now confront the United States. Thus, there is a basic need for the United States "to abrogate the continuum of its history." It must check its natural impulses to expand its influence forcibly overseas. At home a completely different political arrangement is needed to cope with the social injustices. America must subdue its "unruly spirit" and instill "discipline, organization and diplomacy."

804
Commager, Henry S. 1918--1968: IS THE WORLD SAFER FOR ANYTHING? Saturday review, v. 51, Nov. 9, 1968: 21-24, 54. Z1219. S25, v. 51

The failure of the World War I armistice to provide lasting peace is evident in the events of the last half century. Although there are probably particular and immediate causes for the collapse of order after the First World War, deeper causes are responsible for "a change in the currents of history so great that it resembles rather a change in the tides of Nature herself." The most fundamental cause is the emergence of the exploited masses determined to wipe out the inferiority that the West imposed upon them and "take their equal place among the nations of the world." A second cause is the racial revolution--the refusal of all colored peoples to remain inferior to whites and the failure of most whites to acknowledge their responsibility for this subjugation. A third explanation is the ravages of nationalism--fragmentation along racial, linguistic, and religious lines and exacerbation of chauvinism, imperialism, and militarism--and selfish big power exploitation of the competitiveness of new nations. A fourth reason for chaotic world conditions is the revolution of rising expectations generated by advances in science and technology. Although men have been promised a better life, they have not received it; the gap between their expectations and their actual conditions has become intolerable. A final cause of the world's malaise is America's rejection of "the practical, the relative, the organic view of society and politics, and the embrace of the doctrinaire, the absolute, and the static." While ordinary conflicts involve issues that can be settled through compromise, ideological conflicts are moral and therefore difficult to negotiate. The United States has played a significant role in the disorder of the last half century: it failed to support the revolution of the underprivileged masses; it subordinated colored peoples to whites; "it stimulated and supported self-determination after the first war, and the breakup of ancient empires after the second"; and it failed to mitigate the ravages of chauvinism. Further, it engaged a large part of its scientific energies in war and preparations for war, exalted the role of the military, and accepted an ideological approach to international politics. In so doing, America departed from its tradition and betrayed its character.

805
DISARMAMENT AND RELATED QUESTIONS. In United Nations Yearbook 1966. New York, United Nations Office of Public Information [1968] p. 3-32. JA51. U5, 1966

Surveys the 1966 discussions at the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament on a comprehensive test ban treaty, nuclear nonproliferation, and general and complete disarmament. General Assembly consideration of these and other disarmament questions, such as denuclearization of Latin America and the suspension of nuclear tests, is also included.

806
Gittings, John. INVITATION TO A DANCE. Far Eastern economic review, v. 62, Nov. 7, 1968: 325-326, 331-332. illus. HC411. F18, v. 62

Volume 6 of the Foreign Relations of the United States series on China sheds light upon U.S.-Communist Chinese relations during the last years of the anti-Japanese war. Instead of showing implacable hostility toward the United States, the Chinese Communist leaders made overtures toward Washington, hoping to strengthen their position in the important areas of military aid and political recognition. Whether the course of Sino-American relations would have been radically different if these overtures had succeeded is impossible to determine. However, the attempt does provide a lesson: The Communist leaders demonstrated shrewdness and pragmatism in their attitude toward the United States, not the intransigence and dogmatism that has been credited to them. Simple cold war clichés seem inadequate "when the tangled story of Sino-American relations" since those days is examined closely.

807
Mel'nikov, D. [THE GERMAN NATION AND EUROPEAN DESTINY] Germanskaia natsia i sud'by Evropy. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 11, 1968: 39-50. HC10. M5357, 1968

The revolution in November 1918 in Germany, which overthrew the monarchy and set up a bourgeois republic, was one of the events in our violent century whose significance transcends national borders. That is why an analysis of the nature of that revolution, of its motive forces, the causes of its defeat and the influence it exerted on the fate of the European peoples--first and foremost, on that of the German nation--is both essential and instructive. Now it has become clear to all that the struggle of the German Democratic Republic and the democratic forces in West Germany for peace and social progress is of cardinal importance to European destinies--it is an important factor ensuring peace on the entire continent. (Abstract supplied, modified)

B. GENERAL ANALYSES

808
Carter, Luther J. ARMS CONTROL: DEMAND FOR DECISIONS. NUCLEAR WEAPONS . . . Science, v. 162, Dec. 6, 1968: 1102-1105.
Q1.S35, v. 162

Prospects for nuclear arms control measures have been lessened, although not eliminated, by the Czech crisis and the uncertainties associated with the forthcoming change of administration. Alarmed by the contempt for international law shown by the Soviet Union in its invasion of Czechoslovakia, a majority in the Senate, encouraged by President-elect Nixon, succeeded in delaying U. S. ratification of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Because of the absence of full U. S. commitment to the treaty, a number of other nations have not yet signed. The treaty's survival now depends on whether Nixon will push for its ratification in the next few months. Progress in reaching a U. S. - Soviet arms reduction agreement also depends on Nixon's attitudes. As a candidate, he emphasized the undesirability of a "security gap," but he also mentioned the need for a "stable military balance" and warned of the potential dangers from sudden breakthroughs in defense technology. If Nixon wants to curb the arms race and put the breaks on future military technological breakthroughs, he will have to discard his concern for the security gap and accept the concept of a rough strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States. Some officials believe that budgetary pressures may help push Nixon into seeing the logic of arms limitation measures. Nixon's policies will also be influenced by the makeup of the interagency advisory group on arms control affairs known as the Committee of Principals, his rapport with the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the attitudes toward disarmament of his science and national security affairs advisers, and the outcome of the continuing Senate battle between the prodisarmament members and the "cold war hardliners." Nixon's "attitude is the crucial determinant," however; one official observed that in view of the President-elect's past record he at least will not be accused "of being soft on communism" if he does decide to attempt to slow down the arms race.

809
DISARMAMENT. UN monthly chronicle, v. 5, Dec. 1968: 45-52. JX1977.A1U564, v. 5

Highlights the wide-ranging discussions on disarmament held by the U. N. Political and Security Committee during November 1968. Agenda items included reports by the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) on the question of general and complete disarmament, the need to suspend all nuclear tests, and the elimination of all military bases from Asia, Africa, and Latin America; a Soviet memorandum regarding measures to end the arms race and achieve disarmament; and the final document from the Conference of Nonnuclear-weapon States. In addition, the Committee considered draft resolutions that request the General Assembly to urge the ENDC to undertake negotiations on the disarmament measures in the Soviet memorandum, proposed that the Secretary General prepare a report on chemical and bacteriological weapons, asked the Secretary General to seek the views of member states on the registration and publication of all imports and exports of conventional armaments, urged adherence to the partial test ban treaty and consideration of broadening the treaty to include underground nuclear tests, and requested the ENDC to consider workable steps toward general disarmament. During the course of the debates several delegations lauded the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and urged its ratification.

810
Doernberg, Stefan. [RELATIONSHIP OF THE TWO GERMAN STATES--A CRUCIAL ISSUE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY] Das Verhältnis zwischen beiden deutschen Staaten--ein Kernproblem der europäischen Sicherheit. Dokumentation der Zeit; Informations-Archiv, v. 20, no. 410, 1968: 1-5. DD261.D4, v. 20

No stable European peace can be established without recognition of the basic political realities in Europe--the existence of two social systems and of the boundary that separates them in Germany and in Europe. Recognition of the territorial status quo, sovereignty, and equality of all European states is thus a prerequisite of such order, along with readiness for disarmament, for nuclear nonproliferation, for dissolving NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization, and for removal of foreign military bases. An important prerequisite is also the "condemnation of external European conflicts that, like the American aggression in Vietnam, directly endanger the world peace." The main obstacle to a European peace settlement is Bonn, the only European government that demands the change of territorial status quo in Europe. Bonn repeatedly rejected the German Democratic Republic's proposals for normalization of relations between the two German states and for helping to establish a European peace and security system. Although West Germany does not use Adenauer's and Erhard's cold war vocabulary, it still refuses to recognize the Oder-Neisse Line as the final boundary between Poland and Germany, West Berlin as an independent political entity, and another part of Germany as the second sovereign state of one German nation. The fact that two states comprise one nation offers "possibilities for common cultivation of cultural historical traditions," which may pave the way for future reunification of Germany.

811
Foster, William C. MORE WEAPONS--LESS SECURITY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 59, Nov. 18, 1968: 526-528.
JX232.A33, v. 59

"Excerpts from an address made before the Business Council at Hot Springs, Va., on Oct. 19," 1968.

Replies to those who fear that U.S. arms control policy may be inadvertently harmful to national security.

Foster reviews the record of U.S. arms control agreements from the limited test ban treaty to the nonproliferation treaty, and then turns to an analysis of the dynamics of the U.S. -Soviet arms race. He argues that in present circumstances a second-strike capability is the only reasonable goal for U.S. security policy, and not the "superiority" that is so often called for, which is either unattainable or irrelevant, depending on how one defines the term. A new upward spiral in the arms competition would increase defense costs for both sides by billions of dollars but would serve only to expand the destructive capabilities of both defense systems and multiply the danger that one side would be tempted to try a first strike. Thus more weapons would mean less security. There are risks in attempting to halt the arms race through negotiated limitations, and in assessing these risks it must be kept in mind that "powerful elements" in the Soviet Union felt compelled to use force to suppress freedom in Czechoslovakia. However, a delay in arms talks will strengthen these elements, while early discussions will encourage that "growing group in the Soviet Government which sees, as we do, that an arms race has no winners."

812
Gray, Charles H., Leslie B. Gray, and Glenn W. Gregory, comps. A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PEACE RESEARCH INDEXED BY KEY WORDS. Eugene, Or., General Research Analysis Methods [1968] 164 p. JX1904.5.G7
On cover: An information retrieval system.

A compiled bibliography of peace research. The references are arranged in the IBM "Key Word in Context" format, which allows rapid retrieval of titles dealing with any given subject.

813
Hamilton, Andrew. THE ARMS RACE: TOO MUCH OF A BAD THING. New York times magazine, Oct. 6, 1968: 34-35, 40, 44, 46, 49, 52. illus. AP2.N6575, 1968

The United States and the Soviet Union can agree to limit strategic weapons for their mutual benefit or begin a costly and dangerous new phase in the arms race. Short weeks ago the two superpowers were on the verge of announcing their intention to begin talks on these matters, but the invasion of Czechoslovakia disrupted the preparations. Now U.S. and Soviet forces are roughly in balance, since at present levels of armament a nuclear war would mean mutual suicide, no matter who struck first. Moreover, any attempt on either side to change this situation by achieving nuclear superiority would be self-defeating. It has taken a while for this truth to sink in, but if the relative strength of U.S. and Soviet forces in 1961 is compared with the relative strength of those two nations today the futility built into the dynamics of arms competition becomes clear enough. Nevertheless, improvements on both sides continue apace. The multiple independent reentry vehicles alone represent a revolutionary breakthrough in offensive capability, and the pressure mounts for other far-reaching innovations. Furthermore, steady advances in weapons technology require the efforts of a large number of people, who--once they are enlisted in the defense program--add their weight to the forces that give the arms race its built-in momentum. Certainly U.S. and Soviet arms control negotiators will have a tough job ahead of them if they ever get together.

814
Katerinich, V. NATO AND EUROPEAN WAR DANGER. International affairs (Moscow) no. 9, Sept. 1968: 21-27. D839.I465, 1968

Despite the constant talk about NATO's transformation into a political and economic instrument to ease the tension in Europe, a closer look at the practical measures taken by its leaders shows that the organization has not lost its character as a dangerous threat to European peace. The doctrine of "flexible response," adopted in December 1957, has increased the danger of nuclear war and has given the Bundeswehr a central position in NATO's newly developed forward line. The NATO strategists regard central Europe as a principal ground for the preparation of a potential attack against the Warsaw Treaty countries and are deploying the most powerful armed forces there. The Bundeswehr is being equipped with means to deliver the nuclear weapons of the American troops, which in the case of war will be transported to West Germany by way of the "big lift." Nuclear depots and air bases in West European countries, U.S. nuclear submarines carrying Polaris missiles, extensive maneuvers near the East German and Czechoslovak borders, and a naval blockade in the Atlantic and Mediterranean are all readied in support of a potential attack. Obviously there is no need for such extreme measures because West European countries are in no way threatened by the Socialist countries. But the dangerous actions of NATO prove how vitally important are limitation of the arms race and the disarmament and arms control measures proposed in the Soviet memorandum that was submitted to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament on July 16, 1968.

815
Kemp, Geoffrey. A NEW ARMS RACE? WILL U.S. POLITICS ESCALATE IT? Current, Oct. 1968: 60-64. AP2.C9259, 1968

While the political value of the U.S. -Soviet agreement on a nonproliferation treaty is undeniable, it would be unrealistic to expect any dramatic improvement in U.S. -Soviet relations generally. Furthermore, the long-term success of the treaty itself will depend in large degree on how well the two superpowers manage to bring their own nuclear arms race under control. At the moment, there are two major reasons for pessimism about the chances of stopping this vertical proliferation. The first relates to recent breakthroughs in the technology of antiballistic missiles and multiple offensive warheads, since the deployment of either of these systems is liable to introduce new instability into the strategic nuclear balance. The second concerns the growth of a political atmosphere in the United States that is increasingly hostile to attempts to slow down the projected growth of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Should there be a new arms race, and should the Soviet Union manage to hold its own vis-a-vis the United States, the outcome might not be destabilizing, and the only result would be a rise in defense costs for both sides. But if, as seems more likely, the Soviet Union fell behind, then the world would be propelled into a new era of nuclear brinkmanship. This danger can be avoided only by exerting political control over present demands for U.S. "superiority" in nuclear armaments. An open and intelligent debate on the issues is probably the best way to achieve this control, and, as participants in these discussions, members of the academic community will have a special responsibility to inform officials and the public of the facts about national defense and the arms race.

816
Kohler, Foy D. THE PROBLEMS WE FACE: AN INTRODUCTORY COMMENT. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Resources and needs of American diplomacy. Philadelphia, 1968. (Its Annals, v. 380, Nov. 1968) p. 1-8.
Hl. A4, v. 380

During the next decade, the United States will be facing new global problems unimaginable a few years ago. In attempting to forsee these problems, there are two uncertain factors: (1) the extent of domestic problems' effects on our international role and (2) the extent of isolationist trends engendered by the waning "devil" theory of communism and by the frustrations resulting from the Vietnam war. The realities of the 1970's should include: a continued bipolar world; attempts by the two superpowers to alter international power relationships; greater co-operation between them in areas where neither has an overriding interest; further narrowing of the gap between the superpowers and the secondary powers; greater influence of China in Asia, counterbalanced by her internal struggles and the influence of Japan and India; gravitation of the regional alliances toward politico-economic rather than military objectives; proliferation of nuclear weapons, increasing world instability; widening of the gap between the developed and less-developed nations, with resultant tensions and population problems; increased multilateral aid, accompanied by self-help; and intensified trade and balance-of-payments difficulties. Great change, with potential dangers, will be the keynote of the next decade, but change and opportunity go hand-in-hand. Bold, effective leadership will be needed to deal with the challenges of the 1970's. (Abstract supplied)

817
Morlan, Robert L. THE POLITICAL SCIENTIST AND POPULAR POLITICAL FALLACIES. Western political quarterly, v. 21, Sept. 1968: 377-382.
JA1. W4, v. 21

Political scientists know less about politics than they would like to know, but they certainly know more than many are willing to admit, and this knowledge should be put to use exposing the popular fallacies that infect American political life. A number of myths concerning American federalism ought to be laid to rest, as should the fallacious notion that the Federal Government is some sort of huge monolith. Civil liberties provide fruitful ground for the cultivation of harmful fallacies, and Government finance produces its share of elementary confusions. But today one great double fallacy overshadows every other in importance--the belief that peace can be secured either through increased armaments or through disarmament. Those who argue for peace through preparedness fail to see that deterrence cannot last forever; the arms race merely incites mutual fear and suspicion and thereby increases the danger of war. As for disarmament, it is hardly feasible, given the present political structure of the world. In any event, peace is a social and political problem, not a technical or military one. Peace can be secured only by moving the now sovereign nations of the globe toward the world rule of law. This may seem utopian, but in the nuclear age perhaps the advocate of world government is the only realist.

818
Pfaff, William. DECOUPLING THE FEAR FACTOR. Commonweal, v. 89, Nov. 15, 1968: 237-238.
AP2. C6897, v. 89

Although the United States and the Soviet Union are political rivals in Europe and in the Middle East and are struggling for influence in the Third World, a separate level of détente exists between the two countries relative to arms control and disarmament. The belief that Russo-American cooperation can be superimposed upon political rivalry reveals much about America's ambivalence toward Russia; "a conventional rhetoric of anti-Communist mobilization coexists with a confidence in reconciliation with Russia." In fact, Soviet-American competition is becoming an obsolete ritual, an inheritance of misunderstanding that will inevitably be removed, and the revisionist New Left and the anti-Chinese Communist Right in America are indicative of this trend. However, whether Russia or America can set limits on their own nuclear rivalry is unclear. Although the fear of nuclear war demands control of arms that makes it unprofitable for either power to go to war, political rivalry can drive a nation to seek a military advantage that would allow it to impose its will on another nation. The end of the nuclear rivalry between the superpowers is not imminent, but the United States believes a "world interest" in nuclear security exists that preempts any national interest. Russia, though, is a politically frustrated power, which adheres to a political doctrine that admits to no superior or supervening world interest. Therefore its intellectual and political ability to decouple (divorce politics from arms limitation) is very much in doubt. The United States, on the other hand, is able to decouple because it is not deeply interested in the Russian threat, and it has turned its emotions toward the Third World revolution.

819
Wagner, Wolfgang. [PARTITION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT: A CONSEQUENCE OF THE YALTA CONFERENCE?] Die Teilung des europäischen Kontinents: ein Ergebnis der Konferenz von Jalta? Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Nov. 10, 1968: 769-772.
D839. E86, v. 23

Analyzes De Gaulle's celebrated theory on the consequences of the Yalta Conference and points out that the partition of Europe is not as "symmetrical" a division between the two blocs as the French President describes. While the Warsaw Treaty Organization serves exclusively Soviet security and hegemony interests in Eastern Europe, NATO protects West European states in their own interest against the overpowering pressure of the Soviet Union. Wagner contends that Washington's attachment to the line dividing American and Soviet spheres of influence in Europe is so strong that Moscow felt sure there would be no American counteraction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. That predisposition of the American Government--not just the fact that the Government failed to react to the Soviet intervention--is "most horrifying."

820
Wittig, Peter. [CONTROL OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS] Die Kontrolle der atomaren Rüstungen. Köln, Heymann, 1967. 410 p. (Schriftenreihe der Hochschule für Politische Wissenschaften München, n. F., Heft 3)
JX1974. 7. W57 1967
Issued also as a thesis, Würzburg.

Partial contents. --Introduction: Criticism of nuclear weapons in terms of international law. Importance of arms control and disarmament. --pt. 1. Legal and political prerequisites of the control of nuclear armaments: Control of nuclear armaments according to

existing international law norms. Characteristics of negotiations on control of nuclear armaments. Disarmament policy of the most important powers. --pt. 2. Negotiations on control of nuclear armaments: The postwar period, 1945-1950. Transition period during the Korean War, 1950-1953. Disarmament efforts under new signs. Khrushchev at the height of his power. From the Cuban crisis till the present time, 1963-1965. --pt. 3. The concept and the real nature of control: The notion of control. The legal character of control.

Explores the legal, political, and military possibilities of a viable nuclear disarmament. Wittig concludes that, unlike in the past, war cannot now be a means for elimination of wars.

C. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

821
Alekseev, A. IMPORTANT INITIATIVE FOR DISARMAMENT. International affairs (Moscow) no. 9, Sept. 1968: 7-11. D839.I465, 1968

According to UNESCO data, world military expenditures have risen from $180 billion in 1965 to $225 billion in 1967; the Pentagon has requested $102 billion for the year 1969-70, double the amount spent in 1961-62; and there has been a substantial increase in the budget of other capitalist countries, especially West Germany. The only remedy to the growing arms race is disarmament. However, all the recently concluded agreements in this field are not adequate. Recognizing the urgent need for further disarmament agreements, the Soviet Union submitted on July 16, 1968, to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva radical disarmament measures such as the conclusion of agreements that would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, cease their manufacture, reduce stocks and destroy the existing nuclear weapons under appropriate international control; prohibition of underground tests; limitation and subsequent reduction of the means of delivery of strategic nuclear weapons; prohibition of flights of bombers with nuclear weapons beyond national frontiers; abolition of chemical and bacteriological weapons; establishment of nuclear-free zones; and the peaceful use of sea and ocean beds. The Soviet proposals are aimed at the achievement of general and complete disarmament; they are wider and more comprehensive than the American proposals and more convincing and consistent than the British program.

822
United Nations Association. DISARMAMENT: A POLICY AND A PLAN. London [1968] 16 p. JX1974.U54

Examines efforts toward disarmament, summarizes the United Nations Association's (UNA) disarmament policy, and provides statistics on the arms race. The UNA believes that working "for general and complete disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, under effective international supervision and control" is a great contribution to world peace, feels that the objective of general and complete disarmament should be kept in the forefront of international affairs, and promises to "do everything in its power to secure support for general disarmament among the public, in Parliament and in the Government." Further, the UNA pledges its support for partial measures--the nonproliferation treaty and freeze on ABM system development--that will lead to full disarmament and feels that opportunities for general disarmament should be sought in considerations of national defense.

823
Willot, Albert. [ESSAY ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT] Essai sur le désarmement nucléaire. Chronique de politique étrangère, v. 21, Sept. 1968: 577-627. D839.C82, v. 21

Considers various aspects of arms control and disarmament: the arms race, nuclear proliferation, the superpowers' self-restraint in arms production, and the role of nonnuclear powers in arms limitation. Willot maintains that the nonnuclear nations can play a decisive role in influencing the nuclear powers to disarm by launching a concerted diplomatic campaign that would endorse nuclear disarmament and reaffirm the need for general and complete disarmament (GCD). The author fears that ABM systems may negate the importance of the assured destruction concept and encourage a nuclear power to believe that it has a first-strike capability, and that this is possible even though the realiability of offensive weapons has traditionally outclassed the deterrence capabilities of ballistic missile defense systems. He concludes that it is impossible to eliminate completely all nuclear weapons before an international GCD agreement is reached.

V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

A. NEGOTIATION

824
Cousins, Norman. WHAT'S HAPPENING AT THE PEACE TALKS? [editorial] Saturday review, v. 51, Nov. 30, 1968: 32, 66.
Z1219.S25, v. 51

The American military in South Vietnam, by pushing for victory on the battlefield, has hindered previous attempts at peace and now threatens to disrupt the Paris negotiations. The proposed Warsaw talks collapsed in December 1966 because Hanoi was bombed. Although responsibility for this act has never been established publicly, it seems improbable that the President ordered the bombings; instead, the decision was probably made in the field with the knowledge of its effect on the proposed talks. Moreover, in inner-circle discussions the military has continuously counseled against a bombing halt. Today, some among the military are encouraging Saigon's opposition to a political settlement and are pressuring Washington for a bombing resumption and a drive for total victory. The result can only be disturbing for those who earnestly desire peace in Asia.

825
Drummond, Stuart. KOREA AND VIET NAM: SOME SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE INFLUENCES OF THE KOREAN WAR ON AMERICAN POLICY IN VIET NAM. Army quarterly, v. 97, Oct. 1968: 65-71.
U1.A85, v. 97

Parallels between U.S. strategy in the Korean War and in Vietnam indicate that the influences of the earlier war have determined U.S. policies in Vietnam. The result has not been auspicious. The type of war in Vietnam was wrongly diagnosed as conventional rather than guerrilla, and the value of air attacks on North Vietnam was badly overestimated. Two years of stalemated peace talks at Panmunjom conditioned the United States to seek negotiations with the Communists rather than military victory, but American troops have not sufficiently stabilized the Vietnam front so that negotiations can begin with both sides on equal footing. The condition of President Johnson's partial bombing halt requires that North Vietnam not increase the infiltration of the south above the normal level. This is not a concession by Hanoi, but merely an assurance against escalation. The north, therefore, holds all the options, and America is necessarily wary of peace negotiations under this circumstance.

826
Gérard, Francis. [FRANCE AND DISARMAMENT] La France et le désarmement. World federalist, Oct./Nov. 1968: 11-12.
JX1901.W825, 1968

Discusses the French Government's position on disarmament negotiations. The Government will enter only into negotiations that concern the destruction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles, the end of production of these weapons, permament control, regulation of all arms traffic, and reduction of conventional armaments. Gérard notes that France at first would negotiate only with the nuclear powers and concludes that the type of weapons control the French desire implies the creation of world-wide institutions, such as the International Court of Justice, that would have real, though limited, powers.

827
Henry, Edward E. A PLEA FOR COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. In American Bar Association. Journal, v. 54, Dec. 1968: 1187-1189. LL

Argues that compulsory arbitration is a flexible method for settling international disputes and recommends that the U.N. Charter be amended to provide for it. Lawyers at the World Peace Through Law Conference (1967) concluded that the International Court of Justice "could not be depended upon to meet great issues head on when the need for decisiveness was acute"; international disputes lend themselves to arbitration more readily than to judicial solutions. A peaceful means of settling disputes must be found "before we permit our scientific brethren to provide the ways and means of destroying mankind."

828
URGENT ISSUE [editorial] New times, no. 4, Jan. 29, 1969: 4-5. D839.N483, 1969

While the problems involved in negotiating a disarmament agreement are complex, they are not insurmountable, as is witnessed by the significant treaties already concluded. Russia has further proposed in the United Nations comprehensive measures to achieve "general and complete disarmament," which include abolition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Talks are hindered, however, by imperialist moves to strengthen the NATO military bloc, as well as delays effected by certain "influential circles" in some Western governments, "and the signs are that this obstruction will continue in the future as well." On January 20, 1969, the Soviet Foreign Ministry reaffirmed the Soviet Union's readiness to begin disarmament talks as soon as possible.

B. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

1. Escalation

2. Conventional Arms Transfers

829
Klein, Jean. [ARMS TRADE AND DISARMAMENT] Commerce des armes et désarmement. Politique étrangère, v. 33, no. 4, 1968: 351-359.
JX3.P6, v. 33

Traces great power disarmament efforts since World War I and examines the increase in arms trade and

dissemination among the Third World countries. Klein surveys several disarmament conferences and trends over the past years and notes that the dissemination of conventional weapons among the developing countries is related to the competition among industrial countries for reliable and profitable exports such as weapons. The author concludes that weapons proliferation among the developing countries is increasing at an alarming rate and must be controlled but that the principal obstacle to such control is the prestige of possessing sophisticated weapons.

830
PAKISTAN AND U.S.S.R. ARMS [editorial] Socialist congressman, v. 8, July 20, 1968: 3-4.
JQ298.S6A35, v. 8

Indo-Soviet friendship, a decisive factor in the maintenance of world peace and living proof of the validity of the principles of peaceful coexistence, is being threatened by Soviet arms shipments to Pakistan. These shipments might cause an arms race between India and Pakistan at a time when both countries should devote their full energies and resources to raising the living standard of their peoples. Furthermore, Pakistan may use Soviet arms shipments to extract more arms from the United States and Communist China; both countries would view Russia's appearance in Pakistan's affairs as a threat to their influence in Asia. Arms shipments to India, however, can be viewed as part of India's defense preparedness against China and Pakistan. Although Soviet arms shipments to Pakistan might evoke a rightwing reaction and harsh anti-Soviet feelings in India, Indo-Soviet amity is real and genuine and has come to stay.

831
Rajasekhariah, A. M., and V. T. Patil. SOVIET ARMS SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN: MOTIVES AND IMPLICATIONS. Modern review, v. 123, Oct. 1968: 706-710.
AP8.M6, v. 123

Now that the Russians have begun supplying arms to Pakistan, "India will have to adopt a less starry-eyed approach towards the Soviet Union." Eager to create the image of a big power that is "friendly to all and hostile to none," Moscow has found it in its best interests to place Pakistan and India on the same footing. Moreover, Russia may be trying to diminish U.S. and Chinese influence in Pakistan in order to strengthen its southern flank. The Soviet move is also interpreted as an attempt to prevent India from becoming the dominant power in Southeast Asia. Since the massive infusion of arms into Pakistan threatens India's security and may upset the military balance on the subcontinent, India must take steps to protect its national interests. Whether or not disillusionment with Russia will result in close relationships with the United States or China remains to be seen. However, it is obvious that it is in India's best interests to give up its "doctrinaire approach to the [policy] of nonalignment" and link its foreign policy "more effectively with the existing military and geopolitical realities."

3. Nuclear Proliferation

832
ABC'S OF THE NUCLEAR TREATY. U.S. news & world report, v. 65, Dec. 23, 1968: 39.
JX1.U65, v. 65

Questions and answers on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty that concern the obligations of the United States and other nations under the treaty, attitudes and probable reactions of the nonnuclear powers, methods of inspection, verification, and enforcement, and the effect of adherence on freedom to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

833
ATOM IN OVERALLS: THE SECOND SECTION OF THE ATOMIC POWER STATION GOING UP. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 15, Jan. 6, 1969: pt. 2, [item] 3, 1-2. Slav Rm
Translated from Izvestiia, Jan. 4, 1969.
Slav Rm

Reports the progress in construction of a second section of the Novo-Voronezh atomic power station, which began operation in August 1964, and includes data supporting the superiority of atomic energetics as a primary source of electric power. A. Grigoriants, Chief of the Atomic Power Station Administration, indicates that additional stations are planned for use in the near future, which will ultimately result in a power system based chiefly on atomic energy.

834
Beglov, Spartak. A TREATY CHEERED BY MILLIONS. Culture and life, no. 10, 1968: 6-7.
DK1.C8, 1968

The enemies of the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons maintain that only the members of the so-called nuclear club will profit from the treaty, to the detriment of the other countries. If these countries would look rationally and soberly at the problem, they would discover that their own national interests require nonproliferation. They would see that if each country possesses the bomb it soon will be used in local wars in the most unstable regions of the world and may easily bring about a holocaust. No such danger exists as long as only the nuclear powers possess the bomb. The nuclear powers do not belong to one political camp, and in the past the Soviet Union was able to frustrate the hope of the Western Powers that the bomb would be in their hands indefinitely and force them to consider the alternative of nuclear disarmament. The request for early negotiations leading to complete and general disarmament was one of the conditions many countries posed as a prerequisite of their signing the nonproliferation treaty. In response to this request the Soviet Union submitted to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva a memorandum containing proposals for urgent measures in the field of disarmament. But first the spread of nuclear weapons must be stopped, because their prohibition will be almost impossible to achieve once they get out of control.

835
Belovski, Dimče. SECURITY THROUGH DISARMAMENT. Review of international affairs, v. 19, Oct. 5, 1968: 4-7. D839.R4, v. 19

The inability of the great powers to grasp that an increasing number of countries want to participate in international affairs and unwillingness to adapt to this demand create a dangerous situation in the world. An unprecedented arms race still continues in an unstable world, and the use of pressure--including military interventions--is becoming a general phenomenon. The theory of spheres of interests serves only the

blocs and foments militarization. That leaves the independence of small and medium-sized countries in jeopardy. "The security of peace is inseparable from disarmament," and genuine disarmament requires participation on a universal basis, with respect for the interests of all countries and their rights to make independent and sovereign decisions without interference from outside. All nations should be represented in disarmament negotiations. The absence of China is a regrettable loss to the international community, and the same is true of other countries that were excluded from the negotiations without reasons. The U.N. Charter has provided the basic elements for the construction of a system of collective security, but no headway has been made for elaboration and application. What the world needs today is a security system that is not confined to meeting the nuclear danger but that covers all kinds of assaults on the independence and sovereignty of the countries and all violations of peace, such as local wars with conventional arms, that may lead to a general nuclear war. The efforts must be directed toward two ends--stopping the arms race, and disarmament. Yugoslavia has signed the nonproliferation treaty in full awareness of its gaps and shortcomings. The treaty must be improved, as it will eventually "find its rightful place in the system of measures for denuclearization of the great powers themselves." The great powers are bound to make this contribution to lasting peace because of their great responsibilities in the field. Finally, the Yugoslav Government believes that now is the time to consider an appropriate international convention to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons.

836
[BONN'S HARASSING FIRE AGAINST THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS] Bonner Störfeuer gegen den Atomwaffensperrvertrag. Dokumentation der Zeit; Informations-Archiv, v. 20, no. 408, 1968: 13-20. DD261.D4, v. 20

Citing German Federal Republic's policy pronouncements and numerous West German articles, the editors stress that West Germany is practicing obstructionism in regard to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The documentation also includes partial quotations from declarations by members of the East German Government on Bonn's campaign against the treaty.

837
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL. In its Issues before the 23rd General Assembly. New York, 1968. (International conciliation, no. 569) p. 27-46.
JX1907.A8, no. 569

Reviews arms control and disarmament issues debated during the 1967 session of the U.N. General Assembly and emphasizes the problem of nuclear nonproliferation. Attention is focused upon the Conference of Nonnuclear Weapon States (Geneva, Switzerland, August 29 to September 28, 1968) and its possible influence on the fate of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

838
Däniker, Gustav. [SWITZERLAND AND THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY] Die Schweiz und der Atomsperrvertrag. Flugwehr und -Technik; arme et technique de l'air, v. 30, Sept./Oct. 1968: 141-142.
TL503.F625, v. 30

The only asset of the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty is the hope it brings for nuclear nonproliferation and the diminished danger of nuclear wars among medium-sized and small nations. Because of their grave reservations to the treaty, several important states such as India, Brazil, and Argentina will most probably not sign it. Moreover, there is serious doubt among scientists about the effectiveness of international control provisions. The disadvantages of the treaty far outweigh its advantages. The treaty would divide the world into privileged and unprivileged classes of states, with the latter receiving nothing in return for their acceptance of the treaty but a superfluous commitment by nuclear-weapon signatories that they will not pass any atomic weapons to nonnuclear nations--something they surely do not want to do anyway. The nuclear powers' offering the draft of such a treaty clearly proves their complicity to perpetuate their hegemony in the world, their nuclear monopoly, and their arbitrariness in the use of this monopoly. The treaty would certainly fall far short of becoming an instrument to avert nuclear wars; more likely it would increase their danger. In an age of rapid technological change--as the Swiss Federal Council's aide memoire of November 1967 pointed out--a nonnuclear-weapon state cannot be expected "to let its hands be bound" for 25 years in the trust of big powers "who so far have hardly proved themselves worthy" of such extended trust. If Switzerland does not accede to the treaty, it will do so to preserve its freedom of action. No one will be able to accuse it of preparing nuclear war.

839
EUROPEANS SPIN A NUCLEAR FUEL PLAN. Business week, no. 2050, Dec. 14, 1968: 136, 138.
HC431.B87, 1968

The recent decision of the British, German, and Dutch Governments to pool their resources in the development of the gas centrifuge technique for separating fissionable uranium-235 from nonfissionable uranium-238 could have alarming consequences. By providing a relatively cheap method of producing weapons-grade uranium, the centrifuge process increases the danger of nuclear-weapons proliferation. Moreover, it introduces an additional note of uncertainty into the potential makeup of the nuclear-weapons club, thus jeopardizing the successful ratification of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Although the centrifuge technique for enriching uranium has been known for years, most nuclear experts in the early stages of the nuclear era considered it less promising than the expensive gaseous diffusion method for producing large quantities of fissionable materials. However, beginning with the invention of a high efficiency gas centrifuge by a West German in 1960, the productive capacity of the centrifuge method has been greatly improved. The centrifuge group will probably begin with the construction of a common-ownership centrifuge plant in Holland, which is expected to be completed by 1972 at a cost of $100 million. The Anglo-Dutch-German venture should arouse mixed reactions in the United States. Now U.S. industry representatives will probably try to persuade the U.S. Government to lift its ban on the private development of gas centrifuges. Many Washington officials, however, fear that the spread of a new process for producing fissionable nuclear materials could heighten the danger of nuclear-weapons proliferation. Thus Senator Mike Mansfield has urged the immediate U.S. ratification of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in order to prod other hesitant nations into signing it as soon as possible.

840
Fenoaltea, Sergio. NON-PROLIFERATION AND EUROPE. Interplay of European/American affairs, v. 2, Nov. 1968: 13-14, 38.
P&GP RR

Advocates of European unity fear that the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) will deal a fatal blow to European unification and will adversely affect some Western states once it is in force. The treaty sanctions a special position for Great Britain and France in Europe and, consequently, discourages these nuclear powers from merging into a united Europe lest they forfeit their privileged positions. This makes it impossible for Britain and France to surrender their nuclear role to an international European community, and, because of the impossibility of merging the defense structures of these countries with those of non-nuclear European states, the formation of a European defense community is unrealistic. The NPT also fosters nationalism in Europe, and this is a complete reversal of U.S. European policy, which has consistently aimed at European unification since the Marshall plan. The argument that the NPT would not prevent a European federation from having nuclear weapons lacks political substance. Secretary of State Dean Rusk has noted that the treaty "would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components." However, no provision in the treaty allows any federation of states to acquire the nuclear power of its members, and, since a European federation is a remote possibility, the argument is largely academic. Furthermore, to argue that the treaty does not prevent a European union from having nuclear power is incompatible with the fact that it perpetuates the privileged positions of Britain and France.

841
Foster, William C. OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 59, Dec. 16, 1968: 637-643. JX232.A33, v. 59
"Statement in Committee I (Political and Security) on Nov. 19," 1968.

Outlines U.S. views on matters related to the nonproliferation treaty. Foster devotes the major part of this statement to a discussion of information exchange, technical assistance and training, capital assistance, fissionable material supply, and other aspects of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On the security issue, he rejects proposals "to erect separate universal security guarantees alongside the United Nations framework." He takes note of the fact that some states consider the three-power security assurances offered through the Security Council to be inadequate but points out that for the United States the declaration was "a seriously considered political act which indicates how we intend to respond in the circumstances described," and it would be neither responsible nor credible for a government to "obligate itself to take military action automatically in a wide and unspecified variety of contingencies." On the question of additional arms control measures, Foster reminds the Committee of the projected U.S.-Soviet talks on limiting missile systems and also of the "events [that] intervened which forced a postponement of these talks." He expresses approval of the provisional agenda of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) and of the priority it gives to work on measures to halt the nuclear arms race. The United States would also like to see the ENDC explore the feasibility of a prohibition against emplacing weapons of mass destruction on the ocean floor, and it supports the ENDC request that the Secretary General prepare a technical report on the possible effects of the use of chemical and biological means of warfare.

842
Gilinsky, Victor, and Bruce L. R. Smith. CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER AND FOREIGN POLICY. Orbis, v. 12, fall 1968: 816-830.
D839.O68, v. 12

Although it is popular to ascribe reluctance to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) to military aspirations, many nonnuclear nations believe the NPT's provisions, specifically article 3, cannot adequately protect their commercial interests in civilian nuclear power. Indeed, such objections "represent the serious concern of important countries." The prospects for commercial use of nuclear energy are bright, and major industrial countries are planning for the transition of their economies to substantial dependence on nuclear fuels. This shift will have far-reaching implications for developing acceptable means to control and prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from civilian to military use, and unless these means are found the opportunities for nuclear-weapons development will increase tenfold. The growth of foreign nuclear electric power will also necessitate a reevaluation of U.S. policies toward foreign civilian nuclear technology. Since the United States cannot control the rapid growth of foreign nuclear energy facilities, two proposals concerning inspection and enrichment facilities have been suggested. An alternative to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection could be IAEA certification of multinational or regional inspection systems such as Euratom. The IAEA could "standardize inspection procedures, train inspectors and check on procedure, but it would not itself carry out inspection." Although the scheme is not foolproof, its flexibility might permit more effective inspection. The question of enrichment facilities is tied to an understandable reluctance in Europe and Japan to remain dependent on the United States for enriched uranium. The United States should support foreign gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge programs "provided that they are organized on a multinational basis and are economically justified." Attempts to block or hinder these programs fail to satisfy the reasonable aspirations of industrial states for vigorous civilian nuclear power development.

843
Holyoake, Keith. FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTS H-BOMB EXPLOSION. In New Zealand. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs review, v. 18, Aug. 1968: 48-49. JX1591.A35, v. 18

Prime Minister Keith Holyoake deplores France's 1968 H-bomb test series in the South Pacific. New Zealand's primary objection to the French tests is that they fly "in the face of the clear international trend in the last few years towards limiting the spread of [nuclear] weapons." In addition, New Zealand has established a monitoring network to check on the possible health hazards arising from the French tests, and although there is no evidence to suggest that the tests have caused such hazards, the New Zealand Government will continue to keep a close watch on the situation.

844
IS RED CHINA'S H-BOMB A 'PRODUCT' OF THE WEST? Atlas, v. 16, Dec. 1968: 22-24. illus.
API. A83, v. 16
Reprinted from Mainstream, New Delhi.
Newsp

Japan, Switzerland, and West Germany are helping Communist China to become a nuclear power by supplying it with the strategic equipment it needs. Japan is exporting to China special brands of wire, vibro-testing installations, refractory materials for rocket warheads, and computers for missile-testing ranges. In addition, Japanese suppliers assemble and install their equipment, ensure its maintenance and repairs, provide spare parts, and assist in training Chinese personnel. Japanese engineers have even been sent to China to work on equipment used during nuclear tests. Although West Germany is second to Japan in the exportation of strategic materials to China, every German corporation is involved in supplying China with strategic equipment. Swiss corporations are working through dummy firms that are supplying China while Peking maintains its main European intelligence network in Switzerland. A U.S. Government report is calling for a revision in the trade relations between the free world and China, but the governments involved in this trade are hesitant to change the status quo. In fact, there is evidence that Japan and West Germany are coordinating their secret technical aid to China. The leaders of both countries seem willing to forget that a nuclear China is a menace not only to Asia and the Third World but to the whole of mankind.

845
Johnson, Lyndon B., Pres. U.S. PRESIDENT URGES SENATE ACTION ON NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 59, Nov. 4, 1968: 469-470.
JX232. A33, v. 59

President Johnson's radio and television statement of October 11, 1968, urging prompt Senate ratification of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The President asserts that the treaty is neither a "gift" to the Soviet Union nor "a matter of bridge-building," but rather an agreement with the Soviet Government "in our own interest which they happened to share for their own reasons." He expresses fear that if the treaty is not ratified promptly forces opposing it in other countries will gain strength, and some other states will find it more in their interest to acquire nuclear weapons.

846
Klein, Jean. [TOWARD THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY] Vers le traité de non-prolifération. Politique étrangère, v. 33, no. 2-3, 1968: 225-250.
JX3. P6, v. 33

The nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is an objective that the international community has pursued for many years. In January 1968, negotiations entered a decisive phase when the United States and the Soviet Union submitted common drafts of the treaty. The text was not approved by all the members of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament and was rejected by West Germany. One does not know if the treaty will be presented for signature at the end of the present debate in the U.N. General Assembly, but its adoption will have significance only if it is put in the perspective of general and complete disarmament. (Translation of supplied abstract)

847
Nelin, Iu. [THE ATOM AND NATO: PARTNERSHIP AND CONTRADICTIONS] Atom i NATO: partnerstvo i protivorechiia. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 11, 1968: 51-60.
HC10. M5357, 1968

Translated in full in Daily Review, Translations From the Soviet Press, v. 14, Dec. 13, 1968, supplement, [item] 1, p. 1-13, and in Reprints From the Soviet Press, v. 7, Dec. 27, 1968, p. 37-52.
Slav Rm

The policy of ignoring and undermining the nonproliferation treaty, pursued by the West German government, has as its main aim [the] development of atomic industry for military purposes. This is in a great degree favoured by "atomic" cooperation of the NATO countries. The cooperation is carried out in three forms: 1) bilateral and multilateral state agreements for cooperation in the atomic energy field; 2) state-monopolistic union (Euratom); 3) cooperation of private monopolies. Of the three forms, the latter is especially dangerous as being most uncontrollable. Development of atomic industry in the NATO countries resulted in intensification of atomic contradictions among the countries of this military alliance. (Abstract supplied, modified)

848
Niu, Sien-chong. THE NIGHTMARE OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 13, Aug./Sept. 1968: 84-87. UA646. F5, v. 13

Under existing circumstances nuclear proliferation is almost inevitable. As the technical and financial barriers to the development of nuclear weapons decrease, more and more nations will seriously consider acquiring them. They may be attracted to the nuclear club by the desire for self-reliance or to enhance national prestige, and they may be influenced by the deterrent and coercive value of a national nuclear force. The nonproliferation treaty so ardently pursued by the United States is by no means a solution to this problem because it contains no enforcement provisions for preventing nations from "going nuclear." Further, its enactment would weaken NATO by preventing the development of a multilateral nuclear force and would prevent countries from defending themselves against potential Russian and Chinese aggression. While guarantees against nuclear blackmail would probably inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons more effectively than a nuclear nonproliferation treaty, they are difficult to conclude. Most nations would be skeptical of the credibility of such guarantees and reluctant to rely on others for their security. Thus, until the nuclear powers are willing to reduce their own nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons are unlikely to remain the "exclusive property of a favored few." However, the consequences of proliferation do not necessarily have to be as disastrous as some experts predict. Global security will not be seriously threatened if nations such as Sweden or Switzerland acquire the bomb. Moreover, even less stable nations "may find their recently acquired weapons to be more of a source of restraint than a means of aggression." The adverse effects of nuclear proliferation could be further reduced by U.S. efforts to ensure that its allies obtain nuclear weapons before their potential enemies acquire them. "Against the combined strength of the United States and its nuclear allies," minor nuclear powers "could hardly upset the existing balance of the contemporary world."

849
THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY--GROWTH AND PROSPECTS. Washington atomic energy report and the atomic energy guideletter, v. 14, Dec. 16, 1968: 1-3.
HD9698.U5W3, v. 14

Briefly surveys various Plowshare programs and maintains that, while the outlook for developing the peaceful applications of nuclear energy is bright, these applications may be easily converted to military use. Therefore, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system should be supported.

850
Oboussier, Felix. [EURATOM AND THE TREATY ON NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS] Euratom und der Kernwaffen-Sperrvertrag Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Aug. 25, 1968: 571-580.
D839.E86, v. 23

Accession to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty by a member of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) could adversely affect the member's position in Euratom or even undermine the organization itself, given three conditions: the treaty content now recommended by the U.N. General Assembly; the Euratom treaty as it now stands; and abstention by one or more Euratom members, especially nonnuclear-weapon states, from the nonproliferation treaty. A Euratom member, obligated by the nonproliferation treaty not to transfer any fissionable material to any nonnuclear-weapon state without the safeguards required by article 3 of this treaty, would violate the Euratom treaty if he discriminated against any Euratom member that refused to comply with the safeguards provisions. Chapter 9 of the Euratom treaty secures the Euratom members a completely free market of such materials, and article 93 prohibits the members from individually restricting the market in any sense. Proposed supervision of Euratom's safeguards system by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) poses the difficult problem of reconciling Euratom's control provisions with those of the IAEA. However, there are circumstances in which the accession of a Euratom member to the nonproliferation treaty would not contravene his obligations under the Euratom treaty: if all other nonnuclear-weapon members signed the nonproliferation treaty; if the Euratom safeguards and control system remained in operation unchanged; if there were a special agreement between the IAEA and Euratom limiting international control to fissionable materials and exempting nuclear installations; if the IAEA's supervisory function were limited to verification of Euratom control; and if no deadline were set up by the nonproliferation treaty for automatically starting IAEA supervision over safeguards and the Euratom control system.

851
THE PEACEFUL ATOM AS AN INTERNATIONAL BOND. Nuclear news, v. 11, Dec. 1968: 10-14. illus.
QC770.N75, v. 11

Reports on the 1968 International Conference on the Constructive Uses of Atomic Energy and the concurrently held industrial trade show, AtomFair '68. The report summarizes the major points of discussion in the plenary sessions and in addresses by Glen Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Representative Craig Hosmer, ranking minority member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Highlights of the plenary session on international safeguards were a comparison of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and European Atomic Energy Community safeguards systems, a call for further progress in safeguards instrumentation and technology, and reassurances to industrialists concerning the costs of the safeguards procedures to inspected facilities. Hosmer called for prompt ratification of the nonproliferation treaty and enactment of the Plowshare legislation he has proposed but expressed reservations on the cost of implementing the IAEA safeguards. He estimated that the cost of about $1 billion may be too great a financial burden for the safeguards system.

852
THE PENDING NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. Congressional digest, v. 48, Jan. 1969: 1-9, 32.
JK1.C65, v. 48

Contents.--The foreword.--Nuclear disarmament efforts since 1945.--Related U.S. & international agencies.--Text of the nonproliferation treaty.--Congress action to date on the treaty.

Background material relating to the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The events leading up to the conclusion of the treaty are traced from the immediate post-World War II years, beginning with the unsuccessful Baruch plan for placing nuclear weapons in the hands of an international authority. The next section briefly profiles the governmental agencies most concerned with the pending treaty, including the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the U.S. Defense Atomic Support Agency, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is followed by the text of the treaty as signed by President Johnson on July 1, 1968, and a summary of Senate action on the treaty. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended ratification, the Democratic leadership was concerned about the prospects for its approval and failed to call it up for formal Senate debate before the adjournment of the 90th Congress. In accordance with Senate rules, the treaty will automatically be brought up for consideration by the 91st Congress but first must be rechanneled through committee.

853
PRO AND CON DISCUSSION: SHOULD THE U.S. SENATE CONSENT NOW TO RATIFICATION OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY? Congressional digest, v. 48, Jan. 1969: 10-31.
JK1.C65, v. 48

Reports views expressed before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding U.S. ratification of the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty and presents the texts of the committee's majority and minority reports on the treaty. In its majority report the committee recommended approval of the treaty, claiming it represented a significant step toward further arms control measures. This opinion was supported by statements from Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Representative Chet Holifield, and the Chairman of the Educational Committee to Halt Atomic Weapons Spread, Arthur Larson. The minority report urged delaying U.S. action on the treaty until its implications are more fully assessed. It was backed up by statements from Senator Thomas Dodd, Representative Craig Hosmer, Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé, Director of the Foreign Policy Research

Institute at the University of Pennsylvania, and Stanley M. Andrews, National Executive Secretary of the Americans for National Security.

854
Sacher, Wilhelm. [THE STATE AND THE WORLD OF STATES AT THE CROSSROADS; REFLECTIONS ON THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (continuation and conclusion)] Staat und Staatenwelt am Scheideweg; Überlegungen zum Atomwaffensperrvertra (Fortsetzung und Schluss). Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau; Zeitschrift für die europäische Sicherheit, v. 18, Sept. 1968: 486-496.
U3.W485, v. 18

Pt. I was abstracted in v. 5, no. 1, of this bibliography as item 356.

It is a truism that an oligopoly leads to an infringement on the rights of its nonmembers by its members. Nothing indicates that this will change in regard to the oligopoly on nuclear weapons established by the proposed nonproliferation treaty. Any justification of such an oligopoly that refers to a recklessness attributable only to small nations is invalid. After all, wars by proxy are of the big powers' making. Most importantly, an oligopoly is more conducive to nuclear war than an eventual multitude of nuclear-weapon states would be. In the absence of nuclear disarmament, the more nuclear-weapon states there are, the greater are the chances of a chain reaction to nuclear aggression and thus of unbearable consequences to the aggressor. Genuine disarmament is institutionally unattainable in a world marked by power politics, inequality, and injustice among nations. Nuclear armaments seem to be a must for particularly endangered nations such as Germany, India, Israel, Japan, South Africa and the neutrals. Consideration of the potential economic spin-off effect of such armaments also favors the industrial nonnuclear-weapon states' embarking on nuclear arms production since it would be asking too much of the oligopoly's natural behavior to have the spin-off effect of the big powers' nuclear armaments truly shared with other parties to the treaty. The treaty represents, in fact, the power politics of two or three major nations in disguise. What its sponsors claim to be the balance of power is a fixation by the superpowers of the division of their global interests. The leasing of the fate of 3 billion people to the leaders of 400 million would be an impossible situation to last for very long.

855
Sagdeev, R. TO THE OCEAN OF ENERGY. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 15, Jan. 6, 1969: pt. 2, [item] 3, 3-4.
Slav Rm

Translated from Izvestiia, Jan. 3, 1969.
Slav Rm

Explains the exigency of a comprehensive knowledge of plasma physics to the successful construction of a thermonuclear reactor. A reactor "would rid mankind [of] the power hunger danger for all time" by controlling the energy of thermonuclear reactions. An abortive attempt to build a reactor 15 years ago demonstrated that an understanding of plasma physics is essential, but some feel research is now sufficiently advanced for another attempt at a reactor.

856
Shestov, V. CONFERENCE OF NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES. International affairs (Moscow) no. 11, Nov. 1968: 28-30. D839.I465, 1968

Summarizes the proceedings of a conference of over 90 nonnuclear nations at the Geneva Palace of Nations, which includes statements for and against the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Among issues discussed were security guarantees and the peaceful use of atomic energy with respect to nonnuclear countries interested in a viable international sharing of materials and technology. The conference wisely defeated a resolution to make itself into a permanent mechanism whose end result would have been a realinement of nations in terms of nuclear and nonnuclear and the creation of an unrealistic alliance of imperialist and Socialist states. The convention demonstrated that the nonproliferation treaty enjoys substantial support as the first serious step to disarmament.

857
Sinha, K. K. INDIA'S NUCLEAR DILEMMA. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Oct. 1968: 50-55. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 48

Indian complacency about nuclear weapons has been shaken by two recent events--the opening of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) for signature and the report that China intends to test fire its nuclear missile across Indian territory. India suddenly finds itself in the dilemma of having to find adequate, noncontradictory responses to pressure from the superpowers to sign the NPT and to the Chinese nuclear threat, which is rapidly developing on its northern border. India's first reaction may be to opt immediately for a national nuclear deterrent, but a little thought will shown this course to be unprofitable. A second plan--to sign the treaty in exchange for a security guarantee negotiated with the superpowers--would be difficult to carry through in present circumstances and would not be effective in guarding against the Chinese conventional threat in any case. Furthermore, the outcome of this kind of agreement would be perpetual second-class national status for India. Only one other possibility presents itself: if the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be avoided in a way that will guarantee the security of every nation without infringing upon any state's equality or self-respect, a world authority with adequate power to enforce world law will have to be created, preferably through a restructuring of the United Nations. This is the only reasonable course for the world to follow, and India should use this line of argument to resist superpower pressure to sign the NPT.

858
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. In Australia. Dept. of External Affairs. Current notes on international affairs, v. 39, June 1968: 234-240. JX1162.A33, v. 39

Background of the draft treaty, the steps in its development, the final text of the treaty as opened for signature, the resolution on security assurances, and the Australian view of the treaty. The Australian Ambassador to the United Nations, Patrick Shaw, stated that the Australian Government "is prepared to vote for a resolution endorsing the draft treaty." Despite U. N. approval of the treaty, however, it may be some time before safeguards agreements are concluded, and it becomes operational.

859
U.S. Dept. of State. Office of Media Services. THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS [by] Dean Rusk [and others] Text of draft treaty. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968. 21 p. ([U.S.] Dept. of State. Publication 8385. General foreign policy series, 224) JX1974.7.U55

Reprint from the Department of State Bulletin, v. 58, Mar. 25 and May 20, 1968. Annotated as item 1276 in v. 4, no. 3, and items 1692, 1695, and 1709 in v. 4, no. 4, of this bibliography.

Contents.--Gaining the full measure of the benefits of the atom, by Dean Rusk.--U.S. calls for prompt endorsement by the U.N. General Assembly of the draft treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, by Arthur J. Goldberg.--Text of draft treaty.--The nuclear nonproliferation treaty--a vital step in bringing the atom under control, by Nicholas B. Katzenbach.--United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union propose security assurances resolution, by William C. Foster.

Examines both the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the security guarantees to nonnuclear nations. Statements by American public officials emphasize the treaty's importance for future world security.

860
Waldheim, Kurt. [AUSTRIA AND THE TREATY ON NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS] Österreich und der Atomsperrvertrag. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 6, July/Aug. 1968: 225-228. P&GP RR

Weighs the advantages and disadvantages for small nations of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Waldheim considers criticism justified that the absence of effective guarantees by nuclear-weapon signatories to nonnuclear-weapon ones constitutes the treaty's serious defect. On the whole, however, the advantages to Austria of the treaty surpass its disadvantages. The Austrian Government deems that an early signing of the treaty by Austria and other nations would contribute importantly to ensuring world peace.

4. Other (Accidental War, Command of Weapons, etc.)

861
Devaux, Pierre. [WILL THE ABM SAVE OUR CIVILIZATION?] Les antimissiles sauveront-ils notre civilisation? Revue française de l'élite européenne, no. 214, Sept. 1968: 27-34. illus. AP20.R244, 1968

Discussess the reliability and desirability of an ABM system in relation to the spiraling arms race between the superpowers and the technological advances in ballistic weaponry. Devaux notes that the ABM provides no meaningful defense against incoming ballistic missiles. He believes a nonproliferation treaty and an entente between the superpowers can stop the arms race and that the Russians have demonstrated their desire to do both by their insistence on holding arms limitations discussions with the United States.

862
McKinney, John B. THE ARMY'S MINIATURE AT&T. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Nov. 1968: 69-75. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 48

The most significant achievement in the communications buildup in Vietnam is the Southeast Asia Wideband System (SEAWBS). The backbone of this system is the Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWBCS), a multichannel system designed especially for Southeast Asia that employs the most advanced communication devices known and "connects with the Army Area Communications System thus extending SEAWBS circuits to United States and Free World tactical subscribers down to infantry brigade level." Many IWBCS sites are located in Vietcong territory and have to be heavily guarded against enemy terrorists. Although the IWBCS furnishes trunks for a secure Southeast Asia telephone system, there are two major problems in the operation of the network: limited responsiveness of the logistic system and a lack of qualified and trained personnel.

863
THE MALLARD PROJECT. Signal, v. 23, Nov. 1968: 1-112. illus. UG1.M65, v. 23

Entire issue devoted to the Mallard Project.

Contents.--A statement from the Chief of Army Research and Development, by Austin W. Betts.--The Mallard Project--an editorial, by W. J. Baird.--Mallard program/project managers.--Mallard--its direction and control, by Paul A. Feyereisen.--The Mallard user--meeting his needs, by R. K. Tanner.--The technical issues in Mallard, by P. J. Kenny and George Silverman.--Industry participation in Mallard, by E. M. Pritchard and J. D. Sinnett.--Common communications standards--influence on system design, by Edward Kovanic.--1969 AFCEA Convention.--Configuration management from the start--Mallard, by G. W. Engel.--In-house cooperation with Mallard, by R. D. Strock.--Selection of the Mallard design, by Loren Diedrichsen.--1968 Military Academy award winners.--AFCEA chapter man of the month.

Articles describing the Mallard Project, a modern standardized tactical communications system in which the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and Canada are actively engaged. Mallard, whose objective is to provide modern communications equipment for use in tactical warfare for the period 1975-77, represents the largest and most involved communications project for tactical pruposes ever undertaken.

C. REGIONAL

1. Tension Areas

864
Adams, Michael. THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Political quarterly, v. 39, Oct./Dec. 1968: 427-438. JA8.P72, v. 39

The failure of all attempts to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute is not surprising in view of the deeply rooted mutual distrust that divides the antagonists. The dispute originated in the Zionist decision to go beyond the terms of the Balfour Declaration in order to found in Palestine not a "national home" as contemplated in the declaration but a Jewish state. It was advanced another stage when the Zionists succeeded in establishing the State of Israel and, in three wars, occupying all the territory once belonging to Palestine, in clear violation of the United Nations partition order of 1947, which called for the creation of both Jewish and Arab states in that area. The injustices suffered by the Arabs in these events is undeniable, and any

permanent solution to the dispute must take account of that fact. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the present Jewish state--won in the United Nations and on the battlefield--is equally undeniable, and that fact too will have to be accounted for. Three steps will be necessary to achieve a solution that will safeguard the legitimate interests of all parties. First, it will have to be made clear to the disputants that the international community, acting through the United Nations, intends to enforce its will. Second, extremist elements on both sides will have to be suppressed. Third, the Palestinian Arabs will have to be readmitted to Palestine and a new binational state created. This solution will require the Arabs to abandon a pose that is heroic but futile and the Israelis to compromise on an ideal, but since this is the only solution that promises both justice and peace, it is in the interest of both parties to make the required sacrifices.

865
Buzzard, Anthony, Sir. ISRAEL AND THE ARABS: THE WAY FORWARD. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 8, winter 1968: 299-303. UG635.G7A1252, v. 8
Pts. 1 and 2 were abstracted as item 374 in v. 5, no. 1, of this bibliography.

Only slight progress has been made toward soothing the tensions in the Middle East that led to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Neither the Arabs nor the Israelis can be persuaded to accept the U.N. Security Council resolution calling for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" in exchange for Arab acceptance of Israel's right to live in peace and utilize international waterways. Although Israel's military superiority will probably continue for some time, a prolonged delay in reaching a settlement does not favor the Israeli position. Russia has already replaced most of the Egyptian and Syrian arms lost during the 1967 war and through its aid programs to the Arab States is rapidly gaining influence in this area at the expense of the West. Western nations should attempt to improve their relations with the Arabs in order to reduce the latters' reliance on the Soviet Union and should encourage the installation of stabilizing defensive arms instead of offensive weapons. Furthermore, "since it is in Israel's long term interest to withdraw in exchange for Arab recognition," the West should work out a system of guarantees for whatever boundaries are finally accepted by both sides. Although a superpower guarantee would prove most effective, attempts should also be made to work out a guarantee by some intermediate force in case the former fail to reach agreement. France and Great Britain could best fulfill this role and should assume the responsibility, "having originally caused this Middle-East issue." Unless Anglo-Franco assurances can be achieved, "there is likely to be another Arab/Israeli war in due course, and if America has to go to Israel's assistance with Russia still backing the Arabs only, the stage will be set for the nuclear war which nobody wants."

866
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. MIDDLE EAST. In its Issues before the 23rd General Assembly. New York, 1968. (International conciliation, no. 569) p. 12-23. JX1907.A8, no. 569

Outlines U.N. efforts to obtain a Middle East settlement and considers prospects for peace in the area. Today the possibility of a peaceful settlement remains slight; progress depends on the U.N. Special Representative's efforts, the policies of the parties directly involved, and the "determination of the rest of the world, particularly the United States and the USSR, to promote a settlement."

867
Chona, P. R. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. Indian & foreign review, v. 5, Apr. 15, 1968: 17-18. D839.I453, v. 5

The dilemma of the Middle East situation is, Which should come first, withdrawal or negotiation? Egypt has made clear that it will not negotiate until Israel recognizes the Security Council's resolution that calls for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, and Israel is making no commitments about withdrawal. The Arabs blame Israel's intransigence on the failure of the U.N. peace mission, but most observers note that the Arab States have refused to negotiate since the Khartoum summit meeting--2 months before the Council's resolution was adopted. The impasse between the belligerents leads one to conclude that another war is inevitable and that the disagreement is not about whether there will be war, but when. Soviet arms shipments, Arab defense preparedness, the increasing hostility and aggressiveness of the Arabs in the occupied territories, and the various Arab guerrilla organizations are proof that peace in the Middle East will be ephemeral.

868
Cohen, Geula. MOSHE DAYAN ON PEACE AND WAR: AN INTERVIEW. Midstream, v. 14, Dec. 1968: 46-51. DS149.A336, v. 14

An interview which recently appeared in the Hebrew daily Ma'ariv.

Conversation between Israeli journalist Geula Cohen and Israel's Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan concerning various aspects of Arab-Israeli relations. Dayan maintains that the real obstacle to peace in the Middle East is the Arab refusal to recognize Israel's existence, not the Israeli refusal to return occupied territories. He argues that, while the Israelis must never despair of ultimate peace, they must face reality: despite their concessions they "have been unable to get [the Arabs] to really make peace, that is, to come to terms with [Israel's] existence as an acceptable neighbor."

869
Cook, C. P. INDIA: THE CRISIS IN ASSAM. World today, v. 24, Oct. 1968: 444-448. D410.W63, v. 24

Once again events in Assam and Nagaland are drifting toward a tragic crisis. Assam itself is a unity in name only. The Mizo separatist movement is the strongest centrifugal force at work there, but it has been estimated that the present state would need to be divided into at least seven independent entities to satisfy all of the conflicting ethnic demands being made upon it. In the past, settlement proposals from New Delhi have been frustrated by the opposition of intensely conservative Annamese, but more recently a militant and virulently nationalistic Annamese underground has grown up that will make finding a workable solution even more difficult. In Nagaland, although open rebellion has been halted with a temporary cease-fire, inflammatory statements from both sides keep the situation unstable. The Naga movement is itself threatened with a scarcely affordable internal split over the question of Chinese Communist aid and training for rebel units. In this respect, formation of the moderate, anti-Chinese United Front of Nagaland is a hopeful development for both Indian and Naga interests, but it is far too early to say what its influence will be.

Unless a solution to these problems is found, India will soon find itself entangled in protracted guerrilla warfare in a vitally important strategic border area. Recent compromise offers by New Delhi do hold out some hope of agreement between the central government and moderate separatist elements, even though these concessions fall far short of the independence that is being demanded, but which India cannot concede.

870
Crawshaw, Nancy. CYPRUS AFTER KOPHINOU. World today, v. 24, Oct. 1968: 428-435.
D410.W63, v. 24

The Kophinou incident, which brought Turkey and Greece perilously close to war, changed dramatically the course of the Cyprus dispute. For one thing, it forced the Greek Cypriots to abandon their earlier stand on enosis. For another, it strengthened the position of President Makarios while undermining that of his strongest rival, Grivas, who is now immobilized in Athens. In March, Makarios lifted the last of the restrictions on the Turks, but they remained suspicious of Greek intentions. Since then, however, incidents between the two communities have been handled with restraint on both sides, and through the patient efforts of the U. N. representative talks have been started on general principles for a new constitution. The wide gap in living standards between the Greeks and Turks--exacerbated by the damage done to Turkish property during the violence and the crowding of the Turks together in larger groups for security--is a chronic source of tension. Accordingly, fair compensation and a mutual settlement of debts would be a welcome step. Racial hostility is kept alive by school texts and provocative official statements on both sides, and there are still too many Cypriots under arms. In these circumstances, it may prove impossible to find a means of guaranteeing the security of the apprehensive Turks. Nevertheless, the outlook is encouraging in some respects. There is less chance now of a direct clash between Greece and Turkey should fighting break out again on the island. Moreover, responsible Greek Cypriots have come to recognize that the Zurich settlement can be revised only with Turkish concurrence, while the Turks for their part now accept the need for change.

871
Doumas, Christos L. HISTORY AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. Social science, v. 43, June 1968: 146-152.
H1.S55, v. 43

This article attempts to accomplish three limited objectives: first, to define the problem of Cyprus briefly but comprehensively; second, to show that its virtual insolubility is due to the presence of two ethnoreligious communities the masses of which are imbued with two respective nationalist ideologies with mutually exclusive goals--as are the masses in Turkey and Greece; third, to demonstrate that the causes of these ideologies--hence, the roots of the whole problem--are to be found in such historical developments as the Hellenization of Cyprus, the subsequent Byzantinization of Greek Cypriot culture, the transformation of Cyprus into a bicommunal society, and the introduction and consequences of Westernization. (Abstract supplied)

872
Draper, Theodore. ISRAEL AND WORLD POLITICS; ROOTS OF THE THIRD ARAB-ISRAELI WAR. New York, Viking Press [1968] 278 p.
DS127.D7
"Reference notes": p. 266-270.

Examines the forces that led to the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967. Asserting that "to both Arabs and Israelis, their third war was a continuation of the first and second," Draper first reviews the conditions underlying the 1947 and 1956 hostilities. Many of these same problems existed in the post-1956 period when the already tense situation was further compounded by the ascendency of Soviet power in the Arab world and the decline of Western influence. By exploiting the anti-Western sentiments of several of the more radical Arab States, the Russians "hoped to achieve the outflanking of the NATO alliance, the denial of Arab oil to the West, and the total dependence of the Arab world on Soviet-controlled aid and arms." To these ends they "were willing to sacrifice Israel to Arab ambitions." Thus, in many ways the third Arab-Israeli conflict was a sort of war by proxy to gain Soviet hegemony in the Middle East; however, the outcome illustrated that the "proxy nations" are not easily controlled and that, while "war by proxy may be the safest species of small, local conflicts, . . . it is hardly safe." Significant documents pertaining to the turmoil in the Middle East are appended, including statements by President Dwight Eisenhower, President Lyndon B. Johnson, U.N. Secretary Generals Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol.

873
Giniewski, Paul. ISRAEL FACING WAR AND PEACE. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 13, Aug./Sept. 1968: 98-91.
UA646.F5, v. 13

Until the Arabs abandon their aggressive stance toward Israel and agree to respect the latter's frontiers, the situation in the Middle East will remain highly unstable. By engaging in massive rearmament programs, the Arab States have intensified the Arab-Israeli arms race and forced Israel to retain control of the territories occupied in the June 1967 war as a buffer against attack. Israel is preparing to effectively counter a potential Arab attack and is taking positive steps to promote peace in the troubled area. Last June it began construction of an oil pipeline from Elath to the Mediterranean, which will reduce the cost of transporting petroleum to the West and will offer an alternative to the politically dangerous Suez Canal route. Moreover, Israeli authorities have established extremely permissive policies regarding the Arabs in the occupied territories and permit Arab citizens to freely visit Israel. Many Israelis criticize these policies as a sign of weakness. However, they are forgetting that "the strong are gentle"; Israel is fully prepared to defeat the Arabs in another war but at the time it hopes to avoid such a disaster.

874
Guillermaz, Jacques, and Maurice Ciantar. TRYING TO COMPREHEND THE INCOMPREHENSIBLE: TWO EXPERTS EXPLAIN CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION. New York times magazine, Nov. 17, 1968: 48-51, 162, 164, 166-170, 172, 174, 176-180. illus.
AP2.N6575, 1968
Interview conducted by l'Express, Paris.
Newsp

An eyewitness report on Communist China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In an interview,

French sinologist Jacques Guillermaz and journalist Maurice Ciantar assert that the cultural revolution has reduced China to anarchy and introduced a "folded arms and seated buttocks" socialism. They note the isolation of the Chinese regime and people from the outside world and the distorted perceptions to which this gives rise, and they end with a warning of the grave dangers involved in China's underestimation of the power of nuclear weapons and lack of communication with the rest of the international community.

875
Hannoteaux, Guy. THE SAVAGE PEACE. Far Eastern economic review, v. 62, Nov. 21, 1968: 405-407. illus.
HC411. F18, v. 62

Looks at the "militant minorities" who are fighting the war in Laos--the government-supported Meo tribesmen and the Communist Pathet Lao--and notes that since the bombing halt in Vietnam American raids over Laos have drastically increased. From personal experience, Hannoteaux states that appearances are deceptive in Laos--on the surface an atmosphere of peace prevails, "but the savage reality of [Laos] secret war is never far below the surface."

876
Haykal, Muhammed. PASSION OF THE ARABS . . . POWER OF THE SOVIETS. Atlas, v. 16, Nov. 1968: 27-28. AP1. A83, v. 16
Translated from Al Ahram, Cairo.
Newsp

The Middle East crisis will be solved only on the battlefield. A solution through U.N. efforts is impossible because of U.S. political collusion with Israel. The United States will not change this course for various reasons: American objectives have been fulfilled by the blow dealth to Arab nationalism and its Socialist course by the 1967 war, the U.S. Government hesitates to pressure Israel in an election year, and Israel, which has become a small U.S. partner through military victory, will not take orders. Moreover, the situation in Israel is such that U.N. pressure will not dampen Israeli arrogance: The military establishment pervades all aspects of life, and a depressed mood "swinging between suicidal desperation and the lust to kill" pervades the country. The choice is clear--either the Middle East will return to imperialist influence, or it will remain an area of resistance against it. The United States and the Soviet Union cannot disregard events in the Middle East: If they cannot participate in finding peace, they must face the inevitable battle. While the Arabs would never advocate mass Jewish extermination, they must crush the enemy.

877
Kaiser, Horst. [POWER POLITICS AND NONVIOLENCE IN THE PLAY OF FORCES ABOUT THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC] Machtpolitik und Gewaltlosigkeit im Kräftespiel um die CSSR. Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, v. 16, Sept./Dec. 1968: 199-202.
D410. Z4, v. 16

The Czechoslovak crisis has brought out, on one hand, Machiavellian power politics and, on the other, an episode of a "Third Revolution, an international movement transcending socialism" and aimed at a free and noncoercive society. Czechoslovak leaders have put great effort into a substantive renewal of socialism to make it truly appealing and tenacious. This is the last thing Bonn would want to happen. It saw in Czechoslovak political progressivism a much desired nuisance to the "Eastern bloc," which it hoped would provoke Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia and give it a strong pretext for increasing its armaments. It is obvious that the Czechoslovak people and Army have been written off from the Warsaw Pact military strength and that the placement of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia has made a dent in the Soviet defense system elsewhere. West Germans deceive themselves by believing in an enormous passive resistance by the Czechoslovaks against the invaders. Remarkably, the invasion was almost without bloodshed, as is Czechoslovakia's occupation by the Soviet forces. This circumstance alone gives impetus to the nonviolent Third Revolution. As to Czechoslovakia's power politics itself, its leaders fell short of the political astuteness necessary to secure an elementary chance of success for their policy: They failed to prevent the policy from bringing an overpowering destructive reaction on itself.

878
Mueller, Gordon H. GERMANY'S EMERGING NATIONALISM: TRENDS SINCE THE BERLIN WALL. South Atlantic quarterly, v. 67, autumn 1968: 659-671.
AP2. S7, v. 67

The period beginning with the Berlin crisis in 1961 and ending with the formation of the Grand Coalition in 1966 ushered in a new nationalist era in German politics. The chief political feature of the period was the fall from power of internationally minded Atlanticists and the concomitant increase in influence of more nationalistic pro-Gaullists. The continuation of partition, widespread disillusionment with the Western Allies, and a more generalized feeling that internationalism has not "paid off" provoked the change. Germany's new mood is reflected clearly in its impatience with reminders of the Nazi past, the growth of neonazism, the expansion of the press empire of the right-wing nationalist, Axel Springer, and the sharp decline in public support for European integration. In this situation the decisive question is whether German parliamentary democracy has taken root. The answer is still in doubt, but the formation of the Grand Coalition--primarily for reasons relating to nationalist objectives in foreign policy--may be balefully significant. So far the coalition's policies have earned it much good will in Germany, but it could disintegrate before the next election. On the other hand, in an economic crisis, which is a real possibility in Germany today, the last differences between the parties of the coalition might disappear, with the consequence that Germany would once again become a one-party state. In that event the Bundestag would have little or no control over the government. The one hope is that in the coming months the Grand Coalition will show restraint by adopting a policy of understatement and the "politics of a middle power." If it does, the situation may be saved.

879
Murmann, Heinz. [STANDSTILL IN THE NEAR EAST; SMOLDERING CONFLICT AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS] Stillstand im Nahen Osten; schwelender Konflikt und ungelöste Probleme zwischen Israel und den Arabern. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Sept. 25, 1968: 659-668.
D839. E86, v. 23

Explains that prevention of a Near East war is hardly the common denominator of the present American and Soviet Near East policies because such a war

is not imminent. The Russians have restored the technical losses incurred by the Egyptian Army during the Arab-Israeli War, but the Army's morale could not have been restored in such a short time despite Soviet training. Soviet interests in the area would best be served now by keeping the Arab-Israeli conflict smoldering for a long time without open war. This would enhance Soviet chances for intervention without any loss of Arab trust in Moscow. Murmann considers further the U.N.'s Jarring mission in the Near East, the problem of Arab refugees, and plans for solving the Arab-Israeli feud, among which is a plan for a Palestinian state.

880
Nolte, Richard H. [interview] AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE: THE MIDDLE EAST. Arab world, v. 14, July/Aug. 1968: 10-11.
DS36.A74, v. 14

Comments on the U.S. role in the Arab-Israeli War, the present U.S. role in the Middle East, and U.S. interests in the area. Nolte emphasizes the need to deescalate the American-Russian confrontation in the Middle East and maintains that peace is impossible until the Arabs regain their self-respect--in his estimation, this can be accomplished only by force because Israel has eliminated other possibilities.

881
PAKISTAN'S BROKEN PLEDGES. National defence, v. 5, Sept. 1968: 2-4.
U1.N15, v. 6

Mentions specific instances in which Pakistan has failed to honor its commitments with India. The objective of Pakistan's intrigue has been to extend its frontiers and to maintain a constant state of friction so that the attention of its people is diverted from developmental activities.

882
Plischke, Elmer. RESOLVING THE "BERLIN QUESTION"--AN OPTIONS ANALYSIS. World affairs, v. 131, July/Sept. 1968: 91-100.
JX1901.W7, v. 131

The "Berlin question" must be approached from two viewpoints: Berlin's position in the East-West struggle in Europe--the international dimension--and the geographic and political paradox of Berlin's division--the internal dimension and part of the larger problem of Germany's division. The latter issue is complicated by each German state's efforts "to incorporate Berlin into [its] polities--short of complete legal absorption"; West Germany regards Berlin as part of its constituency, albeit separated, and East Berlin's northern district of Pankow serves as the East German capital. On the question of Berlin's unification there are several options. The first would be for East Germany to relinquish control of East Berlin and permit West Berlin to extend its jurisdiction over the whole city. This, of course, is thoroughly unacceptable to the Communists, and the reverse is equally unacceptable to the West. The remaining option would be for both governments to withdraw and allow a new self-determining government to be established, which would create, in fact, a third Germany unless there were a concurrent reunification of Germany itself. With regard to the Berlin question in the context of the total German problem there are again several options: abandonment of Berlin by either East or West Germany, a third German state, internationalization of West Berlin, reunification of Germany, or continuance of the status quo. The interests of East and West discount the first three, and although "by any objective standard, reunification of all of Germany is the most appropriate and reasonable of these fundamental options," it is highly unlikely at the present. Therefore it appears that the status quo will continue.

883
Polsky, Anthony. MAO TAKES TO THE HILLS. Far Eastern economic review, v. 62, Oct. 31, 1968: 240, 289-291.
HC411.F18, v. 62

Increasing Chinese aid to the Naga and Mizo rebellions against India and Burma, such as the training of insurgents in Yunnan Province, has led to the contention that "a Vietnam-type situation is developing in northeast India and along Burma's frontiers with China." Now, however, both sides possess enough options to prevent the devastation that would result from a Chinese-supported guerrilla war. The Naga and Mizo movements are sharply divided between pro-Chinese and anti-Chinese factions; the anti-Chinese factions hope to settle the dispute peacefully with the aid of their respective governments. Therefore, both the New Delhi and Rangoon governments must not overreact militarily if the Chinese faction establishes a government-in-exile in China and obtains Chinese advisers and military equipment--to do so would be to create new insurgents. Inherently the Nagas and the Mizos have no love for China; therefore, the Indian and Burmese Governments should capitalize on this sentiment and attempt to satisfy their grievances. The Chinese might possibly alter the current situation: They hesitate to establish a Naga government-in-exile, as requested, for fear that New Delhi might establish a Tibetan government-in-exile, and they hesitate to send military advisers and equipment into the frontier areas, preferring instead to train the hill youths within China. Burma, which lacks the progressive government of New Delhi, will have more difficulty solving the problem that India. However, there will be no "Vietnam-type situation" in northeastern India if vigorous policy changes toward the hill peoples are implemented.

884
Rubinstein, Amnon. FROM TAUFIG TO KANTARA--A RIDE ALONG THE SUEZ CANAL. New York times magazine, Dec. 1, 1968: 56-57, 60, 62, 64, 67, 69, 72, 74, 77. illus.
AP2.N6575, 1968

Observations made along the Suez Canal, which provoke thoughts on the Arab-Israeli confrontation, present and future. Rubinstein sees little chance for a solution to the quarrel between Egypt and Israel since "Arab hate for Israel, a hatred which perverts common sense and unhinges reason, turns the conflict into an incurable malady" that festers from one deadlock to another.

885
Singh, L. P. [CONFLICT ABOUT SABAH; CONSEQUENCES OF COLONIALIZATION AND DECOLONIALIZATION] Der Konflikt um Sabah; Folgen der Kolonisierung und Entkolonisierung. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Dec. 10, 1968: 875-880.
D839.E86, v. 23

Gives the historical, legal, and political background of the Malaysian-Philippine dispute over former British North Borneo.

886
SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. UN monthly chronicle, v. 5, Dec. 1968: 3-16.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 5

Reports the U.N. Security Council's consideration of recent aspects of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Meeting on November 1 and 4, at the request of the United Arab Republic and Israel, the Council heard testimony from representatives of the United Arab Republic, Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, France, Brazil, Hungary, Canada, and Ethiopia. The Arab and Israeli representatives accused each other's governments of aggravating the tense situation in the Middle East through aggressive acts. The U.S. delegate expressed his Government's concern over the Arab policy of "preventive or protective defence" and the Israeli policy of "reprisal" or "retaliation" and urged the Council to insist upon scrupulous adherence to the cease-fire. Other representatives emphasized the critical nature of the problem and the need for the Council to seek a positive route to peace in the Middle East.

887
Viswanatham, K. RUSSIAN PERFIDY IN WEST ASIA. Modern review, v. 123, Aug. 1968: 550-553.
AP8.M6, v. 123

Russia's pretended friendship for the Arab States is only a facade for promoting its own national interests in the Middle East. With few exceptions the Arab countries are ardently opposed to the Communist doctrine, and many of them have ties with the West, so there is no real basis for Soviet-Arab cooperation. As demonstrated by the Israeli victory in June 1967, the "Russian aid which was offered with so much affected love" has not strengthened the Arab position but just made them more dependent upon the Soviet Union. In fact Russia's professed support for the Arabs "is the greatest fraud history has ever recorded," since the former's real sympathies lie with Israel. Six Israeli cabinet members come from Russia, and many Russian Jews live in Israel. Moreover, unless the Israelis were assured of Russian friendship they would not have exhibited such confidence during the 1967 crisis. Russia's only interest in the Arabs is mercenary; by supplying them with military aid it hopes to "earn in return American Dollars of which Arabs have [plenty]." The Arabs should wake up to this perfidy and realize that Russia, along with the other major powers, will not permit Israel to be annihilated. Unfortunately President Nasser has not yet learned his lesson, and before long he will probably lead his nation into another disaster that could "end up in making his country a mere satellite of Soviet Russia."

888
Warner, Denis. THE NEW WAR IN KOREA. Look, v. 32, Oct. 15, 1968: 90, 94, 98-99.
AP2.L79, v. 32

South Korea, which is constantly plagued by Communist infiltration, bloody border battles, and commando raids, has become the most critical front in Asia after Vietnam. North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung is preparing for war, and captured documents reveal his intention to unify the country before 1971. Militarily North Korea has become formidable; it now possesses eight active infantry divisions, 10 reserve infantry divisions backed by 500 Soviet-built medium and heavy tanks and a Red Guard militia of 1.2 million, 60 MiG-21 jet interceptors operating from 24 airfields and backed by a strike force of 80 Il-28 light jet bombers and by 400 MiG-17 and MiG-15 jet fighter-bombers, four submarines, 66 surface-to-air missile sites, and three surface-to-ship missile sites. Moreover, North Korea has approximately 15,000 agents training for operations in the south; their tasks include contacting friends and relatives, transmitting intelligence, establishing political cells, creating guerrilla bases, and engaging in commando actions. In response to this northern threat, the South Koreans have obtained an increase in American air strength and a U.S. promise of an additional $100 million in military aid, and have built five main lines of defense to protect Seoul. Although both the Russians and the Americans are interested in halting their respective ally's military adventurism, war may come by an act of provocation on either side. However, the prospects of solving the problem without war are higher than they were in Vietnam.

889
Wroth, James M. KOREA: OUR NEXT VIETNAM? In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Nov. 1968: 34-40. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 48

Because of the increasing number of incidents along the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea, the U.N. Command is stepping up its vigil along the border and is constructing anti-infiltration barriers to help capture North Korean line-crossers. The incidents are occuring because the North Koreans want to foment insurgency in the South, reduce South Korea's participation in the Vietnam War by creating trouble at home, and divert the attention of the North Korean people from their present economic difficulties. The North Koreans believe the only way to unify Korea is by guerrilla warfare, but because of the popular support for the South Korean Government, which is the crucial difference between the Vietnamese and Korean situations, infiltrators are finding it difficult to establish guerrilla base areas in the Korean countryside. Nevertheless, North Korea will continue a policy of increased violence against the South. The United States, on the other hand, will have to guarantee South Korea's security because South Korea is emerging as a leader among the developing countries of Asia, and any "disruption of South Korea's current political and economic progress would be a major victory for the Communists."

2. Disengagement, Neutralization, etc.

890
Black, Cyril E., and others. A PLAN TO NEUTRALIZE VIETNAM. War/peace report, v. 8, Nov. 1968: 8-9.
JX1901.W38, v. 8

Proposal developed by Professors Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, Klaus Knorr, and Oran R. Young of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.

Neutralization could perhaps offer the most satisfactory compromise solution to the conflict in Vietnam. In accepting neutralization South Vietnam would have to agree to refrain from political or military agreements with other countries as well as accept the presence of an international force to prevent violations of its neutral status. North Vietnam would have to give up its goal of unifying the two Vietnams, and the United States would have to withdraw its armed forces and accept a compromise political regime. Yet these

difficulties are no more serious than those raised by alternative settlements under consideration, and neutralization at least satisfies the security interests of the countries involved in the Vietnam War.

891
Ishibashi, Masashi [interview] INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES ON EQUAL TERMS. Japan Socialist review, no. 167, Nov. 15, 1968: 14-21.
HX9.J3, 1968

Interview with the chief of the International Affairs Bureau of Japan's Socialist Party.

Projects future Japanese Socialist Party activities in the field of foreign affairs. Ishibashi emphasizes his party's intentions to continue its struggle against the renewal of the Security Treaty with the United States. He mentioned that the Czech crisis and the Japanese Government's staunch anti-Chinese attitudes would somewhat hamper the party's relationships with the Soviet Union and Communist China. However, he stressed that Japan's security depended upon the eventual establishment of friendly relations with Russia, China, and North Korea and suggested the formation of "a large neutral belt in Asia," which would include a united Korea, China, a united Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, and Thailand.

892
Salans, Carl F. GULF OF AQABA AND STRAIT OF TIRAN; TROUBLED WATERS. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 94, Dec. 1968: 54-62. illus.
Vl.U8, v. 94

The U.S. repudiation of Egyptian closure in May 1967 of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba "to Israeli flag vessels and to vessels of other countries carrying strategic cargoes, including oil, to Israel" sprang from legal considerations of the question of freedom of passage through international straits and waters--a question of profound influence on the Middle East peace (the closure consequently gave rise to the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967) and on broader U.S. strategic and commercial interests as well. The repudiation reiterated the longstanding U.S. position that the gulf includes international waters, that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage through the gulf and the strait, and that any such prevention of Israeli shipping by Egypt would "violate the [Egyptian-Israeli] Armistice Agreement." The strait, which has only two navigable channels, each within Egyptian waters, provides the necessary passageway for access to Elath and Aqaba, Israel's and Jordan's only ports on the gulf. The United States, which recognizes only a 3-mile territorial sea, contends that a stretch of water in the gulf has the character of high seas, since it varies in width from 7 to 15 miles. However, more basic is the fact that four states, including Israel, border on the gulf, which makes the gulf and the strait international despite the latter's location within Egypt's territorial waters. "No one of these nations, or even a majority of them, can decide that the Gulf belongs to it, or to them, alone." The Arab States' claim that the gulf is a closed Arab sea is therefore invalid in the U.S. view. This claim cannot be historically substantiated either. The U.S. position on passage through these waterways is based on principles recognized by the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Under the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 neither the Arab States nor Israel could exercise belligerent rights against each other, for the armistice regime they brought about was of permanent character, as the U.N. Security Council pointed out in its September 1, 1951, resolution "calling upon Egypt to terminate restrictions on passage of Israeli shipping throught the Suez Canal."

D. OUTER SPACE

893
Büdeler, Werner. [INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SPACE FLIGHTS? U.N. CONFERENCE OF VIENNA] Internationalisierung der Raumfahrt? Die UN-Konferenz von Wien. Weltraumfahrt; Raketentechnik, v. 19, Sept./Oct. 1968: 142-145. illus.
TL789.W45, v. 19

Reports on the United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which was held August 14-27, 1968, in Vienna. The conference gave "a representative sampling of proposals about future exploitation of outer space."

894
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. OUTER SPACE. In its Issues before the 23rd General Assembly. New York, 1968. (International conciliation, no. 569) p. 46-52. JX1907.A8, no. 569

Examines briefly the outer space treaty, the astronaut agreement, the draft agreement on liability for damage caused by the launching of objects into outer space, and the U.N. conference on the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space and provides examples of international cooperation in outer space research. The outer space treaty is a landmark in international law that governs state activity in outer space, but the military space activities of the superpowers--the projected manned orbiting laboratory, the multiple independent reentry vehicle, the fractional orbit bombardment system, and the multiorbit bombardment system--may lessen its long-range impact.

895
Haggerty, James J. TO BE FIRST IN SPACE. Armed Forces journal, v. 106, Nov. 16, 1968: 45, 50.
Ul.A66, v. 106

Close observers of the Nixon scene believe the President-elect will attempt to revitalize the Nation's space program. Throughout his campaign he emphasized the importance of U.S. space efforts and decried the "snailpace effort" of the Eisenhower administration during the early stages of space exploration. However, he must overcome several barriers before he will be able to carry out his intentions. To step up the manned orbiting laboratory program and investigate the development of an earth-to-orbit ferry craft, space weaponry, and other promising military space projects, he must first change the negative attitude of Defense Department officials to these programs. Moreover, he must persuade a Democratic Congress that vast sums of money--from $8 to $10 billion--must be pumped into the military and civilian space programs if America is to maintain the lead in this area.

896
THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE. In United Nations Yearbook 1966. New York, United Nations Office of Public Information [1968] p. 32-49.
JA51. U5, 1966

Discusses consideration by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its Legal Sub-Committee of an international treaty to govern the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space. Soviet and American proposals that contain substantive provisions for a draft treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space are noted.

E. VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

1. Violation, Inspection, Verification

897
Borcherdt, R. D., and J. H. Healy. A METHOD FOR ESTIMATING THE UNCERTAINTY OF SEISMIC VELOCITIES MEASURED BY REFRACTION TECHNIQUES. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 58, Dec. 1968: 1769-1790. illus.
QE531. S3, v. 58

Time residuals from 75-km segments of 18 crustal seismic-refraction profiles in the Basin and Range province are used to investigate the validity of the linear-regression model and to make large sample estimates of the variance in the travel time distributions. A formula for unbiased estimates of velocity uncertainty is derived, assuming a linear trend with distance for the variances of the travel-time distributions. If the recording units are symmetric about the center of the recording interval, this formula is equivalent to the one derived assuming the variances are equal. At the 95-per cent confidence level the chi-squared test implied 84 per cent of the time-residual samples were inconsistent with the hypothesis that their parent populations had Gaussian distributions. If the number of recording locations exceeds 8, confidence limits computed without the Gaussian assumption suggest the departures from normality are not significant for velocity uncertainty estimates. The large sample estimates of the time-residual populations may be applicable to other areas. This evidence motivated the development of a method, requiring very little numerical calculation, for estimating uncertainties in velocities. The method requires, in addition to the large sample estimates of the travel time variances, information on the quality of the data, the location of the recording interval, and the number of recording units. The method is useful for the design of new experiments and independent estimates of uncertainty reported in the literature. (Abstract supplied)

898
Buchbinder, Goetz G. AMPLITUDE SPECTRA OF PcP AND P PHASES. In Sesimological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 58, Dec. 1968: 1797-1819. illus.
QE531. S3, v. 58

Amplitude spectra were obtained from short-period PcP and P phases from seven explosions and six earthquakes. Long-period PcP and P amplitude spectra were obtained from two earthquakes. PcP and P amplitude spectra for both explosions and earthquakes are similar for any one event; therefore, station and core-mantle boundary effects are small and the general shape of the spectra is related to the source. All of the explosions studied have characteristic spectra with a pronounced minimum in the spectrum near one second. The period of this minimum increases with magnitude of the event. Short-period amplitude spectra from some intermediate- and deep-focus earthquakes resemble those from explosions. Spectra from the other earthquakes studied differ markedly from those of explosions; they have either no minimum in the spectrum near one second or very little energy for periods less than one second. The characteristics of the spectra may be of help in the classification of sources. On a plot of magnitude M_b versus period of the minimum T_d in the spectrum of explosions, the data form a straight line. Earthquakes with an amplitude spectrum similar to that of an explosion are randomly distributed on the plot of M_b versus T_d. (Abstract supplied)

899
Freedman, Samuel. GEOPHYSICAL DETECTION UNDERGROUND AND UNDERWATER. Signal, v. 23, Dec. 1968: 45-47. illus.
UG1. M65, v. 23

Describes an instrument capable of determining the composition of the earth's surface by use of the principle that the strength and range of a radio signal transmission vary with the composition of the earth at the station site. The equipment is now used in mining and oceanography but is untested in numerous other fields.

900
Galbraith, Frank W. EFFECT OF A FAULT ON EXPLOSION-GENERATED GROUND SHOCK SPECTRA. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 58, Dec. 1968: 2033-2041. illus.
QE531. S3, v. 58

Shock spectrum measurements were made for an underground nuclear explosion at the Nevada Test Site of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission using 29 reed gages. The objective of the measurements was to determine the effect of a fault zone on shock spectra measured at the ground surface and generated by the explosion. The reed gages were located along two gage lines; one extended to the west and crossed the fault at right angles. The other gage line extended to the north and was generally parallel to the fault. The results showed that the fault zone had an effect on vertical spectra but not on horizontal radial spectra. The vertical gage directly on the fault showed significantly lower displacements for all frequencies above 3 cycles per second but showed no apparent effect on the 3 cps displacement. For gages beyond the fault the vertical spectra for frequencies higher than 3 cps were greater than for corresponding gages along the north gage line. It is believed that this was caused by the upthrust base rock on the side of the fault away from the explosion with a resultant decreased thickness of tuff and alluvium. This resulted in less attenuation of high frequency response than was expected. (Abstract supplied)

901
Giddings, Ralph L. SECRET WEAPONS. In U. S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 49, Jan. 1969: 80-89. illus.
Z6723. U35, v. 49

Although much scholarly effort has been expended in trying to answer the question whether international

inspection can ensure compliance with arms control agreements, little attention has been given to well-known and instructive historical cases of the secret development of modern weapons systems. Three such cases are the German V weapons program at Peenemünde, the American Manhattan project, and the Japanese construction of the superwarships Yamato, Musashi, and Shinano. Peenemünde, which began operations in 1937, was a vast complex of pilot plants, laboratories, test sites, and tracking stations with its own internal railroad net, airfield, and harbor. Yet as late as the beginning of 1943, the British were unaware of its significance, and by then it was too late to halt the program. The Manhattan Engineer District project included a research and development center at Los Alamos, N. Mex., and huge manufacturing complexes, at Hanford, Wash., and Oak Ridge, Tenn. Yet despite the vastness of the operation and the fact that the United States, unlike Germany and Japan, is a democracy, it proved possible to carry out the program in complete secrecy. The Japanese case differs from the German and American ones in several important respects. Most of the work on the latter projects took place under the cover of wartime censorship. Furthermore, both projects were concerned with revolutionary breakthroughs in weapons technology and for that reason were unsuspected by the enemy. Moreover, Japanese acceptance of the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty should have inclined the other naval powers to maintain scrutiny of Japanese naval construction. Despite these handicaps and others inherent in the very nature of the project, the Japanese were able to hide their construction work from the outside world. Two factors seem to have been crucial to the success of these ventures: a sympathetic population, which lent its support to the projects, and the very audacity of the undertakings, which made it difficult for the enemy to know what to look for. Given these conditions, it is clear that secret weapons could once again be produced. Modern detection methods can make technological surprise more difficult, but they cannot make it impossible.

902
Herrin, Eugene, and James Taggart. SOURCE BIAS IN EPICENTER DETERMINATIONS. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 58, Dec. 1968: 1791-1796. illus.
QE531.S3, v. 58

Epicenter determinations using data from stations at distances greater than 20^{0} from the source make use of standard travel times based on a spherically symmetrical Earth. Lateral inhomogeneities in the upper mantle result in relative delays with respect to the standard times. Delays associated with the end of the up-traveling ray can be handled through the use of station corrections. A constant delay beneath the source can not be easily corrected, but it will result only in errors in origin time. However, if the delay arising beneath the source changes with azimuth, a consistent error, here called source bias, will be present in the estimate of the epicenter. Studies of explosions within continental masses have revealed no significant source bias; however, events on two linear, volcanic island chains in the Pacific (Rat Islands-Aleutians and Hawaii) show significant source bias. Errors arising from this effect may be as large as 1/2 degree and are most likely to occur with events near tectonically active island chains. (Abstract supplied)

903
ONE BANG AFTER ANOTHER. Nature (London) v. 220, Dec. 7, 1968: 943-944.
Q1.N2, v. 220

Little can be expected from the United Nations committee on disarmament until it has become clearer who will or will not sign the nonproliferation treaty, but it is still a good time to look into the possibility of additional international controls over nuclear-weapons technology. One such measure might be a ban on underground nuclear tests. A report now published by the International Institute of Peace and Conflict Research in Sweden proves that an underground test ban can be policed easily, effectively, and without political complications. The report adds little that is new to the conclusions of the 1958 "Geneva Conference of Experts," which argued that it might be possible to use seismic instruments to detect and distinguish from earthquakes nuclear explosions of 10 to 20 kilotons, but it differs from the earlier study in the strength of the experimental evidence for its assertions. While no seismic detection system can be perfect--noise from natural phenomena poses an inescapable limitation on detection efficiency--the report demonstrates that by using existing worldwide seismic networks to measure differences between the propagation of surface and body waves from seismic events explosions of 20 kilotons can be reliably detected. Detection of 5-kiloton devices would be possible with an improved monitoring system. Still, smallish explosions might go undetected, and how much one state is ready to trust another is a political question. The truth is, however, that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would dare to violate a test ban, and nuclear-weapon and nonnuclear-weapon states alike have strong reasons for seeing such a ban put into effect.

904
Perret, William R. SHEAR WAVES FROM A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION IN A SALT CAVITY. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 58, Dec. 1968: 2043-2051. illus.
QE531.S3, v. 58

Shear waves have been resolved in records of acceleration and particle velocity resulting from the Sterling event which was a nuclear explosion (380 tons) within the stable cavity left by the Salmon detonation in the Tatum salt dome. These shear waves were strongest in records of vertical motion at stations in the shot-level plane, but were detectable in records from both vertical and horizontal radial gages above and below that elevation. No appreciable shear waves could be identified in records from shot-level gages oriented horizontally. All instruments involved in this study were situated within the salt dome at ranges between 166 and 660 meters from the explosive source. Shear waves carried over 95 per cent of the energy in vertical shot-level records, but they represented less than 11 per cent of the energy in horizontal radial shot-level records. Cause of the vertically polarized shear waves is considered to be vertical asymmetry at the source. (Abstract supplied)

905
REACTORS OF THE WORLD. In International Atomic Energy Agency. Bulletin, v. 10, no. 5, 1968: 36-37.
QC770.I4955, v. 10

This is an amendment to the list published in v. 10, no. 1, of the Bulletin. For earlier amendments to this list see v. 10, no. 2 and 3, of the Bulletin.

Lists nuclear power reactors operating or under construction in states belonging to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Name, location, type, net output, and criticality date are given for each reactor.

906
Wainhouse, David W., and others. ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS; DESIGNS FOR VERIFICATION AND ORGANIZATION, in association with Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Harry D. Hughes, Byron V. Leary, Theodore Rockwell III, Anne P. Simons, and Arnold Wolfers. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press [c1968] 179 p. JX1974.W23 1968

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Organizational arrangements for verifying arms control: The U.S. proposal to halt production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Gomulka proposals and the Rapacki plan. --pt. 2. Designs for an international arms control organization: Types of verification systems. Organizational principles underlying verification systems. National intelligence in the verification process. Verification and the handling of violations. Number of verification organizations.--Notes.--Index.

A series of articles that deal with verification and inspection problems within the context of arms control and disarmament negotiations. Essays concerning organizational arrangements for verifying arms control agreements--the Rapacki plan, U.S. proposals for a freeze on nuclear weapons, the Gomulka plan, etc.--point out what progress has been made toward securing viable international verification systems.

907
Wickens, A. J., and K. Pec. A CRUST-MANTLE PROFILE FROM MOULD BAY, CANADA, TO TUCSON, ARIZONA. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 58, Dec. 1968: 1821-1831. illus. QE531.S3, v. 58

Love-wave phase velocities were determined for five adjacent segments of a 5000 kilometer great circle path from Mould Bay, Canada, to Tucson, Arizona. Mean-phase velocity curves were obtained from curves based on reciprocal date, thus minimizing the detrimental effects of non-parallel layering. By careful selection and precise treatment of the data over relatively short distances (800 km), detail hitherto suppressed has been retained. Finally, by using reciprocal seismograms, the effect of sloping interfaces was observed. (Abstract supplied)

2. Enforcement

908
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY REPORT. UN monthly chronicle, v. 5, Dec. 1968: 41-43. JX1977.A1U564, v. 5

In presenting the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) before the General Assembly, the agency's Director General, Sigvard Eklund, noted the resurgence of "interest in atomic energy and its consequences because of the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty and the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States." Since its beginning, the agency has been concerned with the establishment of a safeguards sytem to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials intended for peaceful uses to wartime purposes, and during the past year it invested vast sums in safeguards research. Although the agency was handicapped by financial difficulties in implementing its technical assistance program for helping developing countries utilize nuclear power for industrial purposes, it has made progress in the development of a computer-based international nuclear information program. Confidence was expressed in the agency's capability to "cope with the tasks imposed upon it by Article III of the non-proliferation Treaty." Since most General Assembly delegates wanted more time to study the IAEA report, they voted to postpone consideration of the report by a vote of 81 to none, with eight abstentions.

909
Wallensteen, Peter. CHARACTERISTICS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. Journal of peace research, no. 3, 1968: 248-267. AS9.J6, 1968

Draws general conclusions from the experiences of economic sanctions during the last 35 years. Ten cases of sanctions have been examined. A number of theories usually employed to explain the outcome of conflicts have been tested on the data, and it has been possible to restrict the fruitful variables. As principal variable we have used outcome of the sanctions. It emerges that sanctions in general have been unsuccessful and often are not intended to be more than acts of protest and condemnation. Two main types of sanctions are distinguished, giving two types of outcomes. One type of sanction has been oriented toward a resolution of the conflict from the beginning. The statements have been instrumental and compromises have been tried. The other type of sanction has been aimed at the political structure of certain nations, demanding a more or less complete change. In these cases, the economic sanctions have been part of a polarization process, where other types of interaction also have been broken off. (Abstract supplied, modified)

F. CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

910
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DISARMAMENT. In United Nations Yearbook 1966. New York, United Nations Office of Public Information [1968] p. 293-294. JA51.U5, 1966

Summarizes Secretary General U Thant's report on the economic and social consequences of disarmament to the U.N. Economic and Social Council. The report stresses that the Secretary General will have to carry out his investigations biennially rather than annually because of the difficulty of most governments in providing information on the economic and social effects of disarmament. The Council agreed, and the General Assembly adopted a resolution to that effect.

G. OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

911
Blumenfeld, Erik. [STUDENT UNREST AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE] Die studentische Unruhe und die Zukunft Europas. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Sept. 25, 1968: 669-675. D839.E86, v. 23

Considers student political unrest in Western Germany a result of the interrupted continuity of the

nation's politics since 1945 and a symptom of transition from an industrial to a technological society. Europe's future depends on a reconciliation with its younger generation, which in turn depends on acceptance of the "American challenge"; namely, the utilization of "big science" for its technological progress. This Europe can achieve only by a policy of cooperation "à tous azimuts."

912
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. SEA-BED. In its Issues before the 23rd General Assembly. New York, 1968. (International conciliation, no. 569) p. 52-56. JX1907.A8, no. 569

Examines the disposal of the Malta proposal on the seabed in the United Nations and discusses the various issues raised by the economic and legal working groups in examining the proposal. The General Assembly is expected to establish a permanent committee "to continue studying the problem of preserving the sea-bed as the legacy of all mankind with the goal of concluding an agreement along the pattern established by the Outer Space Treaty."

913
Giniewski, Paul. [ISRAEL: AN OIL AND AIR POWER OF THE NEAR FUTURE] Israël: puissance pétrolière et aéronautique de demain? Revue militaire générale, no. 8, Oct. 1968: 361-363.
U2.R48, 1968

In a few years Israel will build its own interceptor aircraft and become a ranking producer of oil. Israel Aircraft Industries, which plans to produce the interceptor, is already handling the maintenance and repair of civil and military aircraft, assembling the French Fouga Magister, manufacturing an Israeli civilian plane, the Arava, and converting certain types of aircraft. Israel is also constructing a 150-mile-long pipeline from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, which will deprive Egypt of one of its principal means of blackmailing Western countries friendly toward Israel.

914
Kirillin, Vladimir A. [interview] DEPUTY PREMIER KIRILLIN ON CO-OPERATION WITH FRANCE. New times, no. 4, Jan. 29, 1969: 5-6.
D839.N483, 1969

Interview with "U.S.S.R. Deputy Premier V. A. Kirillin, who heads the State Committee on Science and Technology, [and] led the Soviet delegation at the third session of the Soviet-French Permanent Joint Commission for Cultural, Scientific and Technical Ties, held on January 3-8 in Paris." Kirillin cites specific examples of mutual transfer of information and developments in the fields of science, industry, agriculture, medicine, and engineering and cooperation in economic and trade concerns. In technology, for example, the French are providing a 6,000-liter hydrogen bubble chamber for the Soviet Serpukhov accelerator of elementary particles, and French and Soviet scientists are jointly exploring fast-neutron reactors, peaceful uses of outer space, and retrieval of resources from the oceans. Kirillin feels that the agreements are a strong basis for international peace.

915
Lillich, Richard B. WHOSE IS THE BED OF THE SEA? New York State bar journal, v. 40, Dec. 1968: 601-604.
LL

Ownership of the world's seabeds is an important issue under U.N. consideration. Technological advances are making accessible the sea's enormous resources, which belong to the world community rather than to those nations with the technological capability to exploit them, according to Dr. Arvid Pardo, Malta's U.N. Ambassador. Therefore, a legal regime should be established to govern "the exploitation of the ocean's riches to avoid a 'new form of colonial competition.'" Whether the administration of the regime should be entrusted to the United Nations or to an autonomous international organization is debatable, but the present trend points to the latter solution. In the development of such an administrative system, the doctrine of the Continental Shelf has only limited applicability because it "is based upon the theory that the coastal state has a vested interest in the exploitation of its own continental shelves [and] . . . when one shifts one's perspective to encompass the entire deep-sea bed . . . the exclusive claims of coastal states must give way to the inclusive claim of the world community to regulate and distribute the fruits of the oceans in trust for all mankind." Once finite limits for the various continental shelves are established, the international regime could establish a leasing system for exploitation of the ocean floor "with a percentage of the profits . . . earmarked for aid to underdeveloped nations and for funding the UN itself," and international judicial machinery could resolve any disputes that would arise. With such an approach a potential international problem "would be nipped in the bud," the United Nations would be strengthened both financially and through the cooperative efforts of its member nations, and international law would be fortified by the resolution of international disputes within a juridical framework.

916
Pardo, Arvid. SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE SEA; THE THREAT OF NATIONAL OCCUPATION. Round table, the Commonwealth quarterly, no. 232, Oct. 1968: 341-355. AP4.R6, 1968

Advances in technology are making possible the exploration and eventual utilization of the world's seabeds. For those nations with the technological capability, there are strong commercial and strategic reasons for appropriating and exploiting these subregions. The resources of the ocean's floors, especially mineral deposits, are incredibly vast, and a nation that exploited them could avoid prolonged negotiations with foreign governments concerning resource acquisition, minimize labor and transportation costs associated with the utilization of land resources, and ensure an adequate supply of petroleum, natural gas, and many minerals for industry during a national emergency. Strategically the sea is important. The ocean's environment is resistant to the overpressures of nuclear attack, and transferring offensive and defensive capability to the seas would be advantageous. Further, tracking devices installed on the ocean floors would impair the immunity of enemy atomic-powered submarines equipped with nuclear missiles. The advantages to be gained will lead to an inevitable scramble for suboceanic land with grave consequences for the world community. World tensions will increase from the injustice of reserving "the plurality of the world's resources for the exclusive benefit of less than a handful of nations." Unfortunately, national appropriation of the seabed beyond the geophysical continental shelf is encouraged by the present juridical framework, which encourages a plurality of national jurisdictions on the ocean floor and the appropriation of this area by those

with the technical competence to exploit it. The only effective alternative to national appropriation is the establishment of an international regime over the seabed outside of clearly defined national jurisdiction. Progress on the problem is being made at the United Nations; there are grounds for cautious optimism.

917
RESERVATION OF THE SEA-BED AND OCEAN FLOOR FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. UN monthly chronicle, v. 5, Dec. 1968: 53-61.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 5

Reviews the discussions within the U.N. Political and Security Committee regarding a report of the ad hoc committee to study the question of reserving the ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes. Various draft resolutions on the question were introduced ranging from a proposal to replace the ad hoc committee with a permament one to a request for all states to refrain from exercising sovereign rights over the seabed beyond the present limits of national jurisdiction. There was unanimous agreement among committee members that the deep seas should be reserved for peaceful purposes and the benefit of all mankind, but different views were expressed regarding the nature of the machinery needed to carry out this task.

918
Wiggins, James R. U.S. SUGGESTS POSSIBLE STEPS BY U.N. TO PROMOTE PEACEFUL USES OF THE DEEP OCEAN FLOOR. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 59, Nov. 25, 1968: 554-558. JX232.A33, v. 59
Statement made in the U.N. "Committee I (Political and Security) on October 29," 1968.

Outlines the U.S. position on problems relating to the exploration and exploitation of the seabeds and ocean floor. Wiggins explains the principles that the United States believes should govern the international community's approach to these problems and makes suggestions on the matter of international scientific and technological cooperation in this field. The United States takes the position that the deep seabed should be reserved for "peaceful purposes" but that this would not preclude military activities generally. What is needed is a detailed arms control agreement to specify prohibited acts; military activities not so specified would be governed by the principle of freedom of the seas and subject to the general restriction that they be exclusively for peaceful purposes. To that end, the United States proposes that the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee examine the problem of negotiating an agreement to prohibit the placing or fixing of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed or ocean floor.

919
Wilkes, Daniel. THE USE OF WORLD RESOURCES WITHOUT CONFLICT: MYTHS ABOUT THE TERRITORIAL SEA. Wayne law review, v. 14, spring 1968: 441-470. LL

Examines developments in claims about the territorial sea in international law, relates these claims to new facts about the development of the sea and adjacent areas, and experiments with a method that projects into the future to test the adequacy of proposed rules for territorial waters. Wilkes destroys myths surrounding the extension of the territorial sea, asserting that the larger the territorial extension, the greater the possibility of armed conflict between nations. He maintains that unrealistic widths will increase conflict over passage through straits, seizures, and overflights. He concludes that the concept of a wider territorial sea is not rationally related to many problems for which extension has been proposed; states need reciprocal, equitable access to the seas for all purposes; resource conservation and the regulation of their use is more rational on a collective than on a coastal basis; and this collective regulation in most cases will reduce the risk of conflict.

920
THE WORLD POPULATION CRISIS: WHAT IT IS AND WHERE TO GET INFORMATION ABOUT IT. Intercom, v. 10, July/Aug. 1968: 18-56.
Z7164.I8I48, v. 10

Contents.--Population forecast: the year 2018. "The world's people will triple in number and many will go hungry," by Philip M. Hauser.--Memo to teachers.--Charts for classroom use.--Where to get information about U.S. population policies and programs.--Where to get information about UN population policies and programs.--Where to get information about citizen programs and resources on population.--Films on the world population crisis.--Additional readings on the world population crisis.

Study guide and bibliography on the problems created by the exponential growth of the world's population. In his introductory essay, Hauser uses projected figures for the world's population in 2018 to illustrate the great magnitude of the problems and points to the probable political consequences of a failure to solve them: increased social unrest, an intensified cold war, sharper divisions between developed and underdeveloped nations, more frequent threats to world peace, and, in the United States, greater military expenditures, higher taxes, and a bigger Government. Since the greatest pressures will occur in the underdeveloped states, a major reallocation of world resources, combined with programs of economic development and population control in these regions, is urgently needed. Unfortunately, the prospects for any of this are dim. Perhaps the only encouraging note is the number of countries that have adopted family planning programs as national policy, but whether these can be made to work in the underdeveloped nations is not known.

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